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Abstract 
 
This study examines how leaders of transnational NGOs (TNGOs) across the United States 
understand transnational activism and the roles their organizations play in world affairs. Three 
roles are identified: alleviation, realization and environmentalism. Analysis suggests that 
scholarship in international relations focuses disproportionately on the least common and least 
resourceful types of TNGOs and routinely mischaracterizes a small number of highly visible 
organizations as exemplary. Leaders‘ perspectives on organizational mission, activities, 
autonomy, collaboration, effectiveness and obstacles reveal that the most numerous and 
resourceful TNGOs are technocratic agencies favoring a materialistic, ameliorative approach to 
transnational activism. Moreover, to the extent that TNGOs exercise ideational power to achieve 
sociopolitical change, this power more closely resembles technocratic managerialism than overt 
political contention. Insights are derived from a mixed-method analysis of over 200 hours of in-
depth interviews with top leaders from a diverse sample of 152 TNGOs registered in the United 
States. 
 
Keywords: transnational NGOs, transnational activism, elite interviews, mixed-method, finite 
mixture modeling, latent class analysis, discrete factor analysis, socially distributed 
conceptualizations, mission, activities, autonomy, collaboration, effectiveness, obstacles  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
What is the role of transnational NGOs (TNGOs) in world affairs? Scholars widely recognize the 
significance of TNGOs to global politics (Boli & Thomas, 1999b; Checkel, 1997; Martha 
Finnemore, 1996; Haas, 1992; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Klotz, 1995; Richard Price, 1998; Risse-
Kappen, 1995; Risse, 2006; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). However, scholars also identify an 
―NGO theory deficit‖ as disagreement persists over the precise role TNGOs play in the world 
system (DeMars, 2005, p. 39).  
 
This debate among scholars of transnational activism can be broadly regarded as a dialectic 
between ‗proponents‘ and ‗detractors,‘ as illustrated in table 1.1 (Cox, 1999; DeMars, 2005; 
Josselin & Wallace, 2001a). Proponents view TNGOs as agents of a grassroots global civil 
society harnessing the ideational power of universal principles to overtly influence political 
outcomes (Anheier, 2007; Boli & Thomas, 1999b; Florini, 2004; Glasius, 2002; Hafner-Burton, 
2008; Kaldor, 2003; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Lipschutz, 2005; P. Nelson & Dorsey, 2007; 
Richard Price, 1998; Risse, 2006; Risse et al., 1999; Struett, 2008; Tarrow, 2005; True & 
Mintrom, 2001). Detractors, on the other hand, view TNGOs as agents of state and corporate 
power that reproduce hierarchical power relations, perpetuate patterns of beneficiary dependency 
and divert public attention from political solutions to ameliorative treatments (Bebbington, 2005; 
Berkovitch & Gordon, 2008; Billon, 2006; Cooley & Ron, 2002; DeMars, 2005; Edwards & 
Hulme, 1996; Feldman, 1997; Gill, 1995; Halliday, 2001; Jaeger, 2007; Roberts, Jones III, & 
Frohling, 2005; Schuller, 2007).   
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Table 1.1: TNGO literature  
 Proponents (thesis) Detractors (antithesis) 
Collaborative 
style 
TNGOs work within civil 
society, achieving sociopolitical 
transformation  
TNGOs collaborate with states 
and corporations, sustaining the 
status quo  
Mission and 
activity 
TNGOs empower constituents 
through grassroots mobilization 
and information politics  
TNGOs create constituent 
dependency through direct 
service provision 
Function TNGOs politicize issues through 
advocacy, addressing underlying 
causes 
TNGOs depoliticize issues, 
diverting attention from causes 
to treatments 
Sectoral 
typicality 
Human rights, environmental, 
and advocacy organizations are 
typical TNGOs 
Development, relief, service 
delivery and contracting 
organizations are typical 
TNGOs 
Examples Anheier, 2007; Boli & Thomas, 
1999; Florini, 2004; Glasius, 
2002; Hafner-Burton, 2008; 
Kaldor, 2003; Keck & Sikkink, 
1998; Lipschutz, 2005; Nelson 
& Dorsey, 2007; Price, 1998; 
Risse, 2006; Risse, Ropp, & 
Sikkink, 1999; Struett, 2008; 
Tarrow, 2005; True & Mintrom, 
2001; Warkentin, 2001… 
Bebbington, 2005; Berkovitch 
and Gordon, 2008; Billon, 
2006; Cooley & Ron, 2002; 
DeMars, 2005; Edwards & 
Hulme, 1996; Feldman 1997; 
Gill, 1995; Halliday, 2001; 
Jaeger, 2007; Roberts, Jones III, 
& Frohling, 2005; Schuller, 
2007… 
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This study explores how leaders—mostly presidents and executive officers—of TNGOs across 
the United States understand transnational activism and the roles their organizations play in 
world affairs. I analyze leaders‘ insights about organizational mission, activity, collaboration, 
autonomy, effectiveness and obstacles.  
 
To minimize prejudice introduced by conventional theoretical demarcations, I study the 
perspectives of leaders from a diverse sample of organizations that vary by size, sector and 
function (advocacy-service delivery). Leaders‘ organizations are generally headquartered in the 
United States while their operations are primarily abroad, so this study offers a US perspective.  
 
Leaders‘ discussions about their organizational missions and activities reveal the specific 
strategies they employ to achieve their goals. The distribution of these strategies across 
organizations suggests that the most common mode of transnational influence is the least 
theorized within international relations scholarship. Leaders also discuss their collaborations 
with other NGOs, states, corporations and intergovernmental organizations, revealing divergent 
propensities toward independence and interdependence with established state and corporate 
interests in the international system. Analysis also discovers the specific strategies TNGO 
leaders employ to maintain organizational autonomy under conditions of financial dependence.  
 
Leaders‘ understandings of organizational effectiveness provide additional insights into the 
highly routinized and managerial nature of professionalized transnational activism. Also key to 
understanding the role of TNGOs in world affairs is an appreciation of the financial and political 
obstacles TNGOs confront as they pursue their missions. Leaders adopt an elaborate discourse 
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that frames politically contentious activism as technocratic manageralism, and their pragmatic 
concerns about funding challenge conventional understandings about the role and function of 
TNGOs in world politics.   
 
Finally, a synthetic meta-analysis of leaders‘ organizations paints a complex portrait of the 
TNGO sector as informed by the perspectives of TNGO leaders in the United States. Analysis 
suggests that the most common and resourceful type of TNGO employs a materialistic, 
ameliorative approach to transnational activism and that a small number of highly visible 
TNGOs are incorrectly regarded as exemplary transnational actors.  
 
Chapter organization  
 
To understand the role of TNGOs in world affairs, I analyze data from the Transnational NGO 
Interview Project at Syracuse University. The data are derived from in-depth, face-to-face 
interviews with TNGO leaders from a diverse sample of organizations registered in the United 
States. Leaders provide particularly valuable insights because they are highly informed and 
specifically empowered to speak on behalf of their organizations. This leadership focus fills an 
important gap evident in the literature about organized transnational activism. Extant scholarship 
is permeated by observational studies relying on secondary sources (e.g. Boli & Thomas, 1999a) 
and in-depth case studies of either single organizations (e.g. Hopgood, 2006) or a small number 
of purposively selected organizations (e.g. Cooley & Ron, 2002) reflecting a tradeoff between 
scope and depth. By analyzing a large number of leadership perspectives, the Transnational 
NGO Interview Project is both in-depth and large-n. I describe the data in detail in chapter two.    
10 
 
 
The Transnational NGO Interview Project generated qualitative and quantitative datasets that 
reveal how TNGO leaders think about governance, goals, strategies, activities, transnationalism, 
effectiveness, accountability, communications, collaboration and leadership. The mixed-method 
research design allows statistical analysis to be grounded in qualitative evidence, facilitating 
interpretation and abductive reasoning (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009).  
 
To understand how TNGO leaders ‗conceptualize‘ transnational activism, I combine the theory-
based approach to concepts and finite mixture modeling (Magidson & Vermunt, 2003; Medin, 
1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985). This novel approach to studying ‗ideas‘ in the context of 
international relations theory is developed in chapter three.  
 
Chapter four explores how leaders understand their organizations‘ missions and activities. 
Analysis reveals four distinct ‗ideologies of activism‘ that structure how leaders perceive and 
shape the world. These ideologies are material amelioration, ideational amelioration, material 
empowerment and ideational empowerment. While the ideology of ideational empowerment is 
often thought to exemplify transnational activism, among TNGO leaders this is the least common 
orientation. The most common ideology is material amelioration.  
 
Chapter five investigates TNGO leaders‘ attitudes toward organizational collaborations and the 
specific strategies they employ to maintain organizational autonomy. Although most leaders 
exhibit a ‗protective‘ collaborative style, others are much more ‗interdependent‘ with states and 
corporations in a manner that could compromise organizational autonomy. These collaborative 
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styles are distributed unevenly across different sectors of transnational activism. Additionally, 
leaders employ a menue of specific strategies to maintain operational autonomy under conditions 
of financial dependence. 
 
Chapter six examines taxonomical approaches to the study of TNGOs and derives an empirical 
taxonomy of TNGOs based on data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project. There are 
three types of TNGO registered in the United States: humanitarian relief and development, 
human rights activism and environmental advocacy. Analysis suggests that scholarship in 
international relations focuses disproportionately on the least common and least resourceful 
types of TNGOs. Moreover, so-called ‗exemplary‘ or ‗quintessential‘ TNGOs such as Amnesty 
International and Greenpeace are highly unrepresentative of TNGOs generally and of the 
subcategories they are widely thought to typify.  
 
Chapter seven explores how TNGO leaders understand what it means to be organizationally 
effective. Most leaders believe that effectiveness involves demonstrating ‗outcome 
accountability,‘ while a minority describes effectiveness as ‗overhead minimization.‘ Both of 
these conceptualizations reveal a strong culture of managerialism among TNGOs that focuses on 
programmatic efficiency and upward accountability to donors with comparatively little emphasis 
on maintaining downward accountability to beneficiaries (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Raggo, 
Schmitz, & Vijfeijken, 2010; Roberts et al., 2005).   
 
Chapter eight examines the primary challenges facing TNGO leaders. Leaders are particularly 
concerned about funding and surprisingly uncomfortable with politics. While theorists of 
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transnational activism often regard politicization as a key tactic in the strategic repertoire of 
TNGOs (e.g., Keck & Sikkink, 1998), most TNGO leaders view politics as an obstacle and 
prefer to couch their work in relatively apolitical, technocratic terms.  
 
Finally, chapter nine summarizes and synthesizes the results of previous chapters to identify and 
interpret three distinct roles TNGOs play in world affairs: alleviation, realization and 
environmentalism. I conclude with suggestions for future research.   
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CHAPTER TWO: DATA 
 
Data for this study have been obtained from the Transnational NGO Interview Project, a large-
scale exploratory data collection effort undertaken by researchers affiliated with the 
Transnational NGO Initiative within the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at the Maxwell 
School of Syracuse University. The core dataset of the Transnational NGO Interview Project is 
available to the public through the Transnational NGO Initiative‘s website.2  
 
The principal investigators of this research project interviewed TNGO leaders to gain deeper 
insights than typically possible with observational research designs focusing on organizational 
attributes gleaned from secondary sources. Leaders are specifically empowered not only to 
direct, but also to speak on behalf of their organizations and are thus uniquely positioned and 
well-informed to offer detailed insights about the inner workings and strategic considerations 
motivating organizational behavior. 
 
The research process involved many stages that have implications for interpreting the results of 
the study. Research design issues of particular importance include how the unit of analysis was 
defined, how potential respondents for the study were selected, how the interview protocol was 
developed and implemented and how the resulting qualitative data were coded to facilitate 
analysis. Each of these issues is addressed in this chapter. 
 
The ultimate goal of the study was to collect baseline information about how leaders understand 
issues of governance, goals, strategies, activities, effectiveness, accountability, transnationalism, 
communications, collaboration and leadership. The study was not intended to test particular 
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theories or models, but to explore leaders‘ perspectives by allowing them to describe their views 
in their own words.  
 
The first challenge of the research design was to define the unit of analysis, the TNGO, among 
which to identify potential respondents. This presents a number of difficulties, however, most 
notably the problem of defining the term ‗TNGO‘ and identifying a suitable roster from which to 
select organizations.  
 
Definition of TNGO 
 
The problem of definition is greatly complicated by the presence of multiple overlapping 
research programs in international relations, within which NGOs tend to be defined differently 
for different purposes. These multitudinous programs examine global civil society (Lipschutz, 
1992), global social change organizations (Gale, 1998), global society (Shaw, 1994), 
international society (Halliday, 1992; Peterson, 1992; Shaw, 1992), social movements (Tarrow, 
1998), transnational activism (Tarrow, 2005), transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 
1998), transnational politics (Tarrow, 2001), transnational relations (Keohane & Nye, 1970; 
Risse-Kappen, 1995; Risse, 2006), transnational social movement organizations (Smith, 
Chatfield, & Pagnucco, 1997; Warkentin, 2001), world civic politics (Wapner, 1995) and world 
polity (Boli & Thomas, 1999a), to name a few. As O‘Brien et al. (2000, p. 12) noted: ―Each term 
refers to a slightly different subject of study with a wider or narrower scope and is selected in 
response to a specific research question.‖  
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The core term ‗NGO‘ emerged around 1945 when the United Nations (UN) found it necessary to 
make legal distinctions between different types of participants (Willetts, 2002). The UN 
recognized two main types of actors: governments and non-governmental organizations. Formal 
UN recognition was achieved through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which 
awarded consultative status to NGOs that met certain criteria. Over time, the term ‗NGO‘ came 
to denote organizations recognized by the UN and embodying six general principles. NGOs were 
organizations that (1) supported the mission of the UN, (2) were representative of publics, (3) 
had identifiable headquarters, (4) were nonprofit, (5) respected state-sovereignty and (6) were 
not established by governments (Willetts, 2001). Since the UN is an international body, the term 
also connoted, at least initially, international in scope.  
 
The legalistic characterization of NGOs that evolved from ECOSOC recognition may be 
contrasted with sociological definitions of NGO (Martens, 2002). More commonly today, NGOs 
are appreciated less for their legal status as for their social roles and functions. Thus, NGOs are 
typically regarded as components of ‗civil society‘ and ‗social movements‘ (Willetts, 2002). 
Within the context of civil society NGOs are said to exist in ―the sphere of ideas, values, 
institutions, organizations, networks, and individuals that are based on civility, located between 
the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, 
polities and economies‖ (Anheier, 2007, pp. 10-11).  
 
The location of NGOs in this abstract sociological conceptual space makes definition somewhat 
more difficult. Struggling to advance a positive, rather than negative definition of NGO, Martens 
(2002, p. 282) defines NGOs as  ―formal (professionalized) independent societal organizations 
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whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level.‖ Here, 
Martins emphasizes a number of important qualities. First, she defines NGOs as legally 
recognized organizations with professional staff. Second, she describes NGOs as independent 
societal organizations, referring to their operational independence from government and location 
within civil society. Third, she recognizes that NGOs exist to promote common or universal 
goals as a means of distinguishing NGOs from organizations that pursue particularistic ends such 
as economic rents. Finally, Martens‘ definition makes clear that NGOs may exist at the national 
or international levels to take note that in common usage the term NGO has evolved from its 
original context to refer not only to international organizations but domestic organizations as 
well.   
 
Willetts (2002) offers a similar definition of an NGO as an ―independent voluntary association of 
people acting together on a continuous basis, for some common purpose, other than achieving 
government office, making money or illegal activities.‖ This definition emphasizes similar 
qualities. First, NGOs are again independent of governments. Second, they constitute a 
―voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis,‖ which indicates that 
NGOs are ongoing concerns in the sense of formal, legally recognized organizations. Willetts 
also affirms that NGOs exist to serve a common purpose, again consistent with Martens‘ 
definition emphasizing common goals. Willetts goes slightly further than Martens, however, by 
offering three specific stipulations. First, NGOs do not seek to achieve government office, 
distinguishing them from lobbying organizations and political action committees. Second, NGOs 
do not seek to make money, distinguishing them from for-profit corporations. And finally, NGOs 
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do not engage in illegal activities, differentiating them from criminal organizations, guerilla 
groups or other violent actors.   
 
Other scholars wrestling with the definition problem tend to offer variations on these main 
themes. Vakil (1997, p. 2059), for instance, noting similarities between kindred terms such as 
NGO, nonprofit organization and private voluntary organization, defined NGOs as ―self-
governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared to improving the quality of life of 
disadvantaged people.‖ Here again, the qualities of independence from government (self-
governing, private), not primarily seeking to make money (not-for-profit) and pursuing common 
aims (improving the quality of life) all appertain.  
 
In sum, most scholars would agree that NGOs are (1) professional organizations that are (2) 
independent of governments, (3) noncommercial and (4) pursuant of public goals. Josselin and 
Wallace (2001a, p. 3), for example, define NGOs as ―largely or entirely autonomous from central 
government funding and control…,‖ while DeMars (2005, p. 41) states simply that they are 
private actors pursuing public purposes.‖ Halliday (2001) notes that NGOs may seek to advance 
particularistic or universalistic goals, but most would agree with Boli and Thomas (1999a) that 
NGOs by construction pursue more public or universalistic aims.  
 
To the four main criteria listed above, we must further specify that a transnational NGO is an 
NGO that operates across national boundaries. Thus, a TNGO is professional organization, 
noncommercial and independent of governments, that pursues public goals across national 
boundaries.  
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This definition has specific implications for the choice of a sampling frame. First, TNGOs are 
legally recognized organizations, which could be formally registered with ECOSOC, the Union 
of International Associations (UIA) or recognized by national bureaus or research centers such 
as, in the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS). However, NGOs listed on such rosters may receive the bulk of their funding 
from governments, violating the requirement of government independence. Additionally, many 
NGOs could receive substantial revenues through fees for services, violating the noncommercial 
criterion. Finally, these rosters often contain inactive organizations and organizations such as 
labor unions, hospitals and food banks not normally considered NGOs. A suitable sampling 
frame must filter out such organizations.  
 
Moreover, as a practical matter, conducting an interview study with TNGO leaders selected from 
an international roster from ECOSOC or the UIA is costly. A more practicable approach is to 
focus on TNGO leaders located in a single country, such as United States. While this strategy 
does represent a limitation, the population of TNGOs registered in the United States is 
nevertheless a particularly large and influential population of organizations worthy of study in its 
own right.  
 
Sampling
3
 
 
The Transnational NGO Interview Study is based on interviews with top leaders from 
transnational NGOs registered in the United States and so offers a Northern, US-centric 
perspective on transnational activism. According to the UIA, the United States itself is home to 
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13 percent of TNGO headquarters, more than any other country. Worldwide, more than half of 
TNGO headquarters are located in the United States and Europe ("Yearbook of International 
Associations: Statistics, visualizations and patterns," 2003/2004, pp. 61-84, 87). Although 
TNGOs located in the United States are not necessarily representative of TNGOs worldwide, 
they nevertheless constitute a large and resourceful population with far-reaching global impact.  
 
Within the United States, TNGOs are typically regarded as international nonprofits. The IRS 
requires 501(c)(3) tax-exempt nonprofits with more than $25,000 in annual revenues to file IRS 
Forms 990, which are available for public inspection. Based on these forms, the NCCS identified 
6,500 international nonprofits in the United States in 2007. According to their data, these 
organizations spent almost $30 billion combined (nominally) during their most recent fiscal 
years.
4
 The combined average expenditures for organizations sampled for the Transnational 
NGO Interview Project over the period 2001-2006 was about $20 billion (nominally).
5
 Roughly 
speaking, the final sample accounts for about two-thirds of all US TNGO expenditures.  
 
The principal investigators chose to sample TNGOs from a database of international nonprofits 
maintained by Charity Navigator, an online rating agency in the United States. Charity Navigator 
evaluates organizations with 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status from the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), at least four consecutive years of IRS Forms 990 available and public support greater than 
$500,000 during their most recent fiscal years. Organizations that report zero fundraising costs or 
that are overwhelmingly funded through government grants or fees for services are excluded, 
along with private foundations, hospitals, hospital foundations, private universities, colleges, 
community foundations and public broadcasting stations.  
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These criteria comport nicely with the definition of TNGO provided above. Organizations with 
501(c)(3) status are noncommercial and have a declared charitable purpose or public benefit, 
meaning that they exist to promote common goals. They are also severely restricted from 
lobbying and are expressly prohibited from supporting political candidates for government 
office. Charity Navigator‘s own selection criteria help to further delineate the desired population. 
Organizations that are primarily funded by governments are excluded, enforcing the 
independence criterion. Additionally, organizations that receive the bulk of their funding through 
fees for services are excluded, reinforcing the noncommercial criterion. Finally, organizations 
that are technically 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations but which scholars widely agree should not 
be considered NGOs—such as hospitals and universities—are specifically excluded.  
 
Charity Navigator‘s criteria also exclude new organizations and very small or inactive 
organizations with low levels of public support. The size criterion is significant since it 
introduces a small bias that has the effect of attenuating the extreme inequality observed within 
the US nonprofit sector.
6
  
 
Based on total revenue data from the 2007 NCCS database, fewer than 10 percent of 
organizations control over 90 percent of the revenues. On a scale of zero, indicating perfect 
equality, to one, meaning perfect inequality, the Gini coefficient for international nonprofits in 
the United States was 0.94 in 2007, indicating extreme inequality. This effect is mitigated in the 
sample, which is a subset of organizations from the NCCS dataset. Among sampled 
organizations, roughly 20 percent control about 90 percent of the revenues. Sampled 
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organizations‘ average revenues over this period ranged from about $100,000 to over $3 billion. 
The median TNGO had about $11 million in revenues. The smaller Gini coefficient of 0.87 
indicates slightly less inequality within the sample as compared to the larger Gini coefficient of 
0.94 in the population.
7
  
 
To identify leaders for the interview study, researchers initially sampled 182 organizations from 
the database of 334 international nonprofits rated by Charity Navigator in 2005.
8
 Stratified 
random sampling was employed to ensure representation by size, sector and financial 
characteristics.
9
 One-hundred twenty-three interviews were completed with leaders from the 
initial sample and 29 replacements were added for a total sample size of 152 cases. Table 2.1 
indicates that the sample statistics closely match those of the population. 
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Table 2.1: Sampling 
 
   Population  Sample  
 
   %  N  %  n  
Sector 
Environment  15% 49 14% 22 
Human Rights  14% 48 14% 21 
Humanitarian Relief  21% 69 21% 32 
Sustainable 
Development  42% 141 42% 64 
Conflict Resolution  8% 27 9% 13 
 
Total  100% 334 100% 152 
 
   
   
   
Size 
Small  40% 132 37% 56 
Medium  40% 135 42% 64 
Large  20% 67 21% 32 
 
Total  100% 334 100% 152 
 
   
   
   
Financial 
rating 
Low Efficiency/Low 
Capacity  12% 40 14% 22 
Low Efficiency/High 
Capacity  11% 38 9% 13 
High Efficiency/Low 
Capacity  27% 90 23% 35 
High Efficiency/High 
Capacity  50% 166 54% 82 
 
Total  100% 334 100% 152 
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The overall response rate was 68 percent.
10
 In the final sample, 81 percent of respondents were 
the CEOs, presidents or executive directors of their organizations, 12 percent were vice 
presidents, and only 7 percent were below the level of vice-president.  
 
Interview protocol  
 
The interview protocol was not designed to test specific models or theories. It was designed to 
collect baseline information about how leaders understand governance, goals, strategies, 
activities, transnationalism, effectiveness, accountability, collaboration, communications and 
leadership. Nearly all of the interview questions solicited open-ended responses where leaders 
were free to speak in the own words. Specific protocol questions were developed in consultation 
with practitioners and pilot tested during workshops in the United States and India throughout 
2005 and 2006.  
 
Interviews took place between 2006 and 2008 and were conducted at leaders‘ preferred 
locations, usually their offices. Leaders were guaranteed confidentiality to promote candor. The 
interviews averaged 82.5 minutes; the shortest was 32 minutes and the longest was 153 minutes. 
Interviewers ultimately collected about 209 hours of digital recording. All the interviews were 
recorded with the permission of the interviewees and subsequently transcribed.  
 
Interviewers were asked to complete debriefing forms at the end of each interview in which they 
assessed respondent candor and other issues that could conceivably affect data quality. Where 
available, data from these debriefing forms show that 86% of respondents were perceived as very 
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candid, 14% to have evinced occasional lack of candor, and none to have displayed prolonged 
lack of candor. Instances of occasional lack of candor involved hesitation at discussing issues 
that were currently confidential within organizations (such as succession planning), delayed 
recall, pacing, and telephone and staff interruptions. In no instance was occasional lack of candor 
judged to warrant discarding data.   
 
A team of five graduate students manually coded the complete interview transcripts using 
computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). An initial codebook was 
created by an interdisciplinary team of researchers and thoroughly revised based on inductive 
readings of initial transcripts for emergent themes. During initial coding exercises with out-of-
sample transcripts, the content and number of codes were adjusted to conform to the interview 
data. The codebook was finalized in the fall of 2007 after extensive deliberations among the 
principal investigators and members of the coding team. To facilitate manual coding, the 
codebook was hierarchically organized into nine major sections, 38 subsections, 91 code families 
and 413 individual codes.  
 
To measure the overall degree of intercoder agreement across all 413 codes, ten complete in-
sample interviews were each coded twice by separate coders. Scores were calculated measuring 
the percentage of agreement between the two coders of each interview transcript. The ten scores 
were then averaged. A value of zero indicates complete disagreement, while a value of one 
indicates complete agreement. The overall intercoder agreement score is 0.80, indicating 
satisfactory intercoder agreement.  
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Data structure 
 
The coding process generated a qualitative dataset located in the CAQDAS that exported a raw 
data table consisting of frequency counts for each code by transcript. The raw statistical output 
from the CAQDAS is a table 152 cases by 413 codes. Additional information from secondary 
sources such as Charity Navigator and organizations‘ websites and annual reports was 
subsequently merged with the table. After merging the data, eliminating qualitative codes with 
no meaningful quantitative interpretation and converting the remaining codes into response 
variables, the final dataset is 152 cases by 327 variables. To facilitate analysis and interpretation, 
and to eliminate a possible source of coder bias, response variables have been binarized. 
Additionally, null observations in empty response vectors have been declared missing.  
 
The quantification process brings with it a discursive change. Codes become response variables 
and code families become sets of response variables. Thus, just as a leader‘s qualitative response 
to a particular interview question can be represented by a string of qualitative codes, so too can 
his or her response be represented by a set of values on a set of response variables. The ability to 
represent leaders‘ responses quantitatively as response vectors, or more informally, response 
patterns, enables useful statistical procedures to be undertaken to structure and discipline 
qualitative inquiry. This is explained in detail in the next chapter. 
 
Information poverty is a principal problem in the interpretation of statistical results. The mixed-
method design of the Transnational NGO Interview Project greatly facilitates interpretation. 
26 
 
Every nonzero valid datum from the primary interview data is linked to an actual qualitative 
quotation organized in the CAQDAS for efficient in-context analysis.  
 
Summary 
 
I use data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project, a large-scale exploratory data 
collection effort undertaken by researchers affiliated with the Transnational NGO Initiative 
within the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. A 
TNGO is defined as a professional organization, noncommercial and independent of 
governments, that pursues public goals across national boundaries. Based on this definition, as 
well as resource limitations, a suitable sampling frame was identified in Charity Navigator, an 
online nonprofit rating agency in the United States. Leaders interviewed for the study were 
selected from a representative sample of 152 TNGOs from Charity Navigator‘s database of 334 
international nonprofits. The United States hosts more TNGOs than any other country and 
sampled organizations account for about two-thirds of all US TNGO expenditures. 
 
The interview protocol was developed in collaboration with TNGO practitioners to collect 
baseline information about how TNGO leaders understand governance, goals, strategies, 
activities, transnationalism, effectiveness, accountability, communications, collaboration and 
leadership. Interview transcripts were manually coded using CAQDAS and the codebook was 
deliberately tailored to conform to the interview data. The coding process generated 
complementary qualitative and quantitative datasets that enable efficient mixed-method inquiry.   
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 
 
This study examines how TNGO leaders conceptualize constructs such as organizational 
mission, collaborations and effectiveness. In understanding leaders‘ perspectives, we gain 
valuable insights about how they view their organizations‘ roles in world affairs. However, this 
focus on leaders‘ conceptualizations requires some ontological and epistemological assumptions 
about the nature of concepts and conceptual structures.  
 
Conceptual structure 
 
Over several decades cognitive psychologists‘ thinking about concepts and conceptual structures 
has undergone a number of shifts (Medin, 1989). The so-called ‗classical view‘ holds that 
concepts are categories with membership determined by the satisfaction of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. However, sets of conditions often have exceptions, and a ‗modified 
classical view‘ allows necessary and sufficient conditions as well as exceptions (Duffy). 
Critiques of the strict classical view also gave rise to a ‗probabilistic view‘ in which category 
membership depends upon proportions of attributes. According to Medin (1989; Murphy & 
Medin, 1985), the classical and probabilistic views (as well as prototype and exemplary views) 
assume that concepts are organized around a notion of ‗similarity.‘ This notion simply posits that 
objects with similar attributes belong in the same category. According to the similarity-based 
view, attributes therefore define categories. However, this has been disconfirmed by a significant 
body of empirical research including many carefully designed experiments (Medin, 1989; 
Murphy & Medin, 1985). Medin and others thus differentiate between similarly-based views and 
a theory-based approach.  
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According to the theory-based approach, attribute correlations do not define categories but 
reflect them (Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985). Under this view, categories are associated 
not only with lists of attributes, but more importantly, with underlying explanatory principles 
that determine which attributes are salient. Categories are thus defined by a latent ―explanatory 
principle common to category members,‖ not merely attribute lists per se (Murphy & Medin, 
1985, p. 298).  
 
Attempts to uncover the latent explanatory principles underlying empirically observed attribute 
correlations adduced by human respondents necessarily involve significant interpretive or 
abductive inference (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009). The methodological challenges are 
substantial, but not insurmountable.  
 
The aggregation problem: shared beliefs as socially distributed conceptualizations  
 
The theory-based approach has been implemented to study social conceptualizations empirically 
within a methodological framework known as the cultural consensus model (Romney, Weller, & 
Batchelder, 1986). Atran, Medin and Ross (2005) formally modeled cultural consensus in social 
networks using instruments that asked respondents to draw relations between inductively derived 
lists of objects. This method has a philosophical affinity with Q-sorting, which Dryzek, Clark 
and McKenzie (1989) notably advanced as a response to Wendt‘s (1987) articulation of the 
agent-structure problem in international relations theory (Brown, 1980; Stephenson, 1953). Q-
sorting similarly models social attributes as an emergent property of individual attributes, a 
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useful approach for identifying social conceptualizations or shared beliefs. Whether modeling 
‗consensus‘ or ‗concourse‘ both of these techniques assume cultural homogeneity.  
 
Although the terms ‗shared idea‘ and ‗shared belief‘ are common in international relations, while 
the term ‗ideology‘ is common in American politics, I introduce the more precise term ‗socially 
distributed conceptualizations‘ to describe my view of shared ideas, beliefs or ideologies. I say 
that conceptualizations are socially distributed to emphasize my understanding of the 
aggregation problem when dealing with shared beliefs. I view social attributes—ideas, beliefs, 
ideologies, conceptualizations, etc.—as emergent properties of attributed individuals existing in 
social contexts.  
 
Individuals may influence society and society may influence individuals, a dynamic property 
commonly understood as the mutual constitution of agents and structure (Adler, 2002; M. 
Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; Guzzini, 2000; Hopf, 1998; Kubalkova, Onuf, & Kowert, 1998; 
Onuf, 1998; R. Price & Reus-Smit, 1998; Wendt, 1987, 1992, 1999; Zehfuss, 2002). However, 
although I recognize the reality of mutual influence, I do not regard individual agents and social 
structures as ontologically independent entities. Individuals are part of the societies they 
collectively constitute and societies are necessarily constituted by individuals. I agree that from 
the point of view of an individual agent his or her social structure may seem immutable, but also 
allow that a sea change in individual attitudes would likely bring about a corresponding change 
in the social structure. Individuals collectively construct their social structure just as any one 
individual may be socialized by it. I therefore view conceptualizations as socially distributed 
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across individuals. One cannot recognize social beliefs without acknowledging, at least 
implicitly, the underlying beliefs held by individuals.  
 
The framework of socially distributed conceptualizations combines the associative network 
model of memory (Collins & Quillian, 1969; Minsky, 1975; Taber, 2003), the theory-based 
approach to concepts (Medin, 1989), the distributional view of culture (R. Huckfeldt, Johnson, & 
Sprague, 2002) and compositional aggregation (Page & Shapiro, 1992). The distributional view 
of culture holds that conceptualizations shared among individuals constitute social 
conceptualizations. Compositional aggregation acknowledges population heterogeneity in 
processes of social aggregation. A helpful formulation of the compositional framework is 
Huckfeldt, Johnson and Sprague‘s (2002) social network approach, consistent with the 
approaches of many agent-based modelers across the social sciences (Atran et al., 2005; e.g. 
Axelrod, 1976; Bertie, Himmelweit, & Trigg, 2006; Bonham, Sergeev, & Parshin, 1997; Epstein, 
2007; Hoffmann, 2006; Shapiro, Bonham, & Heradstveit, 1988; Taber, n.d.; Tesfatsion, 2003). 
Compositional aggregation recognizes the possibility of multiple socially distributed 
conceptualizations within populations. Some recent empirical scholarship in this vein examines 
discord and contention within social networks of heterogeneous agents (Robert Huckfeldt, 2001, 
2007; Robert Huckfeldt, Ikeda, & Pappi, 2005; R. Huckfeldt et al., 2002; Robert Huckfeldt & 
Mendez, 2008; Robert Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004).  
 
As a matter of clarification, socially distributed conceptualizations differ fundamentally from the 
dominant convention in much public opinion research that models belief system structure in 
terms of ideological consistency. Following Converse‘s (1964) seminal article on the nature of 
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belief systems in mass publics relative to elites, ideological constraint has typically been defined 
and measured by the variance in people‘s scaled responses to issue questions (Barton & Parsons, 
1977). Response categories for issue questions typically range along a seven point scale from 
very conservative to very liberal. Respondents demonstrating evidence of ideological constraint 
answer as either consistent liberals or conservatives, yielding a small overall variance. However, 
this approach neglects the possibility that respondents may be constrained by ideologies other 
than those chosen by the researcher. For example, using cluster analysis, Fleishman (1986) 
discovered that the American electorate was empirically divided into six categories of political 
ideology: liberals, quasi-liberals, pro-labors, laissez-faire advocates, conservatives and economic 
moderates. A highly constrained laissez-faire advocate may incorrectly appear to be 
ideologically unconstrained according to the conventional liberal-conservative continuum.  
 
Present methodological approach 
 
The empirical approach I employ to understand how leaders of transnational NGOs 
conceptualize constructs involves an open-ended interviewing process. I infer leaders‘ 
conceptualizations on the empirical basis of their salient conceptual associations. Rather than be 
asked to choose among predetermined responses, leaders respond to questions however they 
deem appropriate in a face-to-face, open-ended interview setting. A question designed to infer 
how leaders conceptualize organizational effectiveness, for instance, asks: ―Let me ask you about 
the concept of effectiveness, which is something we all have trouble defining. How does your 
organization define effectiveness?‖ Leaders respond by, in effect, revealing their salient 
associations. Leaders‘ responses are observed but the underlying explanatory principles or 
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‗conceptualizations‘ that explain their conceptual associations are unobserved. Analysis thus 
requires abductively inferring the underlying conceptualizations that explain their observed 
response patterns. Figure 3.1 illustrates the theorized process. 
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Figure 3.1: Theorized process 
 
 
  
Response Pattern
Socially 
Distributed 
Conceptualization
Interview 
question
Prompt
Explanatory 
principle
Salient 
association
Salient 
association
Explanatory 
principle
Salient 
association
Salient 
association
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A tenet of compositional aggregation allows that different groups of individuals may hold 
different conceptualizations. The variety of latent conceptualizations can be inferred from the 
manifest heterogeneity observed among individuals‘ response patterns. An illustration is 
provided below. 
 
Figure 3.2 displays parameters that have been estimated with a technique called latent class 
analysis (LCA). The results, which are only partially reported for convenience of display, 
indicate that TNGO leaders tend to define organizational effectiveness in one of two ways (see 
chapter seven). The principle explaining the first response pattern has been labeled ‗outcome 
accountability‘ following a thorough in-context review of leaders‘ underlying statements. The 
other conceptualization has been labeled ‗overhead minimization‘ following the same procedure.  
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Figure 3.2: Illustrative example of the theorized process 
 
 
  
Response Pattern
Socially 
Distributed 
Conceptualization
Interview 
question
How does your 
organization define 
effectiveness? 
(n = 150)
Outcome accountability 
(0.82)
Goal achievement 
(0.67)
Evaluation 
(0.55)
Overhead minimization 
(0.15)
Resources 
(0.97)
Evaluation 
(0.67)
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The parameter estimates for ‗outcome accountability‘ and ‗overhead minimization‘ are latent 
class probabilities, which may be interpreted as the proportions of leaders subscribing to each 
conceptualization (a small group of outliers is excluded from the figure). The parameter 
estimates for the salient associations (in this illustration, only goal achievement, evaluation and 
resources) are conditional probabilities, which may be interpreted as the salience of particular 
associations given the latent conceptualization. Hence, roughly speaking, most leaders 
understand organizational effectiveness as outcome accountability, which involves goal 
achievement and evaluation, but not resources, while a much smaller number of leaders define 
effectiveness as overhead minimization, which involves resources and evaluation, but not goal 
achievement. Consistent with the theory-based approach to concepts, the salient associations (or 
alternatively, attributes) do not—strictly speaking—define the conceptualizations; rather the two 
different latent conceptualizations make the two corresponding observed response patterns more 
likely. The meanings of the underlying conceptualizations are inferred from both the statistical 
results and the underlying qualitative evidence. 
 
This empirical approach implements the theory-based approach to concepts to study socially 
distributed conceptualizations. A key contribution of the method developed in this study is the 
ability to interpret underlying principles based on observed response patterns.  Each leader‘s 
response pattern is linked to his or her underlying in-context qualitative statements and the use of 
finite mixture modeling (discussed below) provides certain parameters that help focus 
interpretation on exemplary qualitative evidence. Moreover, the statistical results are replicable 
and since qualitative interpretation is grounded in specific qualitative evidence through a 
structured procedure, qualitative interpretation is also replicable. Throughout the substantive 
37 
 
chapters that follow, wherever possible I present the quantitative and qualitative evidence from 
which I have derived my interpretations.  
 
Finite mixture modeling 
 
Finite mixture modeling is a category of statistical techniques developed to model latent 
heterogeneity in populations. To discover conceptual heterogeneity among TNGO leaders, I 
employ two finite mixture modeling techniques: latent class analysis and discrete factor analysis.  
 
Latent class analysis (LCA) was first formalized by American sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld in a 
study of soldiers‘ attitudes toward the US Army that was published in 1950, but as a concept is 
traceable as far back as 1884 to an article written by American pragmatist philosopher Charles 
Sanders Peirce concerning the measurement of predictive success (Goodman, n.d.; Lazarsfeld, 
1950; Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968; Peirce, 1884). Although the technique enjoys a long and 
impressive lineage, it was not until more recent developments in computer hardware and 
software that LCA became practicable for mainstream social science research. 
 
In common social science parlance, traditional LCA can be understood as discovering an 
unobserved or latent categorical variable that accounts for spurious association among observed 
or manifest response variables (Goodman, n.d.). A key assumption of LCA is that the manifest 
variables are statistically independent within the categories of the latent variable, a condition 
called local independence (Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968; Magidson & Vermunt, 2003; 
McCutcheon, 1987).  
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Discrete factor analysis (DFA) is another type of finite mixture modeling that evolved as an 
offshoot of latent class analysis. Magidson and Vermunt (2003; n.d.) have shown that a latent 
class model consisting of four clusters is analogous to a discrete factor model consisting of two 
dichotomous latent factors, with the added benefit that the discrete factor model requires fewer 
parameters and is therefore more parsimonious. Both LCA and DFA share the same basic 
procedures, statistics and interpretations.   
 
A model that provides adequate fit to the data can be said to explain the association among a set 
of response variables. Model fit is quantified by the L
2
 statistic, which follows a chi-squared 
distribution when multi-way tables are well populated. However, when tables are sparse the L
2
 
statistic p-value is unreliable. Since there are typically many more possible response patterns 
than respondents, tables are sparse and I use a parametric bootstrap procedure to obtain more 
reliable p-values (Magidson & Vermunt, 2003). The bootstrap procedure uses the probability 
distribution given by the maximum likelihood estimates for a model to generate replication 
bootstrap samples. The bootstrap p-value is the proportion of bootstrap samples with an L
2
 
greater than the original (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005). A well-fitting model will predict cell 
frequencies statistically similar to the observed cell frequencies; thus a larger p-value indicates 
better model fit. 
 
Unlike distance-based clustering techniques such as hierarchical cluster analysis and k-means 
cluster analysis, latent class analysis begins with a formal hypothesis test by assessing the fit of a 
null 1-class model. If the null model provides adequate fit then its log-likelihood ratio chi-
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squared statistic will be close to the degrees of freedom and the associated bootstrap p-value will 
exceed a conventional threshold such as 0.05. Under this condition it could be said that TNGO 
leaders‘ responses are homogenous or random. However, it is also useful to inspect the model‘s 
bivariate residuals (BVRs), which quantify the level of statistical association between each pair 
of response variables. Large BVRs (greater than 3.84 at the 95 percent confidence level) indicate 
significant unexplained association in the data. Since the L
2
 statistic quantifies overall model fit, 
the inclusion of response variables with insignificant effects alongside response variables with 
significant effects dilutes the L
2
 statistic.
11
 Thus a model‘s BVRs provide a more robust 
indication of model fit than the overall L
2
 statistic. 
 
When comparing models, it is helpful to test whether increasing the number of latent classes 
significantly improves (reduces) the L
2
 statistic. This is performed with a -2 log-likelihood 
difference test between the unrestricted model and a model in which one class is restricted to 
zero. If the difference is not significant, then the more parsimonious model may be retained. If 
the difference is significant, the unrestricted model is preferred. Again, p-values are estimated 
using a parametric bootstrap procedure (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005). This procedure uses the 
probability distribution given by the maximum likelihood estimates for the restricted model to 
generate replication bootstrap samples and log-likelihood values. The log-likelihood value of the 
unrestricted model is subtracted from those of the bootstrap samples and multiplied by -2 to 
obtain -2LL differences. The bootstrap p-value is the proportion of bootstrap samples with a -2 
log-likelihood difference higher than the that of the unrestricted model (Vermunt & Magidson, 
2005). At the 95 percent confidence level, a bootstrap p-value less than 0.05 indicates that the 
unrestricted model is preferred. The same procedure is used to test for other restrictions, notably 
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the contributions of individual response variables to overall model fit (by setting response 
variable effects individually to zero).  
 
One important assumption of LCA and DFA is that the response variables are locally 
independent or statistically independent within each category of the latent variable. The validity 
of this assumption can be evaluated by reviewing the BVRs for an estimated model. The nature 
of this assumption is illustrated in figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3: Local independence 
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In the diagram on the left, the response variables are locally independent. The latent variable 
explains the association among the response variables within the latent class. In the diagram on 
the right, the response variables are locally dependent. The latent variable leaves significant 
association between the response variables unexplained. Since the goal of exploratory LCA is 
explanation, acceptable models must explain all the associations among the response variables 
(BVRs < 3.84). This can be accomplished by increasing the number of latent classes, adding 
parameters for direct effects between response variables or deleting redundant variables 
(Magidson & Vermunt, 2003).  
 
To identify the best model, I increase the number of latent classes until (1) local independence is 
attained and (2) increasing the number of classes further does not result in statistically significant 
improvement in model fit. The change in L
2
 associated with an increase in the number of latent 
classes is denoted ∆L2. The ∆L2 p-value indicates whether increasing the number of latent 
classes by one significantly improves model fit. The total L
2
 reduction indicates the overall 
amount of association explained by each model.  
 
After a suitable model is chosen, each respondent is assigned to the latent class to which he or 
she most likely belongs based on his or her posterior membership probabilities (PMPs). This 
procedure is called modal assignment (Magidson & Vermunt, 2003; McCutcheon, 1987). Each 
leader‘s PMPs are determined by his or her response pattern and the model‘s parameter 
estimates. The classification errors introduced by modal assignment are displayed for models 
along with various model fit statistics. 
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Qualitative analysis 
 
To discipline qualitative inquiry and facilitate interpretation of statistical results, qualitative 
quotations illustrating particular conceptualizations are selected from leaders with high PMPs for 
their modal assignments. This selection procedure, which I call structured information retrieval, 
helps ensure that in-context qualitative analysis focuses on exemplary textual evidence. Mean 
PMPs are also reported for each latent class. A mean PMP close to one indicates low 
classification error within the latent class, while a mean PMP close to zero indicates high 
classification error within the latent class.  
 
Interview excerpts are selected for their exemplarity and clarity, and to illustrate specific 
conceptual distinctions and nuances. Out of consideration for the reader, they have been edited 
for punctuation, grammar, continuity and appropriate delimitation. In all cases alterations have 
been securely inferred in-context to preserve the obvious intents of the speakers. Brackets 
indicate where words or phrases have been added or omitted, usually to protect respondent 
confidentiality, but occasionally to spell out esoteric acronyms or general reasons of clarity. 
Ellipses indicate where stuttering or interruption occurred or where speakers trailed off, although 
in some circumstances ellipses have been introduced during transcription and left intact.  
 
Discussion  
 
The substantive analyses presented throughout the chapters that follow demonstrate that latent 
class analysis (LCA) and discrete factor analysis (DFA) can be used effectively to identify 
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socially distributed conceptualizations within a large corpus of coded interview data. To assess 
technical validity, all finite mixture model results have been cross-validated with results derived 
from traditional hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA). Independence tests in confusion matrices 
between assignment solutions from finite mixture modeling and HCA consistently show high 
concordance, suggesting both that assignment is consistent across the different techniques and 
that substantive discovery and abduction are robust to technique choice.
12
  
 
Model-based clustering has distinct advantages over traditional HCA. These advantages include 
greater stability and the ability to formally test for specific model restrictions. Also model-based 
clustering provides more helpful information to guide model choice, particularly regarding the 
number of latent classes. Model-based clustering also allows for the measurement of 
classification error and perhaps most importantly, the calculation of PMPs, which provide 
invaluable guidance for focusing qualitative analysis on exemplary evidence.  
 
Possibly the most difficult and likely the most contentious aspect of exploratory cluster analysis, 
regardless of the technique employed, concerns the ascription of labels to the latent segments. To 
explicitly ground analysis in underlying evidence and facilitate replication, profiles identified 
through finite mixture modeling are presented in tables and corresponding exemplary qualitative 
evidence is discussed throughout the text. This structured disclosure offers a level of interpretive 
transparency rare in exploratory qualitative research and often absent in quantitative studies 
employing analogous techniques such as confirmatory factor analysis.  
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A common critique of classificatory analysis of any kind involves the dependence of the results 
on the chosen input variables. As in any analysis, quantitative and qualitative conclusions 
derived through finite mixture modeling depend on the response variables included in the model. 
The larger point here, however, is whether different sets of response variables would generate 
substantively different results, which would suggest that conclusions are unduly sensitive to 
arbitrary variations in coding schemes. Analyses presented in chapters six and seven strongly 
suggest that, under specific conditions, this is not a problem.  
 
Chapter six identifies three types of TNGO on the empirical basis of six input variables. Fearing 
this result may have been induced by the inclusion of the categorical variable sector, I re-
estimated analogous models with sector included as an inactive covariate. The analogous 3-class 
model is nevertheless preferred and all parameter estimates are identical in relative direction, 
although of course not in exact magnitude. Both sets of results generate a nearly identical 
assignment solution and lead to the same substantive interpretation, strongly suggesting that 
substantive conclusions are insensitive to input variable choice.
13
  
 
Chapter seven examines how TNGO leaders understand the construct of organizational 
effectiveness. Here the coding scheme included a general code for evaluation, but failed to 
differentiate between financial evaluation and program evaluation, which proves to be a highly 
salient distinction. However, the generality of the code does not impose an interpretive problem. 
Due to the inclusion of an adequate number of relevant input variables, a meaningful latent 
structure nevertheless emerges. The variable evaluation simply fails to significantly discriminate 
among the latent segments. Quantitative analysts often eliminate variables with insignificant 
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effects, but in this case a detailed in-context qualitative analysis disciplined by PMPs easily 
recovers the underlying qualitative nuance obscured by the simplistic coding scheme. Although 
leaders from both of the main latent segments mentioned evaluation during their interviews, it 
nevertheless becomes clear that they were referring to different types of evaluation. The 
interpretive conclusion proves robust to deficiencies in the coding scheme.  
 
These analyses imply four conditions that contribute to robustness, by which I mean the 
insensitivity of substantive conclusions to arbitrary variations in coding schemes. First, the 
identification of input variables must be grounded in the evidence and therefore be relevant. 
Qualitative codes were extracted from the evidence being coded and not exclusively deduced 
from prior speculation. Second, a suitable range of input variables or codes must be chosen to 
capture the underlying heterogeneity of responses. To continue with the organizational 
effectiveness example, a set of codes all pertaining to ‗overhead minimization‘ would be unlikely 
to uncover the existence of the ‗outcome accountability‘ conceptualization. Codes were 
deliberately added to the Transnational NGO Interview Project codebook to ensure such 
heterogeneity would be captured. Here it is not necessary to already know the latent 
conceptualizations, only to observe and acknowledge common responses for which no codes yet 
exist. Third, an adequate number of variables must be employed to mitigate the effects of 
omitted variable bias. There is no rule of thumb to follow, but more may be better, provided of 
course that the variables are relevant and reflect concepts respondents actually mention in the 
interviews. Committed variable bias, as it might be termed, is not particularly problematic. 
Redundant codes within the Transnational NGO Interview Project codebook were condensed or 
eliminated prior to in-sample coding, but even if such codes remained they could be easily 
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handled by combining them ex post or adding direct effect parameters to relax the local 
independence condition for finite mixture modeling. Naturally, an entirely irrelevant code or 
input variable would have never been applied and thus have no impact on analysis. Finally, 
interpretations of latent variables must be grounded in the underlying qualitative evidence. As in 
the organizational effectiveness example, this was necessary to recover nuance obscured by the 
coding scheme. In sum, a coding scheme and concomitant analytical process that is adequate in 
relevance, range, number and evidence contributes to high interpretive robustness.  
 
It is important to consider that analytical results are driven not only by variable choice but more 
importantly by respondents‘ patterns of conceptual associations. Even results driven by poorly 
labeled or delimited codes can still recover meaningful latent structure on the basis of the 
associative patterns identified through finite mixture modeling and interpreted through structured 
qualitative inquiry.  
 
The ultimate value of finite mixture modeling may be judged according to whether the latent 
structures identified in the data are meaningful. On this score, the techniques applied prove 
highly successful. Only in the context of organizational obstacles, discussed in chapter eight, are 
leaders‘ response patterns statistically homogenous. The results presented in chapters four, five, 
six and seven all identify intuitive latent structures with high face validity.  
 
Conclusion 
 
48 
 
The theory-based approach to concepts is a useful framework for studying socially distributed 
conceptualizations empirically. Finite mixture modeling, including latent class analysis and 
discrete factor analysis, aids in the discovery of latent conceptualizations that explain observed 
associations among response variables. This type of modeling also generates statistics that can be 
used to focus qualitative analysis on exemplary qualitative evidence. The combination of finite 
mixture modeling with structured information retrieval disciplines and facilitates qualitative 
inquiry to generate robust and empirically grounded interpretations.   
 
In the next chapter, I employ finite mixture modeling and structured information retrieval to 
explore how TNGO leaders conceptualize their organizations‘ missions and activities. I call their 
conceptualizations ‗ideologies of activism.‘ 
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CHAPTER FOUR: IDEOLOGIES OF ACTIVISM 
 
How do professional transnational activists conceptualize transnational activism? Do activists 
believe in empowering communities to demand sociopolitical transformation or do they prefer 
less contentious strategies focused on mitigating the detrimental effects of structural poverty and 
humanitarian disaster? How exactly do transnational activists pursue their goals? Do they 
leverage rules and norms derived from universal principles, deliver physical goods and services 
or both? In short, do distinct ideologies of activism exist that describe how professional 
transnational activists prefer to approach global challenges?  
 
To address these questions, I analyze TNGO leaders‘ perspectives on their organizational 
missions. This reveals four ideological orientations toward transnational activism. The highly 
uneven distribution of these ideologies suggests that scholars in international relations 
disproportionately focus on the most visible but least common modes of transnational activism. 
 
Background 
 
Scholars of transnational activism generally agree that to the extent transnational NGOs 
(TNGOs) influence political and social outcomes they do so primarily with ideational tactics, 
since they lack the material powers of states (Florini, 2004; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Richard 
Price, 1998; Risse, 2006; Risse et al., 1999; True & Mintrom, 2001). The ―ability to convert 
moral authority and excellent knowledge of the issue-area into ideational power explains to a 
large degree why transnational advocacy networks sometimes win against materially more 
powerful actors such as MNCs and national governments,‖ writes Risse (2006, p. 268), adding 
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that international NGOs ―rely on social mobilization, protest and pressure‖ using tactics like 
reframing and shaming to mobilize the public and influence targets. Similarly, Florini (2004, p. 
76) affirms that ―NGOs are powerful to the degree they can persuade others (government 
officials, corporate leaders, voters, consumers) to act. They are primarily conveyers of 
information and opinions.‖ Many scholars incorporating this view accord organizations like 
Amnesty International and Greenpeace exemplary status, since these organizations are well-
known to employ such strategies (DeMars, 2005; Halliday, 2001; Wapner, 1995; Warkentin, 
2001). Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, for example, in a study of Amnesty International assert that 
both proponents and critics of transnational activism ―agree on the central role of information 
politics‖ (2007, p. 558), while others, like Hafner-Burton (2008), examine how NGOs like 
Amnesty International employ such tactics to influence state policies.  
 
Transnational NGOs are frequently discussed within different research traditions employing 
different assumptions and terminology (Vakil, 1997). Within the context of a Global Civil 
Society, for instance, NGOs are often central players, although scholars disagree over a precise 
understanding of the concept and its implications (Anheier, 2007; Boli & Thomas, 1999a; 
Glasius, 2002; Kaldor, 2003; Lipschutz, 2005). Transnational NGOs may also emerge as 
transnational social movement organizations grounded in grassroots social movements and 
constituting a New Transnational Activism (Tarrow, 2005). Other scholars identify a New Rights 
Advocacy embodied in the activities of human rights and development NGOs (P. Nelson & 
Dorsey, 2007). Within these perspectives TNGOs are generally regarded as agents of a 
grassroots civil society seeking broader sociopolitical transformation.  
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However, scholars also distinguish between ‗bottom-up‘ and top-down‘ perspectives of global 
civil society and the role of TNGOs in world politics (Cox, 1999). Josselin and Wallace, for 
instance, differentiate between idealists, who view TNGOs as the ―vanguard of an emerging 
global civil society‖ and realists, who see TNGOs as ―front-organizations thinly disguising the 
interests of particular states‖ (2001a, pp. 1, 14). Similarly, DeMars (2005) divides NGO 
scholarship into three camps. Pluralists view NGOs as emancipatory agents of a grassroots 
global civil society; globalists view them as vehicles for global norms; and realists dismiss the 
significance of NGOs. These various dimensions imply several combinatory models of TNGO 
influence in world affairs. A structuralist view, for instance, might characterize TNGOs as part 
of the US-dominated post-WWII system of global governance in which power emanates from 
Northern institutions and TNGOs (Josselin & Wallace, 2001a).  
 
Most scholars acknowledge a structural or ideological divide between Northern and Southern 
NGOs (Demirovic, 2003; Kaldor, 2003; McCormick, 1999; Rohrschneider & Dalton, 2002). 
Rohrschneider and Dalton (2002), for example, argue that a North-South power asymmetry 
enables Northern NGOs to influence their Southern counterparts.  
 
Competing perspectives on the role of TNGOs in world affairs can thus be loosely categorized 
into two main categories, as discussed in the introduction. Proponents maintain that TNGOs are 
components of grassroots social movements that help constitute an emergent global civil society 
(Warkentin, 2001). Transnational NGOs seek to change the status quo using ideational strategies 
such as research and advocacy and specific tactics such as framing and naming and shaming. 
Whether TNGOs are themselves norm entrepreneurs or simply vehicles for the transmission of 
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global norms to local contexts, TNGOs represent a bottom-up force challenging the conventional 
state system with principled ideas. Under this view, the constructivist research program figures 
prominently as agents and structures contest discursive frames and role identities to transform 
world politics.  
 
Detractors, on the other hand, often assume a top-down perspective. This approach takes many 
forms. Edwards and Hulme speculate about the New Policy Agenda and its emphasis on 
increasing official aid to NGOs. They worry that NGOs could transmogrify into state 
contractors, leading to ―cooptation: the abandonment of a mission for social transformation to 
become the implementer of the policy agendas of northern governments― (Edwards & Hulme, 
1996, p. 970). Similarly, Feldman (1997, p. 63) noted that once:   
 
NGOs looked skeptically upon donor assistance that would employ them as vehicles for 
development projects. But, by the early 1980s, donor assistance had turned private 
voluntary organizations into development agencies, recasting their challenge and raising 
anew the question of the meaning of civil society. 
 
In light of the New Policy Agenda, Cooley and Ron (2002) portray TNGOs as subcontractors 
responding to requests for proposals, not as authentic agents of social change. Others simply 
admit that ―Many NGOs are in effect, contractors for states‖ (Halliday, 2001, p. 26).  
 
Another version of this argument is that TNGOs are embedded in a Western neoliberal order that 
guarantees their subservience. ―Most non-state actors,‖ argue Josselin and Wallace (2001b, p. 
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258), ―even among the most subversive, work within the framework provided by Western 
international institutions and regimes, criticizing government policies but not challenging the 
state system or its component states…‖  
 
Those assuming critical orientations, often citing Foucaultian and neo-Gramscian influences, 
implicate global civil society in a transnational neoliberal project of governmentality and 
hegemony (Gill, 1995; Jaeger, 2007). Some criticize TNGOs‘ representations of the poor  and 
question their authenticity as agents of the world‘s marginalized (Bebbington, 2005; Billon, 
2006; Rothmyer, 2011). According to Feldman (1997, p. 46), instead of grassroots empowerment 
NGOs merely ―provide a venue for privatization and…liberalization‖ largely controlled by 
donors. NGOs are either unduly influenced by, or otherwise functionally interdependent with, 
traditionally powerful commercial and governmental institutions. Berkovitch and Gordon (2008) 
describe such an interdependence in which states condition donor preferences, which in turn 
impact the programs and strategies of NGOs, which potentially compromises the constructively 
critical position NGOs are supposed occupy in the world system.  
 
Jaeger (2007) provides one of the most sophisticated theoretical critiques along these lines, 
concluding that during the 1990s NGOs depoliticized issues and became functionally 
interdependent with states (2007, p. 272): 
 
Instead of genuinely political challenges or solutions [global civil society] offered 
humanitarian intervention and relief; and instead of tackling the political questions of the 
effects of markets or of redistribution, it offered a neo-liberal governmentality of human 
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resource development and individual self-realization …[T]he emerging international 
public sphere operated as a subsystem of world politics rather than opposing the system 
from outside. NGOs, as the presumed chief embodiment of global civil society, operated 
within a ―trifurcated‖ political system of states, international institutions, and a public 
sphere. Putting both movements together means that depoliticization itself is part of a 
political logic of international governance, whereby global civil society relieves the states 
system and international institutions from making fundamental political decisions by 
offering ―world opinion‖ as well as ambulance and police services in their stead. 
 
Similarly, DeMars (2005, p. 53) describes scenarios in which ―the ‗apolitical‘ NGO—claiming 
to do development anywhere regardless of politics—inadvertently made itself available to absorb 
and reinforce the existing political context, whatever it was.‖ NGOs were used ―first, to assist in 
the government‘s assumption of responsibility for general welfare; second, to legitimize the 
government‘s relinquishing of welfare responsibility; and third, to support and legitimize…anti-
development, predatory political economy‖ (DeMars, 2005, p. 53). In short, ―the net effect of 
NGO networks may be to protect the status quo by neutralizing both the idealists and the 
manipulators‖ (DeMars, 2005, p. 58).  
 
From this perspective, TNGOs convert political contention into technical ‗managerialism,‘ 
substituting humanitarian aid and relief for meaningful policy reform (Roberts et al., 2005). Thus 
TNGOs further support and legitimize states by ameliorating their failures without resolving 
underlying problems. Advocacy takes the form of public education, a supplementary activity 
with the effect of instilling the neoliberal ideas that sustain governmentality. NGOs are 
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participants in the circulation or diffusion of expert managerial knowledge, within which 
neoliberal values and practices are disseminated globally (Ebrahim, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005). 
While TNGO leaders themselves may view their organizations‘ work in managerial and 
technical terms—‗delivering services‘ to ‗beneficiaries‘ as opposed to ‗mobilizing‘ and 
‗empowering constituents‘—they are nonetheless participants in a neoliberal project that sustains 
and replicates problematic power structures.  
 
This scholarly dissensus provides a challenging puzzle for international relations scholars. What 
role do TNGOs play in world affairs? Are TNGOs vehicles for ideational and discursive power  
that amplify the demands of grassroots activists to influence states (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; 
Struett, 2008) or agents of neoliberal governmentality legitimizing the status quo and extending 
states‘ traditional prerogatives of power (DeMars, 2005; Feldman, 1997; Jaeger, 2007)? Or do 
TNGOs simultaneously play both roles in the world system (H. Katz, 2006)? 
 
Underlying this debate is a deeper question largely unaddressed within the international relations 
literature. How do TNGO leaders approach transnational activism? To answer this question, I 
identify ‗ideologies of activism‘ based on data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project. 
By identifying the ideological orientations of TNGO leaders it is possible to gain deeper 
understanding of the roles their organizations play in world affairs.  
 
There are many definitions of ideology. Erikson and Tedin (2003, p. 64) define an ideology as a 
―set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved,‖ while Denzau and 
North (1994, p. 24) define ideology as ―the shared framework of mental models that groups of 
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individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to 
how that environment should be structured.‖ Moreover, Jost et al (2009, p. 309) note that 
―specific ideologies crystallize and communicate…widely shared beliefs, opinions, and 
values…endeavor to describe or interpret the world as it is…to envision the world as it should 
be…[and] represent socially shared but competing philosophies of life and how it should be 
lived.‖ When TNGO leaders discuss their organizational missions, they reveal their beliefs about 
appropriate strategies for addressing social and political challenges. It is in this latter sense that 
leaders evince ideologies of activism that condition how they perceive their sociopolitical 
environment and choose to act within it.  
 
Data 
 
To understand how leaders conceptualize transnational activism, leaders were asked about their 
organizational missions and activities. Interviewers asked TNGO leaders across the United States 
the following question: ―In general, what would you say your organization is trying to 
accomplish?‖ After a thorough review of initial interview transcripts for emergent themes, eight 
substantive codes were developed to capture leaders‘ open-ended responses. These include 
capacity building (for example, improvement of nonprofits, institutions, sectors, targets, media 
sector, civil society), service delivery (for example, direct implementation), education (for 
example, public awareness education), advocacy (for example, advocating policy change, 
lobbying institutional targets), fundraising or grant management, grassroots mobilization (for 
example, working in communities, organizing protests, getting people to act), research and 
57 
 
compliance monitoring (for example, enforcing compliance primarily through monitoring). 
Leaders‘ responses are distributed across 151 valid cases. 
 
The eight codes may be alternatively regarded as eight binary response variables. Because these 
variables are not mutually exclusive, mathematically there are 2
8
 possible response patterns 
corresponding to 256 different ways in which leaders could have described their organizations‘ 
missions. Since a typical human analyst can only consider about seven of these patterns 
simultaneously, quantification and automated classification analysis must be employed to 
facilitate exploratory analysis (Grimmer & King, 2009). In the following section, I use discrete 
factor analysis (DFA) to search for underlying structure in leaders‘ response patterns. 
 
Respondents were also asked how much their organizations were engaged in specific activities. 
Leaders were asked the following question: 
 
We‘re interested in how your organization pursues its mission and on which activities it 
focuses. I‘m going to mention several different kinds of activities and I would like you to 
rank them from 1 to 5 (with 1 being low and 5 being high) according to how much time 
your organization is engaged in each. In addition, we would like to know what kinds of 
things you do within these domains. Here is a sheet that lists the categories. 
 
Leaders may also have been prompted with the following probe. ―So would you say this is a 
primary activity, a secondary activity, something you do on an as needed or in an ad hoc fashion, 
or that you rarely, if at all, engage in?‖ Regardless of how leaders chose to respond to the 
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question—some rated each activity, some ranked the activities, others discussed them more 
qualitatively—each activity was coded as either ‗primary,‘ ‗secondary‘ or respondent‘s 
organization ‗does not do.‘  As the question implies, the five categories of activities were 
predetermined by the interviewer, who handed respondents a sheet of paper listing the activities. 
The activities are direct aid and services, research and public education, mobilization of the 
public (for example, grassroots political campaigns, organizing public protests), advocacy and 
monitoring (for example, monitoring compliance with policies, international agreements and 
commitments). Leaders‘ responses to this complete series of questions are distributed across 116 
valid cases.  
 
The five categories of organizational activities may be alternatively regarded as five 
trichotomous response variables. Because these variables are not mutually exclusive, 
mathematically there are 3
5
 possible response patterns corresponding to 243 different ways in 
which leaders could have described their organizations‘ activities. Again, discrete factor analysis 
will be used to identify latent structure in the data. 
 
I assume that leaders‘ understandings of their organizational missions and activities are derived 
from their ideologies of activism. These ideologies describe how leaders choose to approach the 
global challenges their organizations confront. In the next section, I use DFA to identify 
underlying ideological dimensions that explain leaders‘ response patterns. These dimensions 
yield a typology, which is introduced and discussed in the sections that follow.  
 
Analysis 
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Magidson and Vermunt (2003; n.d.) have shown that a latent class model consisting of four 
clusters is analogous to a discrete factor model consisting of two dichotomous latent factors, with 
the added benefit that the discrete factor model requires fewer parameters and is therefore more 
parsimonious. Since a discrete factor model offers greater explanatory power than a latent class 
model with the same number of parameters, I estimate discrete factor models to understand 
leaders‘ ideologies toward transnational activism. The models estimated to explain how leaders 
understand their organizational missions are summarized in table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1: Models for organizational mission 
Model 
name Model type LL L² 
p-
value ΔL² 
%
ΔL² 
p-
value 
Class. 
Error BVRs 
Model_M0 1-Cluster -657.24 175.95 0.01 . . . 0.00 Fail 
Model_M1 1-DFactor(2) -634.05 129.59 0.33 46.36 26 . 0.08 Fail 
Model_M2 2-DFactor(2,2) -627.00 115.47 0.47 14.12 34 0.40 0.09 Pass 
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Model_M0 tests the hypotheses that there is no statistical association among the eight response 
variables for organizational mission. This model may also be regarded as the model of 
homogeneous or random response patterns. This hypothesis is rejected since the L
2
 p-value for 
Model_M0 is well below the conventional threshold.
14
 Model_M1 tests for the presence of a 
single discrete factor and provides adequate model fit according to the L
2
 p-value. However, this 
model contains an unacceptable local dependency and therefore fails to explain the association in 
the data. Model_M2 tests for the presence of two discrete factors. This is the most parsimonious 
model that successfully explains the association among the response variables and is therefore 
the preferred model.  
 
The results for Model_M2 are displayed in table 4.2. Level1 of DFactor1 describes about 66 
percent of respondents. Based on (nominal) average expenditure data for sampled organizations 
over the period 2001 to 2006, these leaders direct about 71 percent of US TNGO resources. 
These leaders were more likely to have discussed service delivery than leaders at Level2.  
 
Level2 of Dfactor1 describes about 34 percent of respondents directing about 29 percent of the 
resources. Leaders at Level2 were more likely to have mentioned capacity building, education, 
advocacy, fundraising or grant management, grassroots mobilization, research and compliance 
monitoring.  
 
DFactor1 appears to measure a service delivery-advocacy or operational-campaigning 
dimension (Kaldor, 2003; Willetts, 2002). DFactor1 will be tentatively labeled ‗strategy.‘ Level1 
will be labeled ‗amelioration‘ to indicate the nearly exclusive emphasis on service delivery and 
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Level2 will be labeled ‗empowerment‘ to indicate the greater propensities toward more 
empowering strategies such as advocacy, education, capacity building and grassroots 
mobilization.   
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Table 4.2: Results for Model_M2 (independent probabilities)  
  
DFactor1 DFactor2 
  
Level1 Level2 Level1 Level2 
Prob.(Level) 
 
0.66 0.34 0.77 0.23 
 
p-
value 
    Capacity building 0.05 0.48 0.69 0.56 0.53 
Service delivery 0.00 0.65 0.27 0.55 0.43 
Education 0.25 0.44 0.61 0.46 0.60 
Advocacy 0.00 0.07 0.78 0.26 0.49 
Fundraising or grant management 0.14 0.20 0.43 0.32 0.12 
Grassroots mobilization 0.00 0.07 0.44 0.19 0.21 
Research 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.02 0.50 
Compliance 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.21 
      
  
n = 151 
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Level1 of Dfactor2 describes about 77 percent of respondents directing about 84 percent of the 
sample‘s resources. These leaders were more likely than those at Level2 to have discussed 
capacity building, service delivery and fundraising or grant management.  
 
Level2 of DFactor2 describes about 23 percent of respondents directing about 16 percent of the 
resources. These leaders were more likely to have talked about education, advocacy, grassroots 
mobilization, research and compliance monitoring.  
 
DFactor2 is more difficult to interpret. To facilitate interpretation, I have retrieved leaders‘ 
actual statements about their organizational missions from the interview transcripts for those 
assigned to Level2 of DFactor2 (mean PMP = 0.89).  To discipline analysis and mitigate the risk 
of misinterpreting atypical evidence as typical, I focus analysis on exemplary qualitative 
evidence. The exemplarity of a leader‘s qualitative evidence for Level2 of DFactor2 is defined 
as the probability that the he or she belongs at Level2 of DFactor2. This probability is the 
leader‘s PMP for the modal assignment. A PMP close to zero indicates that a leader‘s statements 
are not likely to provide good qualitative evidence to facilitation interpretation, while PMP close 
to one indicates that a leader‘s statements are very likely to provide good qualitative evidence to 
aid interpretation. Leader‘s statements have been interpreted within the contexts of the complete 
interview transcripts, which are organized in the CAQDAS for efficient querying. Interview 
dates for quotations are provided in the appendix.  
 
One typical leader (ID = 7, PMP = 1.00) at Level2 of DFactor2 emphasized awareness-raising. 
The respondent said that ―the main thing that we're trying to do is to promote environmental 
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protection by [increasing] attention to—and promoting—environmental law, better 
environmental policies and… environmental management.‖ Another respondent (ID = 17, PMP 
= 1.00), whose organization focuses on environmental issues such as overfishing, said his or her 
organization uses a scorecard system to name and shame transgressors—a classic example of the 
use of information politics to enforce compliance with international norms (Keck & Sikkink, 
1998). ―Overfishing has been an issue that has existed for decades at this point,‖ the respondent 
said.  
 
We focused on one, a score card to show who is doing the best on what practices we have 
in hand. And that actually takes the data provided by the government, sorts it out 
according to which [entities] are actually implementing practices that are better than 
others. It applies a grade based on publicly available data and says one is better or worse 
than another. 
 
―Name and shame technique?‖ the interviewer asked. ―That's right,‖ the respondent confirmed, 
―and then to monitor over-fishing.‖ Level2 of DFactor2 appears to account for whether leaders 
are amenable to information politics, especially involving research, advocacy and compliance 
monitoring, as commonly cited in the international relations literature on transnational activism 
(Hafner-Burton, 2008; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). However, it may seem surprising that less than a 
quarter of leaders seem to favor this approach. The strategic use of ideas, considered a major tool 
in the repertoire of TNGOs, appears surprisingly rare given the emphasis it often receives in 
scholarly work (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Ron et al., 2007; Sell & Prakash, 2004).  
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DFactor2 will be labeled ‗mode‘ to indicate leaders‘ preferred mode of influence. Since leaders 
at Level2 of DFactor2 are more likely to employ ideational tactics involving education, 
advocacy, research and compliance monitoring, Level2 will be labeled ‗ideational,‘ and by 
contrast, Level1 will be labeled ‗material.‘ 
 
This discrete factor model with two dichotomous factors may also be interpreted as a 4-cluster 
latent class model. Table 4.3 summarizes the results of Model_M2 by displaying the joint 
probabilities for the two factors. This table implies that there are four ideologies of activism held 
by TNGO leaders. Each of these ideologies is discussed in turn using the PMPs for leaders‘ 
modal assignments to retrieve exemplary qualitative evidence to discipline interpretation.  
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Table 4.3: Results for Model_M2 (joint probabilities) 
  
Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 
DFactor1 
 
Level1 Level1 Level2 Level2 
DFactor2 
 
Level1 Level2 Level1 Level2 
Prob.(Cluster) 
 
0.51 0.15 0.26 0.08 
 
p-
value 
    Capacity building 0.05 0.49 0.46 0.69 0.67 
Service delivery 0.00 0.68 0.55 0.29 0.19 
Education 0.25 0.40 0.55 0.58 0.71 
Advocacy 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.72 0.98 
Fundraising or grant management 0.14 0.23 0.08 0.50 0.22 
Grassroots mobilization 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.43 0.46 
Research 0.04 0.02 0.43 0.04 0.62 
Compliance 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.43 
      
  
n = 151 
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Cluster1: Material amelioration 
 
Overall, about half of TNGO leaders are oriented toward material amelioration (mean PMP = 
0.81). This ideology is most prevalent among leaders from relief and development TNGOs. 
These leaders characterize their missions primarily in terms of service delivery, representing a 
relatively traditional, charitable role conceptualization for transnational NGO leaders. 
 
An example of the material amelioration ideology is provided by a leader (ID = 60, PMP = 0.94) 
who said ―Our role, our real expertise or core capability is processing medical analysis supplies. 
We can take large, bulk, mixed truckloads of medical supplies, process them, refine them to 
usable products, and that's what we try to do.‖ Further emphasizing the charitable, service 
delivery aspect of his or her organization‘s mission, the respondent added that ―we're trying to 
improve the delivery of healthcare, and we do that by gathering, processing and distributing 
medical and other health supplies to other charities.‖ Clearly, this leader is interested in the 
charitable distribution of material, not organizing public protests or engaging in contentious 
information politics.   
 
Another leader (ID = 97, PMP = 0.94) emphasized the ameliorative aspect of the orientation. 
―The bottom line is the alleviation of poverty,‖ he or she said. ―That is really through supporting 
microfinance organizations around the world that are really trying to do what [DELETED] did, 
in terms of creating a large, self-sufficient organization that is able to reach massive numbers of 
poor people.‖ Here the product, credit, is more abstract but similarly conceptualized as a means 
for ameliorating social problems with resources such as money rather than contentious advocacy.  
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Cluster2: Ideational amelioration 
 
The mission orientation of ideational amelioration tends to involve service delivery and 
education, followed by capacity building and research (mean PMP = 0.79) This role 
conceptualization appears to place about equal emphasis on service delivery and education, 
suggesting that neither strategy is substantially privileged. Interestingly, Jaeger (2007, pp. 266, 
272) suggests that TNGOs specifically utilize ―public awareness, information and education 
campaigns‖ to promote ―neo-liberal governmentality,‖ although leaders tend to regard public 
education as means of augmenting service delivery.  
 
Ideational amelioration is most prevalent among environmental TNGOs. A leader (ID = 9, PMP 
= 0.95) from an environmental TNGO said that his or her organization is ―…trying to protect the 
great ecological systems of the planet that enable us to live.‖ Moreover, ―we are wrestling, we 
want to run global campaigns on these global ecological threats, global warming, protection of 
the oceans, stuff that spreads, genetically modified organisms, nuclear proliferation, toxic 
chemicals, and ancient forests.‖ He or she also thought that ―…if we get that stuff right, then the 
planet, and the humanity lives to fight all these good fights, a woman's right to choose, gays to 
marry, whatever it may be, right?‖ Such a mission orientation is difficult to categorize, but it 
appears that the crux of the approach involves leveraging ideology and information to achieve 
material change.  
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Another leader, also from the environmental sector (ID = 21, PMP = 0.94), appeared to favor a 
demand-driven approach. The respondent saw his or her organization as providing direct services 
in the water sector, coupled with hygiene education and local capacity building, all as mutually 
reinforcing components of a broader strategy. The leader also stressed that they ―work with 
people in, in local environments who are likewise ready, willing and able to take the initiative on 
their own behalf.‖ The respondent elaborated on a specific project as a ―demand-driven 
enterprise:‖ 
 
…the community‘s investment was not just a psychic one, it was the people in 
communities [who] demonstrated that they had the demand for this, it was a demand 
driven enterprise because they came forward with labor and materials and actual cash 
contributions to make this thing work. And um, we had assumed I think early on we were 
very good about finding the right kind of local partners. 
 
In its fuller context, it is clear that the leader prefers a participatory approach to development in 
which service delivery, education and capacity building concatenate to generate sustainable 
outcomes. This contrasts with the more common approach of material amelioration, which 
chiefly involves service delivery.  
 
A leader (ID = 23, PMP = 0.90) from a struggling human rights organization brings another 
perspective to ideational amelioration. The respondent candidly admitted that his or her 
organization‘s mission was: 
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well until recently I think it was to, to sort of keep the lights, on, get us paid our salaries 
and, and just you know, keep the shell in place. And ah, be available to receive funding 
and to answer inquiries at a very sort of modest level. And we thought that was preferable 
than nothing at all because um, where would people go… 
 
Substantively, his or her organization generates and disseminates information to achieve arms 
reductions. Given their difficult financial position, the respondent clarified that ―mainly the 
objective then right now is to disseminate information… but in a, in a passive [manner] and I 
mean that in a neutral sense.‖ The term ideational amelioration should not be taken to mean 
‗making people feel better,‘ but rather indicates that some leaders view information 
dissemination as a form of service delivery. The four most prevalent indicators for this view, 
service delivery, education, capacity building and research, when contrasted with the profiles for 
the other ideologies, collectively emphasize the ideational aspects of delivering services. Again 
this also contrasts with the most prominent role conceptualization of material amelioration, 
which focuses primarily on service delivery.  
 
Cluster3: Material empowerment 
 
About a quarter of TNGO leaders subscribe to an ideology of material empowerment (mean 
PMP = 0.82). Material empowerment is most likely to involve advocacy, capacity building and 
education. This orientation aims at providing beneficiaries with the resources they need to live 
more engaged and empowered lives. It is most common among conflict resolution and human 
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rights organizations. A leader (ID = 118, PMP = 0.97) holding this view described the evolution 
of his or her organization‘s goals and strategies as follows. 
 
…in the very beginning we started out being in an organization working for peace that 
um, was doing political work. And…this is all political what we do, but somewhere after 
the first year or two um, people over there started asking, they need help. And um, we 
continued some of the…political work but we changed our focus to doing projects over 
there to help children, and that‘s the main focus of this organization is to you know, give 
hope and…make the lives of children a little bit easier and to work for justice. 
 
More concretely, the leader offered that, ―we built playgrounds, parks and playgrounds. And we 
support women‘s projects and embroidery projects and we also um, support, we set up a 
computer lab at the [DELETED] refugee camp…‖ The respondent seems to believe that 
providing the right materials and infrastructure can help instill an empowering sense of hope 
among beneficiaries. Although his or her organization initially focused on political engagement, 
it eventually adopted more materialistic programming.  
 
Scholars have observed trends among NGOs that have been interpreted as a convergence 
between development and human rights programming and a shift toward increased politicization 
in the humanitarian sector (Barnett, 2009; P. J. Nelson & Dorsey, 2003). As a possible 
illustration of this trend, another leader (ID = 139, PMP = 0.96) described how his or her 
organization had ―been growing into advocacy.‖ He or she identified fundraising, awareness-
raising and public education as core organizational foci.  
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Well, I think that the primary function of the US office is to generate funding for projects 
all over the world, raising money from various sources—corporations, governments, 
private individuals, foundations. We also do advocacy in the United States and public 
awareness…we want poverty and justice issues to become more important to American 
citizens so that they put pressure on their elected officials for just and effective policies 
that are friendly to the poor. 
 
This respondent also emphasized that his or her organization strove to have a ―transforming 
impact‖ not only on beneficiaries, but also on donors. The leader‘s organization uses fundraising 
as an opportunity to influence donors. ―We are trying to deepen the relationships that donors 
have—not to just send us a check every month, but to become a volunteer, to become engaged in 
advocacy, to email a congressman,‖ the leader said. The conceptualization of material 
empowerment involves leveraging physical and financial resources to promote social or political 
empowerment.  
 
Cluster4: Ideational empowerment 
 
The orientation of ideational empowerment is potentially the most transformative ideology and is 
most common among human rights organizations (mean PMP = 0.88). It is dominated by 
advocacy, as well as education, capacity building and research, and it is the least likely to 
involve service delivery. The conjunction of research and compliance monitoring implies an 
affinity for information or accountability politics (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). One of these 
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uncommon leaders (ID = 29, PMP = 0.98) described his or her organization as ―an incubator for 
activists.‖ His or her organization seeks ―peace‖ by holding states accountable to international 
human rights norms. 
 
…our kind of founding principles are the UN declaration of human rights. We would like 
to have that adopted internationally. We would like our government to respect the UN 
declaration of human rights, which includes both political rights and economic rights. 
And so we have concentrated a lot on the economic rights because we think they, they are 
ignored or have been ignored in the past by a lot of the larger [NGOs], human rights 
organizations.  
 
Another leader (ID = 11, PMP = 1.00) said that his or her organization is trying to achieve: 
 
a world where the rights of people [who] live along rivers are respected and where the, 
those people have a say in decision making…and where ecological values of rivers are 
respected. And beyond that, that's the sort of narrower range, beyond that, a world where 
in general development decision making is much more participative and democratic and 
environmentally conscious and there's more say for communities and civil society in 
decision-making to try and to counteract the power of the state and corporations.   
 
Notably, this leader also acknowledged that his or her organization frequently produced reports 
and organized events as tactics for achieving sociopolitical change. From the leader‘s discussion 
it is clear that he or she believes that environmental issues persist in the context of broader social 
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and political power structures. For leaders holding such views transnational engagement may 
involve overt political contention.  
 
This ideology of ideational empowerment is most starkly contrasted with the much more 
common and traditional ideology of material amelioration. Whereas material amelioration 
mainly involves traditional service delivery, ideational empowerment involves strategies that are 
likely to be more contentious and sociopolitically transformative.  
 
Discussion 
 
Overall, most leaders (about 51 percent) believe that the best way to approach global challenges 
is with traditional, charitable strategies consistent with material amelioration. Based on 
(nominal) average expenditure data for the period 2001-2006, leaders holding this ideology 
direct about 56 percent of the sample‘s resources. Slightly more than a quarter of leaders (about 
26 percent) believe in material empowerment or the leveraging of physical and financial 
resources to achieve sociopolitical empowerment. These leaders direct about 15 percent of the 
resources. About 15 percent of leaders directing about 28 percent of the resources favor 
ideational amelioration. They employ ideational strategies to achieve material results. 
Comparatively few (about 8 percent) leaders directing only about one percent of the resources 
appear to subscribe to a transformative ideology of ideational empowerment.  
 
As described above, leaders‘ ideologies are unevenly distributed within different sectors. Their 
organizations were classified into five sectors (human rights, conflict resolution, sustainable 
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development, environment and humanitarian relief) by Charity Navigator, the nonprofit ratings 
agency in the United States from which the sample was drawn. Table 4.4 summarizes the 
relationship between ideology and sector.  
  
77 
 
Table 4.4: Ideological orientation by sector 
 
  
Sector 
  Environment 
Human 
Rights 
Humanitarian 
Relief 
Sustainable 
Development 
Conflict 
Resolution 
  
Ideological 
orientation 
Material 
amelioration 
41% 14% 81% 77% 25% 
9 3 26 49 3 
1.3 7.2 2.5 3.1 2.4 
Ideational 
amelioration 
36% 5% 3% 5% 8% 
8 1 1 3 1 
17.4 0.5 1.3 1.5 0 
Material 
empowerment 
9% 62% 16% 17% 67% 
2 13 5 11 8 
2.4 10.6 1.3 1.8 7.7 
Ideational 
empowerment 
14% 19% 0% 2% 0% 
3 4 0 1 0 
 
2.9 7.5 1.7 1.7 0.6 
  
     
 
Percentage total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Count total 22 21 32 64 12 
 
Chi2 contribution 
total 24 25.8 6.8 8.1 10.8 
       
  
n = 151, Chi2(12) = 75.44, p = 0.00 
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According to the chi-squared decomposition, ideational amelioration is unexpectedly common in 
the environmental sector, while material empowerment is unexpectedly common in the human 
rights sector. Material amelioration is unexpectedly predominant in the sustainable development 
and humanitarian relief sectors, while material empowerment is unexpectedly predominant in the 
conflict resolution sector. Confrontational ideational tactics like naming and shaming may be 
seen as too contentious or counterproductive for leaders in the conflict resolution sector. 
 
The distributions of ideologies within the humanitarian relief and sustainable development 
sectors are strikingly similar. This indicates that leaders of these two types of organizations 
appear to think similarly about the appropriate way to approach global challenges. This may be 
unsurprising given that some scholars have argued that the distinction between humanitarianism 
and development is increasingly a false dichotomy (Slim, 2000).  
 
Leaders‘ ideologies are intuitively distributed across the service delivery-advocacy divide. Using 
secondary data from organizations‘ websites and annual reports, an independent coder classified 
each TNGO as ‗service-oriented,‘ ‗advocacy-oriented‘ or ‗both.‘ Table 4.5 summarizes the 
relationship between ideology and function. 
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Table 4.5: Ideological orientation by function 
 
  
Function 
  
Advocacy Service Both 
Ideological 
orientation 
Material 
amelioration 
15% 84% 54% 
5 59 26 
10.9 7.2 0.2 
Ideational 
amelioration 
15% 4% 13% 
5 3 6 
1.2 1.9 0.5 
Material 
empowerment 
55% 10% 29% 
18 7 14 
10.5 6.8 0.2 
Ideational 
empowerment 
15% 1% 4% 
5 1 2 
6 2 0.1 
     
 
Percentage 
total 
100% 100% 100% 
 
Count total 33 70 48 
 
Chi2 
contribution 
total 28.8 17.8 1.1 
     
  
n = 151, Chi2(6) = 47.66, p = 
0.00 
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Organizations coded as service-oriented tend to be headed by leaders holding ideologies of 
material amelioration, while those regarded as advocacy-oriented are most likely to be headed by 
leaders adhering to strategies of material empowerment. The chi-squared decomposition shows 
that material amelioration is unexpectedly common among service organizations and 
unexpectedly uncommon among advocacy organizations. Additionally, empowering orientations 
are unexpectedly predominant among advocacy organizations and unexpectedly uncommon 
among service organizations.  
 
Independently, DFactor1 (strategy) is strongly associated with function (n = 151, chi2(1) = 
35.68, p = 0.00). About 70 percent of leaders from advocacy organizations favor empowerment 
while about 89 percent of leaders from service organizations favor amelioration. This suggests 
that in the context of TNGOs‘ missions, ‗service‘ is bound up with ‗amelioration‘ and 
‗advocacy‘ with ‗empowerment,‘ independently of whether leaders‘ organizations employ 
ideational tactics (as this has been ‗factored out‘). Given the similarities in the coding schemes 
for mission and function, this result may also be interpreted as a form of cross-validation.  
 
The relationship between DFactor2 (mode) and function is also significant (n = 151, chi2(1) = 
11.14, p = 0.00). Respondents from all types of organizations prefer material over ideational 
modes of engagement, even though leaders from advocacy TNGOs are about five times more 
likely to employ ideational tactics.  
 
Cross-validation 
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As discussed above, leaders were also handed a sheet of paper listing five activities and asked to 
rate how much time their organizations spent engaged with each category of activity. The 
existence if these data as well as the data from the interview question about organizational 
mission introduces the possibility of cross-validation between the two areas of the interview 
protocol. We expect a similar factor or factors to emerge within the context of organizational 
activities as in the context of organizational mission.  
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Table 4.6: Models for organizational activities 
Model 
name Model type LL L² 
p-
value ΔL² %ΔL² 
p-
value 
Class. 
Error BVRs 
Model_A0 1-Cluster -561.73 234.77 0.00 . . . 0.00 Fail 
Model_A1 1-DFactor(2) -515.48 142.28 0.07 92.49 39 . 0.06 Pass 
Model_A2 2-DFactor(2,2) -500.78 112.88 0.20 29.40 52 0.03 0.05 Pass 
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Table 4.6 summarizes the models for organizational activities. The first model, Model_A0, is the 
null model. The low L
2
 p-value indicates that unexplained association exists among the five 
trichotomous response variables. Model_A1 provides adequate fit according to the L
2
 p-value 
and successfully explains the bivariate associations among the response variables. However, 
Model_A2 provides a statistically significant improvement in model fit over Model_A1 as 
measured by the ΔL
2 
p-value. Since Model_A2 provides significantly better fit than Model_A1, 
Model_A2 is the preferred model. The results of Model_A2 are presented in table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7: Results for Model_A2 (independent probabilities) 
   
DFactor1 DFactor2 
   
Level1 Level2 Level1 Level2 
Prob.(Level) 
  
0.68 0.32 0.65 0.35 
 
p-
value 
     Direct aid and service 0.00 Primary 0.81 0.49 0.72 0.69 
 
Secondary 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.16 
 
Does not do 0.11 0.41 0.23 0.15 
Research and public 
education 
0.00 Primary 0.24 0.72 0.43 0.33 
 
Secondary 0.59 0.28 0.42 0.63 
 
Does not do 0.17 0.00 0.15 0.04 
Mobilization 0.00 Primary 0.05 0.53 0.31 0.01 
 
Secondary 0.32 0.34 0.06 0.83 
 
Does not do 0.62 0.14 0.63 0.16 
Advocacy 0.00 Primary 0.08 0.71 0.32 0.22 
 
Secondary 0.53 0.29 0.30 0.74 
 
Does not do 0.39 0.01 0.39 0.05 
Monitoring 0.00 Primary 0.00 0.39 0.07 0.24 
 
Secondary 0.31 0.52 0.37 0.39 
 
Does not do 0.69 0.09 0.56 0.37 
       
   
n = 116 
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Level1 of DFactor1 appears to capture the ameliorative orientation centered on direct aid and 
services and supplemented by research and public education. Level2 of this factor seems to 
reflect a multidimensional approach to empowerment in which leaders believe that their 
organizations are primarily engaged in research and public education, advocacy and 
mobilization, and secondarily involved in monitoring. This factor will be labeled ‗strategy,‘ as 
before, Level1 labeled ‗amelioration‘ and Level2 labeled ‗empowerment.‘  
 
Whereas the first factor discriminates between an ameliorative conception of organizational 
activities based on direct aid and services and an empowering conception based on research and 
public education, advocacy and mobilization, the second factor appears to distinguish between 
strategies of focus versus supplementation.  
 
The profile for Level1 of DFactor2 appears to describe leaders who would rather do something 
wholeheartedly or not at all. The activities have relatively low probabilities of being secondary. 
Leaders holding this view report that their organizations are engaged in direct aid and services as 
well as research and public education. However, they tend to avoid mobilization and monitoring 
altogether and seem ambivalent on the appropriate role of advocacy. Overall, these leaders 
appear more willing to avoid activities toward which they are not prepared to commit significant 
time and resources. Leaders at Level2 of DFactor2, by contrast, believe that their organizations 
are engaged in many activities secondarily. Thus, DFactor2 will be labeled ‗scope,‘ Level1 
‗focus‘ and Level2 ‗supplementation.‘  
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The discrete factor models estimated for organizational mission and organizational activities may 
be assessed for concordant validity. In both contexts factors emerged appearing to measure an 
amelioration-empowerment dimension. Table 4.8 displays a confusion matrix showing the 
concordance between the assignment solutions for mission DFactor1 (strategy) and activities 
DFactor1 (strategy).  
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Table 4.8: Confusion matrix 
 
  
Mission Strategy (DFactor1) 
  
Amelioration 
(Level1) 
Empowerment 
(Level2) 
Activities 
Strategy 
(DFactor1) 
Amelioration 
(Level1) 64 17 
Empowerment 
(Level2) 13 21 
    
  
n = 115, chi2(1) = 18.00, p = 0.00 
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As shown in table 4.8, there are 85 concordant pairs relative to 30 discordant pairs, yielding 
concurrence of about 74 percent. Additionally, a chi-squared test for independence reveals that 
these two factors are statistically associated. Transnational NGO leaders appear to be about twice 
as likely to hold an ameliorative orientation toward transnational activism as an empowering 
orientation. This result is consistent within the contexts of both organizational mission and 
activities. 
 
Analysis of coder and interviewer biases 
 
With data of this nature it is important to determine whether the results described above are truly 
reflective of leaders‘ ideologies toward transnational activism and not mere artifacts of 
interviewer baiting or coder bias. The results of tests for these influences are provided in table 
4.9. 
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Table 4.9: Tests for bias 
 
Test Variable n Chi2 d.f. 
p-
value 
Mission 
Coder ID 
Strategy 
(DF1) 151 6.90 4 0.14 
Mode (DF2) 151 2.38 4 0.67 
Interviewer 
ID 
Strategy 
(DF1) 151 16.41 6 0.01 
Mode (DF2) 151 4.48 6 0.61 
Activities 
Coder ID 
Strategy 
(DF1) 116 4.90 4 0.30 
Scope (DF2) 116 12.26 4 0.02 
Interviewer 
ID 
Strategy 
(DF1) 116 8.22 6 0.22 
Scope (DF2) 116 2.46 6 0.87 
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There is no evidence that coder bias is driving the result for organizational mission, as indicated 
by the high p-value for the respective independence test. However, the variable for interviewer 
identification (ID) is statistically related to the first discrete factor describing mission strategy. 
The explanation is twofold. First, this evidence is not unexpected since interviewers were 
nonrandomly assigned to respondents to facilitate rapport and maximize respondent candor. The 
effect then may not be bias in the undesirable sense, but simply an effect of the assignment 
procedure. To further assess the nature and extent of interviewer bias, the two primary 
interviewers were contacted and asked to discuss their recollections about the interview 
processes. Both interviewers effectively indicated that the association is spurious. Interviewers 
were assigned to undertake multiple interviews in particular geographic areas where various 
functional or sectoral foci tended to predominate among organizations. For example, both 
interviewers commented that Washington, DC tended to host more sustainable development, 
humanitarian relief and service delivery TNGOs, while New York, NY tended to host more 
human rights, conflict resolution and advocacy TNGOs. One interviewer conducted a cluster of 
interviews in Washington, DC, while the other conducted a cluster of interviews in New York, 
NY.  
 
As a result of their recollections, I performed additional tests between interviewer ID and 
mission DFactor1 (strategy), controlling for the geographic location of the interview. The results 
indicate that there are no independent interviewer bias effects (all p-values > 0.05). Caution is 
still warranted, however, due to poorly populated tables, but within the best populated cells the 
observed counts are very close to the expected counts, mitigating this concern.  
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Although there is no evidence of interviewer bias regarding the types of activities respondents 
believe their organizations are engaged in, there does appear to be some coder bias with respect 
to the scope of such activities. This is most likely due to individual differences in how coders 
interpreted whether specific activities were primary, secondary or not engaged in at all. Figure 1 
shows that coders are spread vertically along the factor for activities DFactor2 (scope). The two 
lines inside the graph intersect with the graph‘s axes to indicate the probabilities of being at 
Level2 of each discrete factor.  
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Figure 4.1: Coder bias 
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Coder 3 is the furthest vertically from the intersection, revealing a propensity toward 
supplementation (Level2 of DFactor2), while coder 4 has a propensity toward focus (Level1 of 
DFactor2). An independence test and chi-squared decomposition confirms that coder 3‘s 
propensity toward supplementation alone accounts for more than half of the chi-squared 
statistic‘s magnitude.15 These tests suggest that activities DFactor2 (scope) may be a trivial 
factor generated by coder bias. This factor should be interpreted cautiously.  
 
Overall, tests for interviewer and coder biases do not reveal significant threats to the validity of 
the main results presented in table 3.1.  
 
Conclusion  
 
It is often taken for granted that TNGO leaders are contentious activists who employ information 
politics to influence targets and mobilize support to achieve sociopolitical transformation. But 
proponents expounding the potential of professionalized transnational activism to transform 
world politics typically focus on the least common types of TNGOs. According to data gathered 
in the United States, most professional transnational activists directing most of the resources 
appear to subscribe to an ideology of material amelioration, not ideational empowerment, as 
summarized in table 4.10.  
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Table 4.10: Ideological efficacy 
  
Strategy  
  
Amelioration  Empowerment  
Mode  
Material  
51% of 
leaders 
26% of 
leaders 
56% of 
expenditures 
15% of 
expenditures 
Ideational  
15% of 
leaders 
8% of leaders 
28% of 
expenditures 
1% of 
expenditures 
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Of course more research is needed to understand the perspectives of TNGO leaders outside of 
the United States. Future research might also attempt to identify differences between 
professional and amateur transnational activists.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: AUTOMOMY AND COLLABORATION 
 
Do TNGOs contest states from the outside or are they part and parcel of the international 
system? Scholars question whether transnational NGOs are authentic norm entrepreneurs, 
vehicles for global norms and ideas or merely state subcontractors (Berkovitch & Gordon, 2008; 
Cooley & Ron, 2002; DeMars, 2005; Martha Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Halliday, 2001; 
Josselin & Wallace, 2001c). In the first instance, TNGOs originate norms which they propagate 
within global civil society and among powerful actors like corporations and governments. 
However, TNGOs may also be viewed as vehicles for global norms. In this view, norms emerge 
organically within civil society and eventually become institutionalized in the mandates of 
TNGOs. Transnational NGOs represent the values of grassroots civil society and leverage 
information politics to hold actors accountable to universal principles. Finally, in a critical view 
TNGOs are simply subcontractors paid to enact the foreign policies of states and promote the 
public relations interests of corporations.  
 
Many variations exist on these perspectives. For instance, Josselin and Wallace (2001b, p. 252) 
maintain that ―…the arrival of think-tanks and NGOs on the international stage as vehicles for 
expertise and agenda-setters can hardly be overstated,‖ while later they cautiously note that 
―Many non-state actors further remain dependent (at least in part) on the state for funding their 
activities, and are willing to serve as conduits for the foreign policy of their government.‖ 
(2001b, p. 258) Others question (Halliday, 2001) or simply assume (Cooley & Ron, 2002) that 
TNGOs are basically subcontractors rather than autonomous actors in their own rights. Still other 
scholars, such as Berkovitch and Gordon (2008), argue that the situation is more complex: states 
influence donors who influence TNGO programming. But in most cases TNGO subordination is 
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understood as undesirable on the presumption that the proper role of TNGOs in world affairs is 
to challenge states and corporations rather than collaborate with them.  
 
Normative implications are often premised upon unstated assumptions about what TNGOs are 
supposed to be doing. If TNGOs are independent watchdogs keeping states and corporations in 
check, then TNGO subservience to donors and powerful institutions is undesirable. If however 
TNGOs are supposed to be well-behaved fiduciary agents duly executing their contracts with 
donors, then TNGO subservience is a desirable condition.  
 
Scholars disagree over the implications of TNGO subservience. Sanyal (1997, p. 31) decries the 
―autonomy fetish‖ and argues that decoupling TNGOs from state and market institutions is self-
defeating, whilc Cooley and Ron (2002) argue that TNGOs need to diversify funding sources to 
preserve autonomy since the fiercely competitive marketplace for contracts undermines TNGOs‘ 
missions. Such arguments for and against TNGO autonomy vis-à-vis states and corporations are 
premised upon different assumptions about the appropriate role of TNGOs in world affairs. 
 
Regardless of the desirability of organizational autonomy, scholars seem to underestimate the 
nature and degree of autonomy-preserving strategic behavior among TNGOs. Further 
complicating matters, TNGO leaders exhibit qualitatively different collaborative styles. Some 
TNGOs refuse to accept corporate or government support, while others routinely receive 
corporate donations and coordinate with government ministries. Leaders also report various 
benefits and obstacles to collaborations that are not well known. Each of these topics is discussed 
in the sections that follow.    
98 
 
 
Financial autonomy 
 
When interviewers with the Transnational NGO Interview Project asked leaders if there were 
any additional topics they would like to discuss that were not covered by the protocol, 
respondents reported that more attention could have been paid to discussing the impact of 
funding. Acknowledging this insight, two related questions were added to the interview protocol. 
The first question asked: ―Can you describe how you secure funders and resources for your 
organization?‖ Responses were captured with a general qualitative code, description of how 
funders and resources are secured, to facilitate information retrieval for qualitative analysis. The 
follow-up question asked ―How does the need to secure funding affect your goals, strategies and 
the organization internally?‖ Again, responses were captured with a general qualitative code, 
effect of the need to secure funding, to assist with information retrieval for qualitative analysis. 
Because these codes have no meaningful quantitative interpretations, they are not included in the 
quantitative dataset as variables. Additionally, from a statistical standpoint there is no possibility 
for structured, facilitated inquiry using finite mixture modeling since leaders‘ response vectors 
contain a maximum of one response variable.  
 
However, the qualitative data are quite rich. To proceed with analysis, all quotations coded with 
effect of the need to secure funding were extracted and reviewed. These quotations contain about 
29,000 words. Particularly insightful quotations have been selected discretionarily. 
 
A large part of the debate over TNGO autonomy turns upon a chicken-or-the-egg problem: does 
funding drive programming or does programming drive funding? ―There‘s always that tension...‖ 
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one leader said, ―do you pursue your own vision and mission or do you get driven by the agendas 
of your donors‖ (ID = 4)? If money principally determines where organizations work, what they 
do and how they do it, then transnational NGOs are essentially subcontractors; if they are 
mission-driven organizations that rely upon the trust and generosity of altruistic donors, then 
they exercise considerable discretion and autonomy to influence world politics in ways that may 
run counter to the interests of states and corporations.  
 
Many organizations appear to zealously guard their missions even at the expense of losing 
donors or turning down potentially lucrative contracts. However, these same organizations also 
express a broad willingness to adapt their strategies and programs to accommodate the demands 
of funders, as long as donor requirements fall within the general contours of their supervening 
goals and principles.  
 
At least two alternative characterizations of TNGOs are possible. A naïve view implies that 
TNGOs are authentic representatives of global civil society that raise resources on the basis of 
their programs (e.g. Boli & Thomas, 1999a; Warkentin, 2001), while a cynical view suspects that 
TNGOs are merely subcontractors competing for contracts issued by states and other resourseful 
institutions (e.g. Cooley & Ron, 2002).   
 
These two perspectives should be understood within the context of a conceptual distinction that 
many TNGO leaders articulated. Respondents consistently distinguished between their 
organizations‘ general missions and their specific programs, tending to be fiercely protective of 
the former and strategically accommodating with respect to the latter. The mission-program 
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distinction is subtle but important. For example, one respondent (ID = 144) said that ―by in large, 
foundations are determining—much like big money determining candidates and…politics in the 
United States—foundations determine quite often the direction of programs,‖ whereas another 
(ID = 32) flatly stated, ―We never have created a goal to match a foundation‘s requirement.‖ The 
naïve-cynical distinction can be reformulated in part as a question of how deeply donor demands 
influence TNGO behavior.  
 
Transnational NGOs may not necessarily reformulate their missions in response to donor 
pressure, but they do seem to be highly opportunistic at a programmatic level when lucrative 
funding opportunities materialize. ―There's been a couple of programs that we've taken on,‖ one 
respondent said, ―that with hindsight, I think we were too influenced by the fact that the money 
was available, and it really wasn't a big priority for us, but because the money was there, we did 
it.‖ He or she continued that ―usually those don't turn out very well because we don‘t have the 
capacity or skills or interest to really do them well. But those were specific programs rather than 
broad policy or goals‖ (ID = 11). Another respondent explained how a malaria education 
program began ―because [a corporation]…put out a call for proposals…dealing with malaria 
in…Africa and we responded to that…There was a funding opportunity to do something that we 
probably wouldn‘t have done otherwise.‖ Continuing, ―Similarly, [another corporation] has 
um…pushed us into an area that we probably wouldn‘t have gone into otherwise‖ (ID = 59).  
 
Organizations face strong incentives to adopt a subcontracting model that can bring in large 
amounts of funds more efficiently than soliciting thousands of small individual contributors. One 
small service delivery TNGO encountered such persistent fundraising difficulties with its ―tin 
101 
 
cup approach‖ that it eventually merged with a much larger organization to better secure its 
financial future (ID = 128). ―We‘ve gone from being a mission-driven organization to a contract-
driven organization or a client-driven organization, which means the client is the person who 
issues a contract, so a client-driven organization,‖ the respondent said. The strategy enabled his 
or her organization to take part in a multiyear, multimillion dollar project funded by USAID.  
 
A respondent from a faith-based service delivery TNGO described a similarly contract-driven 
strategy (ID = 101). 
 
And so what we try to do is we try to match what we're doing with what foundations are 
interested in. And we often frequently end up writing unsolicited proposals and some of 
those get funded. Same thing is true of government sources. I mentioned USAID. You 
just have to keep your ear the ground to find out what, what it is that they're interested in 
funding…you basically have to figure out, okay, what is it that the donor is interested in 
and then you try to tailor your requests around that, but always keeping in mind what 
you're trying to accomplish with the poor. 
 
Funding can be an important driver of programs and subcontracting can be an effective 
fundraising strategy. However, the subcontracting model may undermine organizational 
autonomy.  
 
Powerful benefactors capable of influencing TNGO behavior include governments, activist 
donors, corporations and foundations. Of these four, governments are generally the most 
102 
 
controversial and draw the greatest interest from international relations scholars. If TNGOs are 
subcontractors to states then their role in world politics is effectively determined by national 
interests. Indeed, in one respondent‘s words, ―sometimes you gotta do the bidding of the United 
States government and you don‘t have the freedom to do what you want to do. You know they 
basically look upon the use of government money as an extension of US government policy.‖ 
When governments are major funders and TNGOs act as subcontractors, the ―tendency is always 
to follow the money and to be dominated by accountability to the US government‖ (ID = 77).  
 
Reflecting strongly upon the political character of what TNGOs do, many leaders implicated 
government money as a singularly compromising force to transnational activism. A respondent 
from an animal rights TNGO noted that minimizing government funding was organizational 
policy ―because we‘re an advocate organization. We [want] to stay away from, from large 
government grants because it…inhibits our ability to speak out‖ (ID = 10). The primary concern, 
presumably, is that government agencies will strategically withhold or fail to renew funding on 
key contracts if a TNGO refuses to cooperate.  
 
A respondent (ID = 28) from a human rights TNGO offered his or her assessment of the risk 
involved when challenging government policy on the one hand while receiving government 
funding on the other.  
 
We‘ve considered having [to finesse relationships with government funders] and decided 
not to. I mean, that‘s kind of the way…what it came down to was we do get money from 
the State Department, from USAID, Office of Refugees…but it‘s very straightforward 
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contract work, and we made the decision early on that we weren‘t going to change any of 
our principles or the way that we do our work, or not speak out on those things and that 
we would, you know, ‗God help us,‘ you know, try to deal with, you know any potential 
repercussions later. And we haven‘t had those. It was the same piece when we decided, 
again I keep coming back to [DELETED], testifying ‗cause that was a very public thing 
to do. Very you know, kind of an edgy time, and the decision was made that we would do 
it, and we you know, we certainly heard back from that in support and others who 
thought maybe we shouldn‘t have, but we did not see any negative impact for 
development work or from our contract work. 
 
However, most leaders did not describe government funding as a strategic lever of state control. 
Instead, government contracts are often seen as providing bridge money that can be useful for 
covering expenses while organizations search for less restrictive contributions. ―We try not to be 
donor driven,‖ a typical respondent said. ―In fact, that is a dirty word in [DELETED]. We'll 
even, I mean, a lot of NGOs will seek government grants that they don't really want or need but 
they feel like they have to have them because they need cash‖ (ID = 139). Overall, large grants 
from powerful institutions like states, corporations and foundations can be pursued very 
selectively. Leaders accept disproportionately large contracts on the precondition that donor 
priorities already cohere with their missions.  
 
We only um, pursue those projects and that funding if it is very, very closely aligned to 
what our priorities and what our strategies already are. And I think…it can be very 
tempting, right to…to sort of be staring at this five million dollar potential grant—‗Oh 
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but that's going to require us to, to do this and that; well we really weren't thinking about 
that, but hey it's five million dollars‘—you know? I think that we've been very good so 
far, in not going there (ID = 14).   
 
The threat of eroding organizational autonomy with big contracts and large individual 
contributions is salient among respondents, and most leaders implement strategies to mitigate 
this vulnerability. These strategies include raising unrestricted funds, diversifying funding 
sources, educating donors and strategically structuring their organizations transnationally. 
Theoretical perspectives that view TNGOs as subcontractors probably apply much more 
narrowly to organizations that receive at least a majority of their funding in restricted form and 
predominantly from a single source. ―We‘ve really striven to, to try to maintain a very high 
percentage of unrestricted money, and non-governmental [money] so we‘re not encumbered by 
government regulations, government procurement policy, all the USAID you know, architecture 
that comes with that,‖ a respondent from a large TNGO said, ―so we‘re not chasing that money 
and…we don‘t chase major donors who want to be highly engaged in restricting and directing 
their funding…we‘ll walk away‖ (ID = 69). 
 
Another respondent said that his or her organization targeted unrestricting funding specifically to 
avoid the ―whole mission creep thing‖ that often occurs ―when you‘re running around chasing 
USAID dollars.‖ The leader continued, ―that was the whole reason behind having a grassroots 
independent funding base—to give us that freedom, that flexibility, those unrestricted 
resources…‖ (ID = 136). This was echoed by several other respondents, one of whom declared 
that moving to a ninety percent unrestricted funding base had ―been extremely effective‖ and had 
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―allowed [their] programs to grow tremendously, and it allowed [them] to get away from 
government funding…‖ This despite acknowledging that the pursuit of ―unrestricted multiyear 
commitments…goes a little bit against the grain of fundraising strategies‖ (ID = 56). 
 
In addition to promoting organizational autonomy, unrestricted funding is valuable to TNGOs 
because it can be used to fund administrative and fundraising expenses—essential for 
organizational growth and survival—widely disparaged by donors and nonprofit ratings 
agencies. 
 
Leaders unable to secure such large proportions of unrestricted funding necessarily adopt mixed 
strategies, pursuing unrestricted funds when they can and accepting restricted contributions when 
they must. One such respondent said the following (ID = 97): 
 
Several years ago we found that we were a bit too donor driven...we're less that way, but 
it still affects us…we are still confined by the interest of our donors, being able to support 
certain areas. We can use unrestricted funds for certain things and, of course, we typically 
try to raise money as unrestricted, but often the donor will say, ‗Well, it's four packets to 
X‘ or ‗It's for the Philippines.‘ 
 
It is natural to assume that donors influence TNGOs with restricted money, but less common to 
acknowledge that TNGOs influence donors about what they should be funding. Concerted efforts 
at donor education constitute another key strategy for supporting TNGO autonomy. Many 
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TNGO leaders discover this strategy through experience, such as the following respondent (ID = 
17):  
 
RESPONDENT: When we got to [a large number of] projects a handful of years ago, 
before the strategic plan, it was because we chased the money. That's the phrase that's 
often used. Chasing the money. It's very hard and often very tempting to do it, especially 
when resources are scarce, like all the time. But we really try to stick to our knitting, be 
extremely rigorous. Funders approaching us, more often a foundation—because the 
individuals, more often than not, trust in us to make the decision as to how the program 
should lay out—foundations come at us with a specific thing. We try to educate them 
around what our programs are and why we're pursuing them compared to anything 
else…For our priorities that we're focusing on, we just have to tell people [that] out of all 
the things, out of all the recommendations, we feel that these are the 
top…recommendations…the most urgent, and we either convince them or we don't. 
 
INTERVIEWER:  And if you don't then you…you let that funder go? 
 
RESPONDENT:  We let the funder go. 
 
Transnational NGOs and donors actively influence one another and the transnational activism 
‗market‘ evinces a similar symmetry. Much is made of the theory that TNGOs are like for-profit 
subcontractors that fiercely compete for large contracts in a market for donor resources (e. g. 
Cooley & Ron, 2002), but the reverse tends to be underemphasized, that donors compete against 
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one another to fund and influence certain TNGOs.  
 
Donors, like TNGOs, have limited resources. Donors presumably attempt to allocate their 
contributions among organizations so as to maximize the expected benefits. The numbers of 
competent TNGOs that work in specific areas are limited and in many instances TNGOs do 
enjoy the luxury of choosing their funders. Transnational NGOs have the most leverage when 
they are reputable, offer highly differentiated services and are already funded to scale. One 
respondent enjoying this position said the following (ID = 5): 
 
If a donor wants to give us money for something that is not part of what [DELTED] does, 
we attempt to educate them as to what [DELETED] is really doing and how it‘s effective 
in helping, and how unique [DELETED] is, in the sense that…there isn‘t another 
organization [that] does what [DELETED] does…and if there still is not consensus on 
that then we do not accept their funds. But we‘re very good at the…it is a very, it is a 
very marketable thing… 
 
Funding is a prevalent challenge for TNGOs and identifying worthy organizations to support is a 
challenge for donors. Scarcity influences both parties to the transactions, not just TNGOs 
searching for contributions but also donors looking for efficacious organizations that match their 
values. Both the naïve and cynical views of TNGOs fail to fully appreciate this reciprocity.  
 
Transnational NGOs raise unrestricted funds from diverse sources and attempt to carve niches 
and educate donors as strategies for maintaining organizational autonomy. Some also have found 
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ways of capitalizing on their transnational organizational structures to the same effect. In the 
contemporary funding environment, donors place increasing value on supporting TNGOs based 
in the developing ‗South‘ instead of the developed ‗North.‘ Some leaders of US-based 
transnational NGOs explained how they were adapting their organizations to meet this new 
reality. 
 
Legally speaking we are a [nonprofit corporation], not a partnership, not an individual, so 
as an American based organization well we are not eligible for ECHO [European 
Commission Humanitarian Aid] money or EU money of any sort and probably even less 
from others, maybe Canada, maybe Australia, but not really. So we are going to, we are 
creating a sister agency in India that will be…an Indian Society, a nonprofit, that we will 
work very closely with, to be able to receive funds from…[non-] US sources (ID = 8). 
 
Another respondent (ID = 132) inasmuch as confirmed this strategy, declaring: ―that‘s one of the 
objectives of setting up these [kinds] of [independent] affiliates is that they can tap into funding 
as Central American organizations that we cannot tap into [as a] US-based organization.‖ This 
particular strategy risks undermining the intent of donors since some US-based TNGOs seem to 
be effectively exploiting technical loopholes to access funding intended for Southern NGOs. 
 
Additionally, some TNGOs join formal confederations that allow them to exploit the financial 
benefits of transnationalism. This structural strategy enables TNGOs to fundraise globally 
through other member organizations, transforming the restrictions that governmental donors 
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often place on funds from obstacles into assets. One respondent explained the strategy as follows 
(ID = 48): 
 
Different nations have different geographic areas of interest and so one of the strengths of 
being in a confederation is that, as a country director, if, for example, the US government 
isn't particularly interested in your country—but the Dutch could be interested or the 
Danes could be interested or the Brits could be interested—you can work with those 
particular national members to get some of the funding that's coming from those 
governments.   
 
Transnational NGOs act strategically to mitigate and circumvent donor requirements and 
safeguard organizational autonomy. Donors also act strategically by imposing conditionalities on 
their contributions. These contrary propensities collide in negotiations between donors and 
TNGOs. Government agencies, activist donors and large foundations demand specific 
commitments from TNGOs as conditions for disbursement. Transnational NGO leaders admit 
that they occasionally adjust their programs to meet donor requirements, but assert that such 
accommodations occur squarely within the contexts of their missions. Transnational NGO 
leaders also persuade donors to adopt their own priorities and appear to be adept at leveraging 
large contracts to fund ongoing expenses while pursuing more desirable funding sources. 
Leaders can structure their organizations transnationally to exploit national preferences and 
technical loopholes and ultimately many can exercise their prerogative to walk away if they feel 
their missions are being threatened.  
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Neither the naïve nor cynical view of transnational activism appears to hold up very well 
empirically. Rather than favoring one over the other, data suggest that donors and TNGOs 
strategically influence one another in a reciprocal, ongoing process of negotiation that primarily 
influences the direction of projects, not missions. Overall, organizational autonomy does not 
appear to be an all or nothing proposition and evidence suggests that independence is a function 
of reputation, specialization, funding diversification and the proportion of unrestricted funds.  
 
Transnational activism achieves a balance between the desire of TNGOs to raise money for 
programs and the occasional need to modify programs to conform to donor expectations. 
Whether the proverbial funding ‗cart‘ drives the programming ‗horse‘ seems less important than 
whether they are both headed in the same direction. As one leader said (ID = 138): 
 
The interesting thing is—this is the chicken and the egg—you have to have the vision and 
the program to get the funding. Money follows vision. It isn't, ‗I want to raise all of this 
money and then we'll go do this‘ There's that fine line that you have to almost promise, 
‗Yes, we will do this, and I'll go find the money.‘ But you have to be very careful or 
you're going to get yourself out there on thin ice and then you don't find the money. I 
wish that I could say that there's a wonderful formula. I'm sure somebody has a 
wonderful formula. But it just sort of works out of my gut in this way. 
 
And another leader said the following (ID = 30): 
 
It‘s a combination of you trying to influence the funders to be interested in the things 
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you‘re interested [in], but in the end, you also get interested in the things that the funders 
will fund.  And it‘s…I think for every organization, there‘s a fine line of trying to hone to 
your values.  I think there are plenty of things [DELETED] will not do even if given 
money to do…I could even give you examples of that but within your set of values and 
the general areas that you‘re interested in, do you skew a little one way or the other 
because that‘s where the funding is? Sure.   
 
TNGO leaders constantly negotiate the operational priorities their own organizations identify 
with those their donors are willing to fund. Organizations face different types of funding 
challenges and tend to adapt pragmatically to their circumstances. For most TNGOs this means 
developing a funded activism model with the flexibility to accommodate a certain level of 
conflict between donor demands and organizational priorities. This involves a certain level of 
―compromise,‖ as one leader termed it, with the commonplace caveat that the outcome be 
consistent with the organization‘s overarching mission (ID = 137): 
 
You often have to compromise because funding agencies—be they governments or 
individuals or foundations—have a particular point of view. The trick is to obviously 
never take money when you don‘t believe in their point of view, but…sometimes their 
point of view and yours overlap but not 100 percent. So how you balance what the donor 
wants to get out of it with what you want to get out of it takes a lot of time and effort and 
skill.  
 
Collaborative style 
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The notion of TNGO autonomy can also be understood in relation to collaborative behavior, 
namely the extent to which TNGOs collaborate with powerful entities like states and 
corporations. Truly independent and autonomous TNGO challenge the status quo by confronting 
states and corporations, not partnering with them. If TNGOs restrict their collaborative behavior 
only to other NGOs, then TNGOs might be more accurately regarded as agents of an authentic 
grassroots global civil society than subservient state subcontractors. To discover how TNGO 
leaders understand organizational collaborations, I again analyze data from the Transnational 
NGO Interview Project. 
 
Data 
 
Transnational NGO leaders were asked a series of questions about their organizations‘ 
collaborative relationships. They were first asked about their collaborations with other NGOs 
and were then asked ―Do you collaborate with other types of organizations or institutions? Why 
or why not?‖ Leaders may also have been prompted as to whether they collaborate with ―NGOs, 
international organizations, governments or corporations.‖ Accordingly, four substantive codes 
were developed to capture their open-ended responses: NGOs, states, corporations and 
intergovernmental organizations. Leaders responses are distributed across 141 valid cases. 
 
Several latent class cluster models were estimated to explore leaders‘ collaborative styles. The 
results are presented in table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Models for collaborative style 
 
Model 
type LL L² 
L² p-
value ΔL² 
ΔL² p-
value %ΔL² 
Class. 
Error BVRs 
 Model1 1-Cluster -345.51 24.15 0.03 . . . . Fail 
Model2 2-Cluster -335.68 4.49 0.77 0.81 0.00 81 0.14 Pass 
Model3 3-Cluster -335.27 3.68 0.97 0.18 0.97 85 0.34 Pass 
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The null of homogenous or random response patterns is rejected since the L
2
 p-value for Model1 
is within the conventional limit. Model2 contains no local dependencies, provides adequate 
model fit, represents a statistically significant improvement over the null model and explains 
most of the association among the indicator variables. Model3 offers virtually no improvement 
over Model2, so Model2 is the preferred model. The latent class and conditional probabilities are 
presented in table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Results for Model2 (collaborative style) 
  
Cluster1 Cluster2 
Prob.(Cluster) 
 
0.63 0.37 
 
p-
value 
  Intergovernmental 
organizations 0.01 0.23 0.60 
Corporations 0.00 0.38 0.76 
States 0.00 0.29 0.92 
NGOs 0.11 0.81 0.95 
    
  
n = 141 
 
  
116 
 
About 63 percent of leaders vastly prefer to partner with other NGOs than with corporations, 
states or intergovernmental organizations. This collaborative style is labeled ‗protective‘ because 
favoring partnerships with other NGOs likely serves to protect organizational autonomy.  
 
The remaining 37 percent of leaders describe collaborative relationships not only with other 
NGOs, but also with states in almost equal likelihood, followed by corporations and 
intergovernmental organizations. This collaborative style is labeled ‗interdependent‘ because 
leaders are more likely to partner with a wider range of actors, potentially engendering 
relationships of dependence that could threaten organizational autonomy.  
 
Crosstabs between collaborative style, coder ID and interviewer ID did not present strong 
evidence of coder bias (n = 141, chi2(4) = 8.18, p = 0.09) or interviewer bias (n = 141, chi2(6) = 
5.65, p = 0.46).  
 
Cluster1: The protective collaborative style 
 
This collaborative style (mean PMP = 0.90) describes TNGOs that actively refuse to partner with 
states and corporations as a matter of principle as well as organizations that are more passively 
selective. In one discussion typical of the protective collaborative style (ID = 9, PMP = 0.98), the 
respondent said that his or her organization would only partner with other NGOs: 
 
in a extremely minimal way. Never with governments. And corporations, again, 
extremely limited. Always stuff that can be really isolated…if you know, if 3M or GE or 
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whomever said, ―We‘ve got a plan,‖ we would not touch it; we just would not touch it. 
We could be in an economic crisis and we would not touch it, just would not touch it.  
 
However, most leaders do not harbor this strong distaste, but are nevertheless disinclined to 
partner with governments and corporations. One such leader (ID = 24, PMP = 0.98) said that 
―there are times when we have friendly conversations with, or conversations that are at least not 
unfriendly, or at least they're interested in listening to us with the, you know, government offices. 
It's not too often…‖ His or her organization is ―not so much in partnership‖ with governments as 
merely in acquaintance with them. ―And with corporations,‖ the respondent continued, ―no. In 
fact at the [DELETED] we are not supposed to take money from any corporation or 
government…‖  
 
Other leaders are simply highly selective about the types of organizations with which they 
collaborate. For example, one leader (ID = 95, PMP = 0.93) admitted that ―we work with a lot of 
corporations but we don't work with the U.N., don't work with the World Bank, don't work with 
USAID.‖ The respondent added that he or she does not have much faith in the ability of 
governments to address social problems, saying that ―we have some very interesting thoughts 
about the role of government in, I mean, I do personally, on social services for the poor…I tend 
to be, I'm not sure governments are very effective.‖ 
 
Still for other leaders other types of organizations are simply not as relevant to them as other 
NGOs. One such respondent‘s organization (ID = 31, PMP = 0.99) collaborates with ―labor 
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groups‖ and ―HIV groups‖ but the respondent seems to be more focused on his or her 
interpersonal relationships with activists in other NGOs:  
 
we clearly collaborate a lot with feminist and women‘s rights organizations. Because the 
issues of sexuality have such crossover, and frankly there are a lot of lesbians in each 
community doing work, and so there is just this crossover in terms of just our colleagues, 
and our long-term colleagues, and some of us have been around if not doing work 
internationally, have been around and known people, known each other for a very long 
time. 
 
The protective collaborative style favors partnerships with other NGOs, often to the deliberate 
exclusion of states, corporations and intergovernmental organizations. Respondents vary in the 
intensity of their convictions that organizations other than NGOs should be avoided, but 
otherwise the style is straightforward.  
 
Cluster2: The interdependent collaborative style 
 
This collaborative style (mean PMP = 0.79) includes TNGOs that partner with both corporations 
and governments, as well as those that partner with corporations but not governments. Many 
organizations exhibiting this collaborative style work within the environmental, humanitarian 
relief and sustainable development sectors. 
 
One environmental TNGO, for example, regularly collaborates with governments and partners 
with major corporations to certify their products (ID = 14, PMP = 0.92): 
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We have substantial relationships with companies like [DELETED], and [DELETED], 
and [DELETED], and some of the larger [DELETED] companies, beyond just being 
certification clients, or whatever, we have our, at our gala every year, we recognize our 
corporate partners, they're part of the whole thing, the recognition thing. We call attention 
to some of those companies each year, so corporate, and then governments, I mean we 
have, you know, formal, like MOU's [memorandums of understanding] with, you know, 
ministries, government ministries in various countries, just as sort of, to work toward 
similar purposes in the environmental sector, or the tourism sector for example 
 
A leader from another environmental TNGO (ID = 20, PMP = 0.69) candidly explained that his 
or her organization works ―with governments, not for governments:‖ 
 
since it's anonymous, I will say this…my strategy is that we work with governments, not 
for governments. Working for governments is suicide in terms of your money, in terms of 
your project, in terms of them stealing everything from you…but that doesn't mean that 
we don't work with them. Purposely, we create a program where we don't have to ask for 
permission. We don't go and say, "Oh, we're going to be working in this country," 
because then they want to get more involved and get more of a little bita—that's a 
Spanish word for "little bite"—they want their part. We try to avoid that. 
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A leader from a humanitarian relief organization (ID = 45, PMP = 0.69) explained how his or her 
organization collaborates intimately with corporations, governments and NGOs. Adopting a 
corporate idiom, the respondent said: 
 
In the global humanitarian assistance program, we basically operate as an intermediary 
between the wealth and the capacity of pharmaceutical and medical equipment 
companies and resource starved communities. And we systematically cover those 
companies. We seek to establish a strategic connection to their corporate philanthropy 
and their corporate sustainability and responsibility programs to service their 
intermediaries for product donations… 
 
We work with local healthcare providers and intermediaries like the ministries of health 
and clinic operators to be our in-country partners and so our objective is to supply them 
and strengthen them… 
 
We have some places in which the government is an in-country partner, the Minister of 
Health…and to the extent that you‘re working in any of these countries, you at least have 
to have a relationship with the Ministry of Health. But, it would be relatively unusual for 
us to have a program partnership with the Ministry of Health… 
 
The respondent also mentioned several ―great partnerships‖ with prominent TNGOs. A leader 
from another humanitarian relief organization (ID = 60, PMP = 0.69) said that in addition to their 
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corporate partners, ―we have partners that are governments,‖ but they are chosen very 
selectively:  
 
You either have to be a nonprofit NGO group to be a partner with us or a government. 
Now, it's not every government. Domestically we work with a lot of different 
governments, like an aging services department of a county or something like that. We do 
a lot of that kind of stuff to help them get product and supplies to help their groups, 
because they have very limited budgets, so we feel like that fits. Some governments and 
some countries we would never work with, because of the worry about it getting resold or 
used for something else is too great. So, we would rather find and NGO to work with, but 
we will work with governments.  
 
A leader from a sustainable development TNGO (ID = 133, PMP = 0.92) described partnerships 
with NGOs, corporations and governments. For instance, their relationship with: 
 
―[CORPORATION 1] goes back to about 1990. And actually goes back to when it was 
[DELETED]. It's had several mergers. So we now have a very close relationship with 
them. And we have two [CORPORATION 1] executives on our board. We just got a fifty 
thousand dollar grant for our work in India from them. [CORPORATION 2] became a 
donor several years ago. There is a [CORPORATION 2] executive who is on our board 
as well. There are others, but those would be the two biggest. 
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They also ―get funding from the…bilaterals and multilaterals‖ and ―have a small grant from the 
World Band through [DELETED] to do a test pilot program in India.‖ Interestingly, the 
respondent claimed that ―we don't work with governments,‖ but added ―with one exception: 
[COUNTRY]. One of our local partners is the ministry of health. It just happened that way. 
They're able to deliver service at a high level.‖ 
 
Overall, the interdependent collaborative style is more likely than the protective style to involve 
loose collaborations or formal partnerships with governments, corporations and 
intergovernmental organizations. Relationships with governments can take many forms, as one 
respondent remarked that his or her organization works with, but not for governments. Corporate 
partnerships are also varied, as some TNGOs receive donated goods from corporations while 
others certify corporate products. Collaborations with intergovernmental organizations typically 
place TNGOs in the role of funding recipient, although some leaders mentioned that they 
benefited from the research and other work of intergovernmental organizations including UN 
agencies.  
 
Discussion 
 
Theorization about the role of TNGOs in world affairs is often driven by purposive case studies 
of single sectors or individual organizations, and inconsistent generalizations are difficult to 
reconcile and contextualize. This is also true in debates over TNGO autonomy and independence 
from states. Compare, for instance, McCormick‘s (1999, pp. 56, 53) favorable view of 
environmental TNGOs on the grounds that these organizations ―function outside the rule-making 
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process‖ of governments and ―contribute to the development of a global civil society‖ with 
Cooley and Ron‘s (2002, pp. 5, 36) disapproving assessment of humanitarian aid TNGOs in 
which they find widespread evidence of ―subverted nominal agendas,‖ ―inhibit[ed] cooperation‖ 
and ―dysfunctional results.‖  
 
The TNGO data reveal a more nuanced picture. The interdependent collaborative style is most 
common among sustainable development, environmental and humanitarian relief organizations, 
based on classifications provided by Charity Navigator. The protective style is most common 
among conflict resolution and human rights organizations, as shown in table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: Collaborative style by sector 
  
Sector 
  Environment 
Human 
Rights 
Humanitarian 
Relief 
Sustainable 
Development 
Conflict 
Resolution 
  
Collaborative 
style 
Protective 
52% 81% 64% 51% 83% 
11 17 18 30 10 
Interdependent 
48% 19% 36% 49% 17% 
10 4 10 29 2 
       
 
Percentage 
total 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Count total 21 21 28 59 12 
  
     
  
N = 141, chi2(4) = 9.37, p = 0.05 
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Benefits and obstacles to collaborations 
 
Transnational NGO leaders were also asked about the benefits and obstacles to collaborations. 
Regarding the benefits, leaders were asked: ―What kinds of benefits, if any, do you see resulting 
from networks and the formation of partnerships?‖ Ten substantive codes were developed to 
capture their open-ended responses: better results (for example, increased effectiveness, 
increased efficiency), broader programs (for example, can help more people, make a larger 
impact), increased funding, better understanding, (for example, better understanding of 
substantive issues), local capabilities, learning, enhanced visibility, better access (for example, 
registration, government requirements, accreditation, invitations to delegations, etc.), legitimacy 
or credibility (for example, with donors, policy makers and peers), and legal. The results are 
presented in figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: Benefits of collaborations 
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n = 129, error bars represent the 95% confidence interval
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Overall, better results was the most frequently mentioned benefit of partnerships or 
collaborations, while about 40 percent of leaders mentioned increased funding. Leaders from 
TNGOs with an interdependent collaborative style were more likely to have mentioned increased 
funding as a benefit of collaboration (54 percent versus 34 percent, n = 126, chi2(1) = 5.04, p = 
0.03). 
 
Regarding obstacles to partnerships and collaborations, leaders were asked: ―Are there obstacles 
or challenges that arise in the formation of partnerships and networks?‖ Seven substantive codes 
were developed to capture their open-ended responses: incompatibility of missions (for example, 
concerns about compatibility of missions or agendas), muddled management (for example, roles 
and responsibility, accountability, uncertainty about leadership, no partnership experience, ‗too 
many cooks in the kitchen,‘ etc.), reduction of resources (for example, loss of resources to 
partners, less funding individually or for the field, etc.), time (for example, too time consuming 
in comparison to going at it alone), organizational cultures (for example, conflicts about how to 
manage the collaboration), loss of control (for example, too many concessions, concerns over 
intellectual capital/ownership of ideas, etc.), and lack of confidence (for example, concerns about 
reliability and trustworthiness). The results are shown in figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Obstacles to Collaborations 
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Incompatibility of missions was the most commonly mentioned obstacle, which suggests that 
TNGO leaders are relatively concerned about safeguarding their missions and prefer to partner 
with likeminded organizations. 
 
Conclusion  
 
In sum, transnational NGOs are strategic in their own rights and appear to be highly protective of 
their overarching missions even though they may strategically adjust their programs in response 
to donor preferences. On balance, neither TNGOs nor donors appear to be clearly dominant and 
both parties seem to be engaged in a reciprocal relationship of mutual negotiation. Transnational 
NGOs with strong brand recognition, diversified funding sources and a high proportion of 
unrestricted funds can walk away from pushy donors rather than compromise their missions. 
When financial pressures become more intense, TNGOs can secure government or other large 
grants to serve as bridge funding. Finally, transnational organization gives TNGOs additional 
autonomy-preserving efficiencies since organizations can acquire funds internationally that may 
be unavailable domestically and can use Southern partners to secure resources ostensibly 
unavailable to Northern organizations. 
 
The debate over the desirability and implications of TNGO autonomy is confounded by 
heterogeneity in TNGOs‘ organizational types and collaborative styles. Protective TNGOs are 
most likely to work in the conflict resolution and human rights sectors, where neutrality and 
distance from government, corporate and intergovernmental interests is presumably an asset. For 
these organizations, autonomy enhances organizational effectiveness by maintaining 
independence and neutrality. Interdependent TNGOs are most likely to work in the sustainable 
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development, environment and humanitarian relief sectors, where corporations, governments and 
intergovernmental organizations are major players whose complicity and support may be 
necessary for organizational effectiveness. These TNGOs may receive donated medical supplies 
from corporations to distribute to beneficiaries, while collaborating with ministries of health to 
streamline service delivery, for example. For such organizations, maintaining independence from 
important institutions may significantly hinder service delivery and ultimately prove 
counterproductive. The normative desirability of TNGO autonomy, in short, is contingent upon 
organizational type.  
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CHAPTER SIX: TAXONOMY  
 
The possibility that different types of TNGOs serve different roles in the international system 
may be regarded by now as self-evident. Unfortunately, agreement is lacking as to the 
specification of any one taxonomy of TNGOs specifically relevant for international relations 
theorists. This chapter presents a taxonomical meta-analysis of criteria commonly used to 
differentiate among different types of TNGO. The result is a synthetic taxonomy of TNGOs.   
 
Transnational NGOs are difficult to define and distinguish from other types of organizations 
using formal criteria. Many established taxonomies include TNGOs as a type of 
nongovernmental organization, international organization or nonprofit organization. Within these 
taxonomies, TNGOs are rarely a clearly distinguished subset. More commonly, TNGOs are 
placed into broad categories or are distributed across multiple subcategories. Moreover, the most 
established classificatory systems generally do not correspond with the classification criteria 
implicitly used by academics in international relations, which generally exclude lobbying 
organizations and interest groups, for example (Willetts, 2002). 
 
Salamon and Anheier (1992) reviewed several taxonomies that have been adopted at the 
international level. The United Nations offers an International Standard Industrial Classification 
System (ISIC) that contains three categories that could be used to identify NGOs: organizations 
that are engaged in education, health and social work or other community, social and personal 
activities. The Eurostat General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities (NACE) system 
goes further by distinguishing between research and development and recreation and cultural 
organizations within the ISIC‘s latter residual category.  
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The Union of International Associations (UIA) provides a comprehensive inventory of 
international organizations. The UIA‘s taxonomy includes 15 categories of organizations further 
classified into five main clusters, each of which is divided into intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations. They counted 10,399 international nongovernmental 
organizations in 2002, although this category includes trade unions and trade associations, which 
might be considered lobbying groups, not TNGOs. Caution is warranted since UIA numbers can 
vary widely depending upon whether one refers to international organizations, intergovernmental 
organizations, nongovernmental organizations or various combinations or subsets ("Yearbook of 
International Associations: Statistics, visualizations and patterns," 2003/2004, p. 3).  
 
Within the United States, the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) produces the 
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE), which offers several hundred detailed 
categories organized into 26 major groups (Lampkin, Romeo, & Finnin, 2001; Salamon & 
Anheier, 1992). The closest NTEE category to TNGOs is labeled ―international, foreign affairs, 
and national security.‖ The 2007 NCCS dataset contains 6,500 such entities filing IRS Forms 
990, which are required for 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations with revenues greater than 
$25,000. Figure 6.1 shows that nearly half of all these international organizations were classified 
as either international development or international relief agencies. Note that some categories are 
missing labels in the NCCS codebook.  
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Figure 6.1: NTEE classification (international, foreign affairs and national security)  
 
  
Q36 Unlabeled
Q51 International Economic & Trade Policy
Q02 Management & Technical Assistance
Q42 United Nations Associations
Q43 National Security
Q39 Unlabeled
Q03 Professional Societies & Associations
Q19 Support NEC
Q71 International Migration & Refugee …
Q38 Unlabeled
Q01 Alliances & Advocacy
Q31 International Agricultural Development
Q41 Arms Control & Peace
Q99 International, Foreign Affairs & …
Q23 International Exchange NEC
Q05 Research Institutes & Public Policy …
Q50 International Affairs, Foreign Policy & …
Q70 International Human Rights
Q40 International Peace & Security
Q34 Unlabeled
Q21 International Cultural Exchange
Q32 International Economic Development
Q22 International Academic Exchange
Q11 Single Organization Support
Q35 Democracy & Civil Society Development
Q12 Fund Raising & Fund Distribution
Q20 Promotion of International …
Q30 International Development
Q33 International Relief
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
N = 6,500
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Filers are asked to apply up to three IRS activity codes to their organizations. However, almost 
half of organizations have nothing coded as their first activity, and still less data are available for 
secondary and tertiary activities. Among those reporting primary activities, the most common is 
qualified state-sponsored tuition (9 percent), followed by other related school activities (4 
percent), gifts, grants or loans to other organizations (3 percent), discussion groups, forums, 
panels, lectures, etc. (3 percent), supplying money, goods or services to the poor (2 percent), 
501(k) childcare (2 percent), cultural exchanges with foreign countries (2 percent), boy scouts, 
girl scouts, etc. (2 percent) and missionary activities (2 percent). Clearly, the NTEE system is 
designed for legal and tax purposes, not international relations theorization.  
 
Researchers working with the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, after having 
intensively reviewed the most prominent classification systems, created the International 
Classification of Nonprofit Organizations (ICNPO) containing 12 major categories each with 
several detailed subcategories tailored to the nonprofit sector. This was propounded around 1992 
and by 2006 had reportedly attracted some interest (Tice & Salamon, 2006). Other classificatory 
schemes include the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and AIRS/INFO 
LINE Taxonomy of Human Services, but neither of these is well suited for researching 
nonprofits (Lampkin et al., 2001). For these reasons, yet another system was created, the 
Nonprofit Program Classification system (NPC), to augment the NTEE system with a menu of 
26 major categories and about 1,000 subcategories.  
 
Current taxonomies generally do not contain categories that correspond well with what scholars 
commonly consider to be transnational NGOs. Instead, most established classification systems 
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have been created for arcane legal and tax purposes, such as for facilitating taxation, regulation 
or representation to international bodies. None of the current systems is capable of intuitively 
differentiating TNGOs by their goals, strategies and activities, which would be much more 
useful to scholars of international relations who often subdivide organizations by function or 
sector to promote theoretical clarity.  
 
A few international relations scholars have attacked the classificatory problem directly. After an 
extensive review of attempts by numerous scholars and experts to produce general and specific 
taxonomies of NGOs, Vakil (1997) recommended that a general framework be adopted for 
developing a taxonomy in the future. The recommended framework involves identifying 
―essential‖ and ―specific‖ criteria for sorting NGOs. Essential criteria could include orientation 
and level of operation, while specific descriptors could include sectoral foci and evaluative 
attributes. Orientation here refers to organizations‘ main area of activity, potentially ―welfare, 
development, advocacy, development education networking and research‖ (Vakil, 1997, p. 
2063). Sectoral foci might include the environment, healthcare or other substantive fields.  
 
Vakil‘s distinction between activity and sector is more permeable for other taxonomists, 
however. For example, Spar and Dail (2002) identify ten types of NGOs: health services, 
infrastructural services, development assistance, education, commercial services, refugee 
assistance, basic needs, social development, environmental concerns and human rights. Spar and 
Dail‘s scheme apparently collapses Vakil‘s multiple criteria into a single categorical variable.  
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Naturally additional taxonomies are possible and can be created to suit specific purposes. 
Scholars differentiate organizations according to systemic location (Northern or Southern), scope 
(global or local), function (service or advocacy), sector or issue-area (environment, human rights, 
etc.), social purpose (solidarity or mutual benefit), form (formal or informal, network or 
federation, etc.) and so forth (DeMars, 2005; Kaldor, 2003). Many of these distinctions imply or 
operationalize particular theoretical perspectives. For instance, the North-South distinction is 
often employed in discussions of systemic power asymmetries between Northern and Southern 
organizations, while others use the service-advocacy distinction as proxy indication of whether 
NGOs partner with or challenge governments (e.g. DeMars, 2005).  
 
Taxonomies of TNGOs are often created for tax and legal purposes, but they are also applied 
within particular research programs to explore certain theoretical relationships. The categories 
and distinctions employed by researchers determine what questions can be asked and what 
answers are possible. As heuristic devices, they structure empirical and theoretical inquiry and 
sustain distinct research programs emphasizing particular units of analysis and theoretical 
approaches.  
 
Common taxonomic criteria  
 
Scholars commonly recognize distinctions by sector, function, degree of autonomy, mode of 
influence and strategic repertoire (DeMars, 2005; Kaldor, 2003; Vakil, 1997). Organizational 
sector or issue-areas often include categories such as environment, human rights, humanitarian 
relief, sustainable development and conflict resolution. The functional classification generally 
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includes service delivery-advocacy or equivalently, operational-campaigning organizations 
(Willetts, 2002). This functional distinction can have important theoretical implications for 
theories of NGOs and world politics. For example, Lecy et al. (2010) caution that service and 
advocacy organizations exhibit different characteristics which impose scope conditions for 
grafting theories of the firm or collective action onto NGOs. Moreover, DeMars (2005) asserts 
that service NGOs tend to cooperate with states whereas advocacy NGOs are more 
confrontational. Incidentally, an independence test between collaborative style and function 
reveals that although there is a small effect along these lines it is not statistically significant (n = 
141, chi2(2) = 0.72, p = 0.70). 
 
Scholars discuss the primary mode of TNGO influence in world affairs, with most affirming that 
TNGOs wield some form of ideational, cultural, normative or discursive power, as distinctly 
opposed to material or coercive influence (Boli & Thomas, 1999a; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 
2006; Struett, 2008). Many analyze the strategic repertories of TNGOs, generally focusing on 
ideational rather than material tactics (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Ron et al., 
2007; Sell & Prakash, 2004). Finally, at the broadest level scholars study the overall significance 
of TNGOs to world affairs, debating the extent to which they empower grassroots civil society to 
challenge the status quo or simply alleviate failures of the international system (DeMars, 2005; 
Jaeger, 2007; Josselin & Wallace, 2001a; Warkentin, 2001). 
 
As such, classifications of TNGOs according to sector, function, autonomy, mode of influence 
and strategy appear to be among the most useful and relevant to international relations theorists 
seeking to understand the role of TNGOs in world affairs. These classificatory criteria speak to 
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the principal theoretical differences between TNGOs that appear to have the most significant 
implications for many research programs pertaining to transnational activism across various 
subfields.  
 
The following section addresses the problem of TNGO taxonomy empirically by analyzing 
information about leaders‘ organizations derived from both primary interview data and 
secondary sources. While any empirical inquiry necessarily rests upon prior theory and 
categorization, great pains have been taken to substitute inductive learning for deductive 
categorization. This is reflected in the largely inductive development of the protocol questions 
and codebook categories of the Transnational NGO Interview Project. Additionally, I favor 
exploratory over confirmatory statistical analysis. Finally, by incorporating a large number of 
classificatory criteria into a meta-analysis, coverage of the conceptual space is relatively 
thorough and the effect of any one factor is unlikely to dominate the results.  
 
Taxonomy 
 
Taxonomical analysis is based on variables representing the five key criteria mentioned above: 
sector, function, autonomy, mode of influence and strategy. The variable sector was obtained 
from Charity Navigator while the variable function was obtained from information found on 
organizations‘ websites and annual reports. Variables derived from the interviews include 
mission DFactor1 (strategy), mission DFactor2 (mode), activities DFactor1 (strategy) and 
collaborative style. Activities DFactor2 (scope) is excluded because it likely reflects coder bias. 
Incidentally, the biased factor does not contribute significantly to model fit.
16
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Two variables are included to describe the missions and activities of TNGOs. Mission DFactor1 
(strategy) indicates whether TNGO leaders direct their organizations according to an ideology of 
amelioration or empowerment. Activities DFactor1 (strategy) indicates whether leaders believe 
their organizations are actually engaged in ameliorative or empowering activities.  
 
Much is written about the ideational nature of transnational activism and the central role of 
information politics. Mission DFactor2 (mode) indicates whether leaders‘ organizations employ 
more materialistic or ideational modes of influence.  
 
Finally, collaborative style indicates whether leaders‘ organizations are protective or 
interdependent in terms of their propensities to collaborate with entities other than NGOs, such 
as governments and corporations. The latent variable collaborative style may be roughly 
interpreted as a proxy for organizational autonomy.  
 
Several latent class models have been estimated, as indicated in table 6.1. The null of 
homogenous or randomly distributed attribute profiles is rejected since the L
2
 p-value for the 
Model1 is well within the conventional limit. Model2 is similarly rejected since it also fails to 
account for the observed association in the data and contains local dependencies. Model3 
provides adequate model fit. Increasing the number of latent classes from three to four provides 
an ambiguous improvement in model fit since the associated ΔL
2
 p-value only barely 
transgresses the traditional threshold (p = 0.054). In the interest of parsimony, Model3 is 
preferred.  
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Table 6.1: Models for TNGO taxonomy  
 
Model 
type LL L² 
L² p-
value ΔL² 
ΔL² p-
value 
%ΔL² 
Class. 
error BVRs  
 Model1 1-Cluster -527.94 262.01 0.00 . . . . Fail 
Model2 2-Cluster -474.80 155.73 0.03 0.41 0.00 41 0.03 Fail 
Model3 3-Cluster -458.69 123.51 0.16 0.21 0.00 53 0.03 Pass 
Model4 4-Cluster -448.14 102.42 0.29 0.17 0.05 61 0.02 Pass 
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To ensure the solution represented by Model3 is robust and does not simply reproduce the 
sectoral classification, another model was estimated with sector specified as an inactive 
covariate, as discussed in chapter three. This analysis yielded an interpretively identical solution, 
strongly indicating that the results are robust to indicator choice.
17
 The latent class and 
conditional probabilities for Model3 are presented in table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2: Results for Model3 (TNGO Taxonomy) 
   
Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 
Prob.(Cluster) 
  
0.67 0.26 0.08 
 
p-
value 
    
Sector 0.00 
Environment 0.17 0.00 0.72 
Human Rights 0.03 0.58 0.13 
Humanitarian 
Relief 0.26 0.03 0.01 
Sustainable 
Development 0.54 0.06 0.02 
Conflict Resolution 0.00 0.33 0.12 
Function 0.00 
Advocacy 0.05 0.61 0.86 
Service 0.60 0.03 0.13 
Both 0.36 0.35 0.02 
Mission: Strategy 
(DFactor1) 
0.00 Amelioration 0.85 0.16 0.51 
Empowerment 0.15 0.84 0.49 
Mission: Mode 
(DFactor2) 
0.00 
Material 0.90 0.89 0.04 
Ideational 0.10 0.11 0.96 
Activities: Strategy 
(DFactor1) 
0.00 
Amelioration 0.87 0.45 0.04 
Empowerment 0.13 0.55 0.96 
Collaborative Style 0.00 
Protective 0.53 0.84 0.17 
Interdependent 0.47 0.16 0.83 
 
  
n = 106 
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Cluster1: Charitable relief and development TNGOs 
 
The emergent taxonomy reveals that there are three types of TNGO. About two-thirds of TNGOs 
are charitable development and relief organizations. This type of TNGO is most likely to be 
classified as sustainable development and to be regarded as a service organization. Its strategies 
and activities are overwhelmingly ameliorative (rather than empowering) and its mode of 
influence is unequivocally materialistic (rather than ideational). Finally, charitable development 
and relief organizations are more likely than not to partner with powerful actors like 
governments and corporations. Based on average expenditure data for sampled organizations 
over the period 2001 to 2006, this type of TNGO controls about 85 percent of US TNGO 
resources.  
 
Cluster2: Human rights activism TNGOs 
 
About a quarter of organizations are human rights activism TNGOs. They are most likely to be 
classified as human rights organizations and are more likely than not to be regarded as advocacy 
TNGOs. Leaders from this type of TNGO describe missions emphasizing empowerment, but 
when it comes to their organizations‘ actual activities this emphasis is much less pronounced. 
Interestingly, human rights activists appear to eschew ideational tactics like information politics. 
However, they are the most fiercely protective type of TNGO, avoiding partnerships with 
powerful entities that could compromise autonomy. Based on average expenditure data for the 
period 2001 to 2006, this type of TNGO controls about 14 percent of US TNGO resources. 
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Cluster3: Environmental advocacy organizations  
 
Finally, only about eight percent of TNGOs are environmental advocacy organizations. This type 
of TNGO is most likely to be classified as environmental and engaged in advocacy. Leaders of 
these organizations describe their missions in terms of amelioration and empowerment almost 
evenly, but their organizations‘ actual activities are summarily empowering. This is the only type 
of organization that is overwhelming likely to employ ideational tactics like information politics. 
However, environmental advocacy TNGOs are also the most interdependent organizations as 
they are very likely to collaborate with partners like states and corporations in ways that could 
erode autonomy. Based on average expenditure data for the period 2001 to 2006, this type of 
TNGO controls about one percent of US TNGO resources. 
 
Discussion 
 
Scholars of transnational activism often identify Amnesty International and Greenpeace as 
quintessential or exemplary TNGOs (DeMars, 2005; Halliday, 2001; Wapner, 1995; Warkentin, 
2001). As human rights and environmental advocates, respectively, these organizations are 
regarded as exemplifying the research-oriented information politics and occasionally contentious 
activism thought typical of TNGOs generally. But these so-called exemplary or quintessential 
TNGOs are neither representative of US TNGOs nor even of their own categories. As a human 
rights activism organization, Amnesty International is renowned for its research and 
documentation (Hopgood, 2006). But such tactics are empirically uncharacteristic of human 
rights activism organizations, which are unlikely to employ ideational tactics. Greenpeace, as an 
environmental advocacy organization, is also highly atypical. Greenpeace is most famous for its 
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contentious politics that publicly challenge states and corporations, not its collaborations with 
them, as is typical among environmental advocacy TNGOs. Even as a composite category, 
human rights and environmental organizations together only account for about one-third of US 
TNGOs, which together control only about 15 percent of total US TNGO resources. These types 
of organizations are unrepresentative of their categories and far less common and less 
resourceful than charitable development and relief organizations. So-called exemplary 
transnational actors like Amnesty International and Greenpeace are outliers.  
 
This taxonomical result largely comports with that derived by Boli and Thomas (1999a), who 
organized 5,983 TNGOs into 13 sectors using comprehensive UIA data. They concluded that 
about 60 percent of organizations (a percentage they estimated was increasing) ―concentrate on 
economic or technical rationalization,‖ not contentious human rights activism or environmental 
advocacy. Only about 14 percent were ―individual rights/welfare‖ or ―world-polity oriented,‖ by 
contrast, categories which include ―many of the most prominent [T]NGOs, especially 
environment and human rights organizations‖ specifically including Amnesty International and 
Greenpeace (Boli & Thomas, 1999a, pp. 41-45).  
 
Comprehensive 2007 NCCS data for 6,500 international nonprofits filing Forms 990 in the 
United States show 1,642 ―international relief‖ organizations and 1,590 ―international 
development‖ organizations relative to only 57 ―alliances and advocacy‖ organizations (see 
figure 6.1). Relief and development TNGOs dominate the US TNGO sector, while advocacy 
organizations, though commonly the focus of TNGO scholarship, are rare. 
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This implies that international relations scholarship focuses disproportionately on the least 
common and least resourceful types of TNGO: human rights activism (e.g. Berkovitch & 
Gordon, 2008; Hafner-Burton, 2008; Hagel & Peretz, 2005; P. Nelson & Dorsey, 2007; Richard 
Price, 1998; Ron et al., 2007; True & Mintrom, 2001) and environmental advocacy (e.g. 
McCormick, 1999; Raustiala, 1997; Rohrschneider & Dalton, 2002; Wapner, 1995, 1996). 
Accounting for this phenomenon (although employing a slightly different taxonomy), Boli and 
Thomas (1999a, p. 46) noted: 
 
oppositional or emergency-catalyzed activity of human rights, environmental, and relief 
organizations makes them especially prominent in the world polity, while the more 
central rationalizing sectors are much less well known…[the latter‘s] highly rationalized 
universalism (especially in scientific and technical areas) is considered ―neutral‖ and 
therefore unremarkable, despite the enormous effects they have on definitions of reality, 
infrastructure, household products, school texts, and much more. 
 
In other words, even though charitable development and relief organizations are the most 
numerous and resourceful TNGOs in world affairs, they are the least visible and presumably the 
least studied because their work is perceived as less interesting. However, their relative 
invisibility does not imply their relative unimportance. To the contrary, sociological 
institutionalists such as Boli (1999) assert that the rational-voluntaristic form of authority 
common to relief and development TNGOs is manifestly powerful. Similarly, critical scholars 
such as Jaeger (2007) consider their managerialism a key vehicle of neoliberal power in world 
politics.  
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Conclusion 
 
Since TNGOs are a heterogeneous class, scholars often employ taxonomies of TNGOs and focus 
on specific subsets of organizations. While this is useful for promoting theoretical clarity, 
differences in classificatory criteria combined with an abundance of intra-category studies that 
lack an explicit treatment of context and proportion hinder theorization about the roles of 
TNGOs in world affairs. Moreover, a disproportionate emphasis on highly visible and 
uncommonly interesting organizations (for example, organizations purposively selected for their 
role in successful campaigns) apparently leads scholars to incorrectly identify organizations like 
Amnesty International and Greenpeace as exemplary or quintessential TNGOs. However, 
taxonomical analysis suggests that these organizations are highly uncharacteristic of both 
TNGOs generally and of the subcategories they are commonly thought to typify.  
 
Broadly, international relations research seems to focus disproportionately on human rights 
activism and environmental advocacy TNGOs. While few scholars of transnational activism 
would deny the significance of these organizations, combined they probably compose less than a 
third of all US TNGOs and control as little as 14 percent of all US TNGO resources. These 
findings are consistent with data on global TNGOs as well (Boli & Thomas, 1999b).  
 
Much more significant are the charitable development and relief organizations that dominate the 
US TNGO sector in both numbers and resources. However, their ameliorative orientation and 
material mode of influence are not as well understood by international relations theorists in 
comparison to the voluminous studies examining TNGOs involved in contentious advocacy.  
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Theories of transnational politics based on extrapolations from the experiences of highly 
unrepresentative and uncommon organizations are likely to mischaracterize the true significance 
of TNGOs to world politics. More research is needed to better understand the role of charitable 
development and relief TNGOs.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
 
How to define a TNGO‘s organizational effectiveness is among the most important but also most 
difficult challenges of the nonprofit sector. Transnational NGO leaders struggle to demonstrate 
their effectiveness in order to obtain resources and maintain accountability.  
 
Over the last half century, scholars have proposed various definitions or ‗models‘ of 
organizational effectiveness.  Much of this research is based on conceptual analyses and 
stakeholder surveys. Largely absent from this rich academic literature, however, are systematic 
efforts to directly understand how TNGOs define effectiveness empirically. Thus, this chapter 
addresses a simple research question: how do leaders of TNGOs in the United States—as an 
important subset of US nonprofits—define organizational effectiveness?  
 
Background 
 
Within the academic literature on nonprofit management, scholars have proposed various models 
of organizational effectiveness. One model, generally known as the goal attainment model of 
effectiveness, has served as a conceptual anchor in organizational effectiveness scholarship 
(Campbell, 1977; Etzioni, 1964; J. L. Price, 1972; Sheehan Jr, 1996; Spar & Dail, 2002). 
Herman and Renz (1997, 1998, 2004, 2008) have consistently characterized the research 
program as mostly working out alternatives to, or modifications of, the goal attainment model. 
But many scholars argue that this model, which simply posits that organizations are effective to 
the extent to which they achieve their goals, is untenable. For example, goals necessarily reflect 
values and priorities and are therefore not objective (Mohr, 1982). Goals are identified through 
150 
 
processes of negotiation within organizations and are therefore political (Murray & Tassie, 
1994).  Goals are too difficult to concretely specify, precluding measurement (Fowler, 1996; 
Herman & Renz, 1999; Mohr, 1982; Murray & Tassie, 1994; Stone & Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 
2001; Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967). Even if meaningful measurement was possible within an 
organization, differences in goal specification would invalidate comparisons between 
organizations (Mohr, 1982). Finally, even if all these difficulties could be surmounted, it is often 
too difficult, if not impossible, to satisfactorily address the fundamental problem of causal 
attribution (Herman & Renz, 1999; Mohr, 1982; Stone & Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 2001).  
 
In light of the many difficulties with the goal attainment model of effectiveness, scholars have 
proposed a variety of alternatives. Etzioni (1960) proposed effectiveness be defined in terms of 
well-functioning bureaucratic systems; Katz and Kahn (1966) proposed it be a ratio of an 
organization‘s inputs to its outputs; Yuchtman and Seashore (1967), borrowing from ecological 
theory, proposed it be a nonprofit‘s ability to exploit its environment through fundraising; Price 
(1986) equated organizational effectiveness with a nonprofit‘s financial viability; and more 
recently, Herman and Renz (1997, p. 188) have proposed effectiveness be understood as ―a set of 
judgments by various stakeholders‖ rather than ―a real property‖ of organizations. Scholarship in 
this most recent vein has generally sought to identify the implicit criteria stakeholders employ 
when judging the effectiveness of specific organizations, as distinct from identifying how 
nonprofits define effectiveness per se (Herman & Renz, 1997; Packard, 2010; Shilbury & Moore, 
2006; Tassie, Murray, & Cutt, 1998).  
 
151 
 
Forbes (1998) reviewed the literature on nonprofit effectiveness from 1977 to 1997 and 
concluded that treatments of the topic initially attempted to evaluate organizational effectiveness, 
then to identify correlates of effectiveness and finally to focus on processes. However, this 
impressive body of academic research has generally not focused on how nonprofits define 
organizational effectiveness.  
 
More recently, Herman and Renz (2008) aptly summarized the state of the art of organizational 
effectiveness research in ―nine theses.‖ Among their theses, they conclude that organizational 
effectiveness is always comparative, multidimensional and socially constructed, and offer 
―stakeholder responsiveness‖ as ―a useful organizational-level effectiveness measure‖ (Herman 
& Renz, 2008, p. 399). They note that a ―measure that leaves to the respondent just what criteria 
are to be used might offer a way [of] recognizing the social construction of effectiveness but still 
allow for aggregating stakeholders‘ judgments of effectiveness‖ (Herman & Renz, 2008, p. 405).  
 
Such conclusions have encouraged scholars to consider increasingly complex perceptual, 
multiple stakeholder and multidimensional models, often emphasizing stakeholder perceptions 
and judgments (Herman & Renz, 1997; Lecy, Schmitz, & Swedlund, 2010; Packard, 2010; 
Shilbury & Moore, 2006; Sowa, Selden, & Sandfort, 2004; Tassie et al., 1998). Meanwhile, the 
practical challenge of measuring organizational effectiveness persists. Nonprofit rating and 
designation agencies have emerged in the United States offering evaluations of nonprofit 
effectiveness and efficiency based primarily or exclusively on financial data. Such assessments 
take neither stakeholders‘ perceptions nor organizations‘ programmatic achievements into 
account, and although these ratings are widely consulted, they are also considered to be deeply 
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flawed (Hager, Pollak, Wing, & Rooney, 2004a, 2004b; Hager, Pollak, Wing, Rooney, & Flack, 
2004; Lowell, Trelstad, & Meehan, 2005; Ogden et al., 2009). Although scholars have even 
recommended the construct be dropped (Kahn, 1977), the quest for a workable definition of 
organizational effectiveness is simply too important to abandon. Despite the ―conceptual disarray 
and contradictions of organizational effectiveness…,‖ Murray and Tassie (1994, p. 322) remind 
us, ―managers still must manage, and various stakeholders still make judgments…‖ Much hangs 
in the balance, but without a workable definition of what it means for a nonprofit to be effective 
the problem of appropriately evaluating organizational effectiveness must remain. 
 
A good place to look for a workable definition of organizational effectiveness is within nonprofit 
organizations themselves. The following sections describe how leaders of TNGOs in the United 
States understand the construct of organizational effectiveness.  
 
The following section describes the data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project. The 
section after that introduces the results of an exploratory latent class analysis of leaders‘ open-
ended responses to an interview question asking them to define organizational effectiveness. 
This analysis discovers that leaders tended to define organizational effectiveness in one of two 
distinct ways. The two sections after that correspondingly provide structured qualitative analyses 
of these two definitions of effectiveness. In the final two sections I offer some further discussion 
and concluding remarks.  
 
Data 
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Among several questions in the interview protocol related to organizational effectiveness, 
interviewers asked leaders: ―Let me ask you about the concept of effectiveness, which is 
something we all have trouble defining. How does your organization define effectiveness?‖ Nine 
substantive codes were developed to capture leaders‘ open-ended responses to this question. 
These codes were designed to conform to the interview data and were not created to test for the 
presence of any preexisting theories or models of effectiveness. The nine codes, which were 
organized into a single code family, are resources (for example, material resources such as 
money), flexibility (for example, nimbleness and adaptability), innovation (for example, 
innovative thinking), expertise (for example, expertise in an issue area or established credibility), 
contacts (for example, making contacts for networking and collaboration), staff or associate 
competencies (for example, a well-trained staff), stakeholder satisfaction (for example, donors, 
members and other constituents), goal achievement (for example, achievement of own goals, 
loyalty to own mission and meeting of own standards) and evaluation (for example, project 
evaluations, evaluations for donors, global assessments and certifications). Leaders‘ responses 
are distributed across 150 valid cases. 
 
The nine codes may be alternatively regarded as nine binary response variables. Because these 
variables are not mutually exclusive, mathematically there are 2
9
 possible response patterns 
corresponding to 512 different ways in which leaders could have defined organizational 
effectiveness. Since a typical human analyst can only consider about seven patterns 
simultaneously, quantification and cluster analysis must be employed to facilitate exploratory 
analysis (Grimmer & King, 2009). In the following section, I use latent class analysis to 
determine the number of ways in which leaders understand organizational effectiveness 
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empirically. In the two sections after that, I use structured information retrieval to help interpret 
leaders‘ response patterns. 
 
Latent class analysis 
 
Four exploratory latent class models have been estimated, each including all of the nine response 
variables listed above. The models differ only according to the number of categories of the 
posited latent variable. Model1, Model2, Model3 and Model4 test the hypotheses that there are 
one, two, three, and four definitions of organizational effectiveness present in the data, 
respectively. The models are summarized in table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1: Models for organizational effectiveness 
  
 
Model 
type LL L² 
L² p-
value ΔL² 
ΔL² p-
value %ΔL² 
Class. 
Error BVRs  
Model1 1-Cluster -596.63 153.62 0.07 . . . . Fail 
Model2 2-Cluster -586.70 133.75 0.14 13% 0.12 13 0.12 Fail 
Model3 3-Cluster -575.53 111.41 0.31 17% 0.02 27 0.09 Pass 
Model4 4-Cluster -571.63 103.62 0.20 7% 0.90 33 0.14 Pass 
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The retention of all nine response variables regardless of statistical significance complicates 
formal hypothesis testing. The null hypothesis that all leaders think alike is initially accepted 
according to the usual rule since the L
2
 bootstrap p-value for the baseline model, Model1, 0.07 > 
0.05. However, significant unexplained association nevertheless exists among four pairs of 
response variables (see appendix), suggesting that the L
2
 statistic is simply diluted by the 
inclusion of many variables that fail to significantly discriminate between the clusters.
18
  
 
Model2 does not provide a significant improvement in model fit over Model1 according to the 
ΔL
2
 bootstrap p-value and contains three local dependencies, again violating the local 
independence assumption required of latent class analysis (see appendix). This means that 
Model2 fails to explain significant association among the response variables and is therefore 
unacceptable. Model3 provides a significant improvement in model fit over Model2 and contains 
no local dependencies (see appendix), meaning that Model3 successfully explains the observed 
association among the response variables. According to the ΔL
2
 bootstrap p-value Model4 does 
not significantly improve upon Model3, indicating that Model3 is the preferred model.  
 
Each leader is subsequently classified into the latent class to which he or she most likely belongs 
based on his or her PMPs, a procedure known as modal assignment (Magidson & Vermunt, 
2003; McCutcheon, 1987). Each leader‘s PMPs are determined by his or her response pattern 
and Model3‘s parameter estimates. The classification errors introduced by modal assignment are 
displayed for each model in table 7.1. Model3 has the lowest classification error.  
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An important consideration when analyzing data of this nature is whether the three ways of 
defining effectiveness are truly the result of respondents‘ conceptualizations or merely artifacts 
of coder bias or interviewer baiting. A chi-squared test for independence performed between 
Model3‘s assignment solution and the variable interviewer identification indicates no evidence 
of interviewer bias (n = 150, chi2(12) = 13.63, p = 0.33), but a similar test with the variable 
coder identification implies the presence of coder bias (n = 150, chi2(8) = 28.38, p = 0.00). This 
coder bias is illustrated in figure 1, which indicates Coder 4‘s divergent propensities relative to 
the other coders.
19
 Coder 4 is entirely responsible for the existence of the third latent class and a 
chi-squared decomposition reveals that coder 4 accounts for an overwhelming 81 percent of the 
statistic‘s magnitude.20  
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Figure 7.1: Coder bias 
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Conveniently, the 3-class solution perfectly identifies the small outlier group generated by coder 
4, isolating the bias. Removing the four outliers introduced by coder 4 has a negligible effect on 
sample size and results in a statistically significant reduction in coder bias as measured by the 
difference in chi-squared statistics [n = 150, (chi2(8) = 28.38) – (chi2(4) = 9.75) = (chi2(4) = 
18.63, p = 0.00)].
21
 As an artifact of coder bias, the third latent class will be ignored.
22
 To test for 
the robustness of this strategy, a 2-class model was estimated with the outliers deleted ex ante 
and the assignment solution was compared against that of Model3 with the outliers deleted ex 
post. The assignments are identical, indicating that outlier deletion has no effect on the 
composition of the two main latent classes. For convenience of exposition, the original solution 
from Model3 is preserved.  
 
The key quantities of LCA are the latent class and conditional probabilities (Magidson & 
Vermunt, 2003; McCutcheon, 1987). The latent class probabilities provide estimates of the size 
of each class and the conditional probabilities describe the profiles of each class. These 
quantities for Model3 are indicated in table 7.2.
23
 The profile for Cluster1 describes about 82 
percent of respondents while the profile for Cluster2 describes about 15 percent of respondents. 
The other values in the columns labeled Cluster1 and Cluster2 are the probabilities that 
respondents in those clusters mentioned the corresponding items during the interviews, given 
their latent class assignments.
24
 As can be seen in table 7.2, the definition of effectiveness 
indicated by the profile for Cluster1 involves goal achievement and evaluation, while the 
definition indicated by the profile for Cluster2 emphasizes resources, and to a lesser extent, 
evaluation.   
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Table 7.2: Results for Model3 (organizational effectiveness) 
  
Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 
Prob.(Cluster) 
 
0.82 0.15 0.03 
 
p-value 
   Goal achievement 0.08 0.68 0.29 0.94 
Evaluation 0.34 0.56 0.67 0.96 
Resources 0.01 0.25 0.97 0.70 
Stakeholder 
satisfaction 0.28 0.23 0.18 0.70 
Contacts 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.92 
Staff or associates 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.66 
Expertise 0.03 0.04 0.19 0.45 
Flexibility 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.44 
Innovation 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.44 
     
  
n = 150 
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While latent class analysis is very useful for discovering latent structure in data, quantitative 
results alone are seldom adequate for interpretation. How do we interpret the definitions of 
organizational effectiveness implied by the profiles for Cluster1 and Cluster2 in table 7.2?  
 
In the next two sections, I have retrieved leaders‘ actual statements about organizational 
effectiveness from the interview transcripts separately for those assigned to Cluster1 and to 
Cluster2. To discipline analysis and mitigate the risk of misinterpreting atypical evidence as 
typical, I interpret each definition of organizational effectiveness based on exemplary qualitative 
evidence. The exemplarity of a leader‘s statements about organizational effectiveness is defined 
as the probability that the leader belongs to the cluster to which he or she was assigned. This 
probability is the leader‘s PMP for the modal assignment. A PMP close to zero indicates that a 
leader‘s statements are not likely to provide good qualitative evidence to facilitation 
interpretation, while PMP close to one indicates that a leader‘s statements are very likely to 
provide good qualitative evidence to aid interpretation. Leader‘s statements about organizational 
effectiveness have been interpreted within the contexts of their complete interview transcripts, 
which are organized in the CAQDAS for efficient querying. Interview dates for quotations are 
provided in the appendix.  
 
Cluster1: Organizational effectiveness as outcome accountability 
 
The most prevalent way leaders think about organizational effectiveness is indicated by the 
profile for Cluster1 in table 7.2 and may be labeled outcome accountability (Kearns, 1996). The 
strongest theme underlying this conceptualization (mean PMP = 0.94) is the notion that 
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effectiveness involves achieving measurable progress toward specific outcomes. ―Well I mean 
ah, for us to be effective,‖ one such leader noted (ID = 34, PMP = 1.00), ―is to achieve the 
programmatic or strategic goals that we‘ve identified.‖ Another phrased it slightly differently (ID 
= 7, PMP = 0.99). ―We define it as whether or not we are sort of getting the tasks achieved that 
we set for ourselves.‖ And another put it even more simply (ID = 22, PMP = 0.94). ―We set 
important goals and, and we achieve them.‖ Whatever phrasing they chose, most leaders seem to 
agree that effectiveness involves goal attainment.  
 
Another common theme is that of promise-keeping. Leaders routinely promise donors to use 
their resources to achieve specific outcomes, such as is commonly exemplified in formal 
contracts. One leader who conceptualized effectiveness in this way argued that ―if we‘ve done 
the work that we‘ve said we would do, that‘s...that should be one level of effectiveness‖ (ID = 
147, PMP = 0.73).  Other respondents characterized effectiveness more mission-centrically. ―I 
mean, to me,‖ the leader asserted (ID = 136, PMP = 1.00), ―it‘s when you are doing what you‘re 
saying you‘re doing, that you‘re serving your mission...and that you‘re able to show that you‘re 
serving your mission…‖ To be effective involves not only goal attainment, but demonstrable 
goal attainment.  
 
Another widespread theme involves the use of detailed frameworks and timelines for outcome 
evaluation (Poole, Davis, Reisman, & Nelson, 2001). A typical leader responded to the question 
about effectiveness by first emphasizing the goal attainment and promise-keeping aspects of 
organizational effectiveness, then describing sometimes very elaborate evaluation frameworks 
and providing examples of recent program evaluations. Leaders frequently discussed mixed-
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methods and multiple indicators and defined broad evaluative frameworks encompassing both 
outputs and outcomes. One leader said as follows (ID = 115, PMP = 1.00): 
 
Well, very simply we set out in the logical frameworks, where our goals and objectives 
are, and then through our [monitoring and evaluation], in monitoring those goals that 
we've set out, and objectives, we measure outputs and outcomes and we, I mean it's easy 
to measure the outputs, and that's one measurement of effectiveness, but the outcome is 
of course in the goals and objectives we've set out. 
 
The precise delimitation of the output-outcome distinction is not always crystal clear, but 
respondents are generally adept at distinguishing between notions like inputs and outputs on the 
one hand, and outcomes and impacts on the other—consistent with the well-known logical 
framework approach (Rosenberg & Posner, 1979). This despite inherent measurement 
challenges. Another leader said as follows (ID = 112, PMP = 0.73). 
 
On the education part, that‘s the part that‘s hard, that‘s the part I talked about just a little 
while ago, and you can‘t just measure…you can just measure how many people show up 
for a lecture, but that‘s not going to do it. That‘ll give you your output; it won‘t give you 
your impact. And so we‘re struggling right now to make sure that all of our measuring 
and evaluation instruments look at…what are the three? There‘s output, impact—I guess 
result, output and impact. 
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Generally, leaders at least implicitly acknowledge potential disconnections in the causal chain 
between upstream output indicators and downstream outcome and impact indicators. They 
distinguish between inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts. Inputs involve the resources 
necessary for producing goods and services, such as money. Outputs generally refer to the goods 
and services organizations provide, whereas outcomes are the presumed effects of these services 
on beneficiaries. Finally, impacts are effects that are causally attributable to an organization‘s 
activities (White, 2009). As might be expected, outputs are often associated with short-term 
objectives, while outcomes are associated with longer-term goals, again consistent with a logical 
framework approach (Thomas, 1994).  
 
Although leaders affirm the primacy of achieving meaningful results, their organizations do not 
necessarily take the additional steps to systematically evaluate outcomes and impacts (Berger, 
2009; Poole et al., 2001; Sawhill & Williamson, 2001; Sheehan Jr, 1996). Many organizations 
are held accountable for inputs, such as functional expenses, and outputs, such as quantities 
delivered, but not necessarily outcomes or impacts. One leader remarked that (ID = 125, PMP = 
1.00): 
 
…there has been a tendency in the organization in the past and there‘s tendency for a lot 
of organizations just to measure outputs. I am opposed, personally, to measuring output 
because I think you have to measure outcomes, and so we don‘t count—I‘ve already told 
you that we don‘t pay attention to the fact that we did 50 missions in a year or that we 
saw 10,000 patients. What we‘re all about is changing behaviors, changing capabilities… 
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Measuring goal attainment on an ongoing basis usually involves complex systems. Leaders 
expound ―matrix‖ (ID = 17, PMP = 1.00) systems and assess progress quarterly, annually and 
even according to ―five-year plans‖ (ID = 98, PMP = 0.98). ―Well we have a strategic plan,‖ a 
respondent (ID = 98, PMP = 0.98) said, ―we have certain goals that evolve annually, and we, at 
least quarterly, we measure what is happening against what our goals for the year are, our five-
year plan.‖ Another leader‘s account illustrates a concern about the practical difficulty of 
operationalizing abstract outcome variables with proxy measures (ID = 36, PMP = 0.81): 
 
Yeah, so effectiveness for us is, is really seeing concrete positive change on the ground 
for the displaced people that we‘re concerned about. So you know, that‘s really the only 
measure. Ultimately, I mean, there are many; you try to make those changes through a 
variety of means. So yeah for example getting, you know, an op-ed article in a newspaper 
or getting an important meeting or you know, having someone publicly acknowledge the 
importance of a report that we‘ve put out. But unless you see actual change, you know, 
unless the recommendations are adopted and you see actual change for…among the 
people that we‘re concerned about, you know, those other things don‘t really add up to 
very much. 
 
Moreover, just as leaders differentiate between outputs and outcomes, they also distinguish 
between short-term, intermediate and long-term goals in a variety of ways. For example, one 
leader said as follows (ID = 143, PMP = 0.99): 
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The way we broke it down is that we have goals, and then we have objectives, and then 
we have performance indicators. And my expectation of my staff is that they are 
attempting to determine whether we are hitting our performance indicators, which are 
leading to our objectives, which, long term, will lead to our goals. Or whether we need to 
constantly reevaluate and determine whether or not we‘re aiming for the right things, 
whether we have the right performance indicators, whether we have the right objectives, 
and ultimately, whether we have the right goals.   
 
Leaders also differentiate between long-term abstract missions and short-term programmatic 
goals. When pressed, respondents often discussed effectiveness at the programmatic level rather 
than the more abstract level of their organizational missions. Outcome accountability involves 
the demonstrable achievement of measurable goals, not necessarily the complete fulfillment of 
overarching missions. As Sawhill and Williamson (2001, p. 380) found, nonprofits need 
―specific, actionable, and, most critical, measurable goals to bridge the gap between their lofty 
missions and their near-term operating objectives.‖ While some scholars criticize the 
conceptualization of organizational level effectiveness as a function of program effectiveness 
(for example, Herman & Renz, 2008), many nonprofit leaders appear to make precisely this 
connection. 
 
In sum, outcome accountability involves goal attainment, promise-keeping, complex 
intertemporal evaluation frameworks and multiple levels of analysis. Many leaders adhere to a 
logical framework approach, whether explicitly or implicitly. Leaders subscribing to this general 
view believe that effectiveness means being accountable for achieving their promised outcomes.  
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Cluster2: Organizational effectiveness as overhead minimization 
 
The second latent class is indicated by the profile for cluster2 in table 7.2 and may be labeled 
overhead minimization (mean PMP = 0.72). This conceptualization involves themes that include 
financial efficiency, cost minimization, functional expense ratios and accounting. One leader 
described organizational effectiveness as whether programs achieve ―bang for the buck,‖ 
emphasizing financial efficiency (ID = 144, PMP = 1.00). Another respondent from a traditional 
service delivery organization explained that his or her ―way of thinking about a nonprofit is that 
you want to at least strive to do what you do for less until you can do it for free‖ (ID = 103, PMP 
= 0.90). Organizational effectiveness, in other words, is cost minimization.  
 
A particularly succinct definition of effectiveness as overhead minimization came from a 
respondent who simply stated that ―to be effective in [DELETED] is to deliver services and 
assistance to the people of [DELETED] at low cost‖ (ID = 78, PMP = 0.53).  Other leaders 
included both conceptualizations of effectiveness in their definitions, simply prioritizing 
overhead minimization over outcome accountability. One defined effectiveness in ―two ways. 
The amount of money that‘s actually getting to the field dedicated to the programs…and 
secondarily the actual impact of projects that you can quantify‖ (ID = 44, PMP = 0.65). Another 
respondent offered a slightly more detailed explanation (ID = 40, PMP = 0.89).  
 
I think we define effectiveness in three ways. In terms of fundraising we consider 
ourselves effective if we meet our fundraising goals and if we turn over a substantial 
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amount, obviously an overwhelming amount of that to [DELETED]. And if we keep the 
administrative costs on that low. So right now we say we have…about ninety-two cents 
on the dollar are used for programs. 
 
The leader continued to describe his or her organization‘s second and third ways of defining 
effectiveness, one of which was also financial and the other of which was programmatic. 
However, achieving fundraising goals and minimizing overhead were the respondent‘s most 
immediate associations with effectiveness.  
 
There are many possible explanations as to why some leaders would understand effectiveness 
more as overhead minimization than outcome accountability. Leaders may be responding to 
external pressures from donors and nonprofit ratings agencies in the United States evaluating and 
comparing nonprofits based on publicly available financial information. Indeed, many leaders 
touted their organizations‘ low overhead ratios during the interviews and some explicitly 
commented that low overhead is an important selling point for fundraising. One such leader 
volunteered that ―our best ace card is our efficiency in terms of how we have a low overhead,‖ 
and subsequently explained how he or she measured effectiveness in the context of disaster 
relief, where the construct is possibly easier to define (ID = 63, PMP = 1.00). How to measure 
effectiveness ―depends on what kind of program it is. In disaster relief…it‘s the number of 
people you treat, the injuries you‘ve come in contact with, the number of patient contacts and the 
amount of medicines you‘ve dispensed…‖ (ID = 63, PMP = 1.00). 
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That low overhead is an ―ace card‖ and that effectiveness can be measured by counting outputs 
are more typical of the overhead minimization perspective than the outcome accountability view. 
Measuring effectiveness, another leader admitted (ID = 74, PMP = 0.65): 
 
Well that‘s very difficult for the international programs…we can‘t determine the 
outcomes, so we measure products. We, we measure outputs. What is sent over you 
know, what its purpose is, where it goes. We don‘t necessarily know how many people it 
will affect. If it‘s a missionary group that we‘re equipping, they can say well we treated 
you know, two-thousand people within a two week time period. This is what you gave us, 
this is what you know, we did with it, and these were the outcomes. I mean you can do 
that. But when you‘re dealing with, let‘s say a clinic or a hospital…you can measure 
success primarily by your outputs. 
 
Financial and output reporting constitute two broad themes that contrast with those of goal 
attainment, promise-keeping and program evaluation that characterize outcome accountability. 
While evaluation is also a prevalent theme of overhead minimization, evaluation tends to focus 
on financial reporting and outputs rather than promise-keeping and goal attainment.  
 
Discussion 
 
These two definitions of organizational effectiveness observed among TNGO leaders pose a 
challenge to the academic literature summarized earlier. Most leaders define organizational 
effectiveness as outcome accountability, which clearly subsumes the embattled goal attainment 
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model. Given the strong emphasis on evaluation within the outcome accountability model, 
contemporary practitioners clearly are wrestling with the well-known evaluation challenges 
associated with goal attainment model (Fowler, 1996; Herman & Renz, 1999; Hoefer, 2000; 
Mohr, 1982; Murray, 2005; Stone & Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 2001). 
 
The overhead minimization model of effectiveness may have emerged among practitioners as an 
expedient alternative to the outcome accountability model. Within the academic literature this is 
analogous to the emergence of financial models of effectiveness in response to the measurement 
difficulties associated with the goal attainment model. Consider Price, for example, who first 
defined organizational effectiveness as ―the degree to which a social system achieves its goals‖ 
(1972, p. 101), but who in a later edition of the same work changed this definition to ―the 
financial viability of an organization‖ (1986, p. 128). His reasons for this change are instructive. 
Financial viability is easier to measure, is ―correlated with traditional views of effectiveness‖ 
(although he notes that ―systematic evidence for this view does not exist‖), is conducive to 
identifying ―determinants of effectiveness‖ and has wide application (J. L. Price, 1986, pp. 129-
130, 135). Similarly, we might attribute the existence of the overhead minimization model 
among practitioners to evaluative expediency, or perhaps to donor pressure, but more research is 
needed to better understand how these views emerge. 
 
It is worth reiterating that leaders interviewed for this study were based in the United States, 
where we might suspect a cultural bias favoring financial accountability and the use of business 
metrics. It is very possible that leaders of domestic nonprofits in the United States may be more 
susceptible to the overhead minimization model, while leaders of international nonprofits located 
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in other countries may be less so. Here again more research is needed.  
 
Leaders‘ conceptualizations of organizational effectiveness do not vary based on sector, 
function, Charity Navigator efficiency rating or capacity rating, headquarters location, 
respondent‘s gender, tenure at organization or country of residence.25 They do however vary 
based on organizational size. This association (n = 150, chi2(2) = 9.11, p = 0.01) is driven by the 
larger than expected number of ‗overhead minimizers‘ within large organizations (annual budget 
greater than $10 million), an effect that accounts for 67 percent of the chi-squared statistic‘s 
magnitude.
26
 This may be the result of larger organizations being more likely to hire financial 
professionals, but more research is needed to reach a firm conclusion.  
 
Finally, there is reason to suspect that the proportion of leaders holding the overhead 
minimization view may be overstated due to Charity Navigator‘s selection criteria, which 
exclude nonprofits with revenues less than $500,000. The data suggest that leaders from smaller 
organizations may be less likely to define effectiveness as overhead minimization.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Leaders of TNGOs in the United States tend to conceptualize the construct of organizational 
effectiveness in one of two ways (see table 7.2). Most leaders (about 82 percent) conceptualize it 
as outcome accountability. They focus on achieving substantive outcomes, not just maximizing 
outputs, and believe that their organizations are effective when they keep their promises to 
stakeholders, particularly donors (Raggo et al., 2010).
27
 Only a minority (about 15 percent) 
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subscribe to an overhead minimization model of effectiveness that focuses on financial 
evaluation and output reporting. A small group of outliers also emerged from the analysis. These 
leaders appear to hold an extraordinarily complex conceptualization of organizational 
effectiveness (see table 7.2), but subsequent analysis revealed this to be a result of coder bias. 
Future scholarship may seek to test this finding more directly.  
 
This research reveals that there are at least two major strategies with which organizational 
effectiveness is measured within the TNGO sector in the United States. One strategy involves 
evaluating the extent to which an organization achieves its goals; the other involves the 
proportion of an organization‘s total expenses allocated to programs. It is not uncommon for 
financial metrics of the latter type to be taken as proxies for the former. Future research may 
wish to ascertain whether this substitution is empirically warranted.  
 
Finally, leaders‘ sophisticated conceptualizations of organizational effectiveness involving 
complex logical frameworks and financial accountability reveal a technocratic managerial 
discourse presumably quite foreign to their beneficiaries. As Roberts et al. (2005, p. 1849) found: 
 
Managerialism of a distinctly northern type—marked by concepts like accountability, 
transparency, participation, and efficiency, as well as practices like double-entry 
bookkeeping, strategic planning, Logical Framework Analysis, project evaluation, and 
organizational self-assessment—has been shown to be pervasive in NGO‘s operations 
(Edwards & Fowler, 2002; Lewis, 2001). 
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This would be an unremarkable statement, except that they go on to note that ―research has also 
shown how managerialism has transformed the form and day-to-day operations of even the 
smallest NGOs in the global south (Crewe & Harrison, 1998; Mawdsley, Porter, & Townsend, 
2000; Mawdsley, Townsend, Porter, & Oakley, 2002; Robinson, 1997)‖ (Roberts et al., 2005, p. 
1849). Northern discourses of outcome accountability and overhead minimization may transmit 
Western values and organizational forms in addition to pervasive managerial practices. More 
research is needed to determine the nature and extent of these influences. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: OBSTACLES TO GOALS 
 
Most TNGO leaders subscribe to a traditional ideology of material amelioration and believe their 
organizations are effective when they demonstrate outcome accountability, particularly to 
donors. To understand TNGO behavior, it is not enough to identify how organizational leaders 
approach transnational activism and understand their effectiveness. Leaders are also constrained 
by their environments and must attempt to be effective within the context of these constraints. 
Chief among the challenges TNGO leaders perceive is the need to secure funding, and to a lesser 
extent, political context. When asked to discuss the obstacles they believe their organizations 
face, leaders reveal a highly pragmatic orientation toward the intricacies of funding and a 
surprising distaste for political contention. The combination of these factors portrays TNGO 
leaders more as technocratic managers than sociopolitical change agents, although as discussed 
in the final chapter, these roles may not be mutually exclusive.  
 
The challenges of transnational activism 
 
The challenges that TNGO leaders experience appear to reflect the multidimensionality of 
transnational NGOs as both charitable nonprofit organizations and sociopolitical actors in world 
affairs. To better understand these challenges, the interview protocol for the Transnational NGO 
Interview Project asked leaders about the obstacles they believed their organizations faced. 
Leaders were asked the question: ―What are the major obstacles, if any, to reaching your 
objectives?‖ After inductive readings of initial transcripts for emergent themes, eleven codes 
were developed to capture their open-ended responses: funding, political context, staff or 
associate competencies (for example, human capital issues, expertise), local resistance (home 
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country public awareness, target area public opinion, cultural issues), bureaucratic and legal, 
lack of coordination (for example, organizations working at cross-purposes, inefficiencies, poor 
communications, etc.), programs (for example, inadequate programs), time, founder (for 
example, the founder of the organization poses challenges), access (for example, access to 
officials, leaders, etc.) and technology. Figure 8.1 displays the overall results.  
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Figure 8.1: Obstacles to goals (proportions)  
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The most widely mentioned obstacle was funding, followed somewhat distantly by political 
context. Figure 8.2 shows how often leaders mentioned each obstacle. The distribution of mean 
counts suggests that funding issues are significantly more salient than political context. Leaders 
mentioned funding as a challenge on average one and a half times per interview, while political 
context was mentioned less than once per interview. Other obstacles were less salient.  
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Figure 8.2: Obstacles to goals (mean counts) 
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Latent class analysis did not identify significant association in the data, suggesting that leaders 
tend to think similarly about their obstacles.
28
 As such, the discussions below focus on the two 
most common challenges, funding and political context. In the absence of LCA, PMPs are 
unavailable to structure inquiry. Instead, complete quotation reports for each of the two codes 
were separately retrieved from ATLAS.ti and fully reviewed. Quotations coded for funding 
contain about 13,000 words, while quotations coded for political context contain about 11,000 
words. In the following sections quotations have been selected discretionarily.  
 
The challenge of funding 
 
When asked about obstacles facing their organizations, most respondents immediately replied 
―money‖ or ―funding.‖ Often leaders repeated this several times, occasionally amidst 
lighthearted laughter acknowledging the apparent ineluctability of their replies. Other 
interviewees were more matter-of-fact. ―The major thing is funding,‖ said one respondent (ID = 
146), ―the other major obstacle of course is simply funding,‖ said another (ID = 27). These 
comments were often followed by more detailed explanations elaborating upon specific aspects 
of their financial challenges.  
 
Some leaders characterized the funding problem as an omnipresent component of transnational 
activism. ―The problem of humanitarianism,‖ one such respondent quipped (ID = 129), ―is that 
we're trying to solve a hundred billion dollar a year problem with twenty-five billion dollars a 
year.‖ Many leaders acknowledged this fundamental asymmetry between the scope of global 
problems and the comparatively modest capacity of TNGOs to achieve commensurate impact. 
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This asymmetry underscores the imperative of organizational growth and implies a frustrating 
limitation as to what TNGOs can realistically accomplish.  
 
For many respondents financial problems were intimately bound up with growth issues. ―There 
is never enough money,‖ lamented such a respondent (ID = 70), ―even though we've—in our 
own small way—we've grown a lot. But there is never enough money and so fundraising is a 
constant challenge.‖ It would be misleading to formulate resource inadequacy exclusively as a 
fundraising problem, however. For most transnational NGOs funding shortfalls would likely 
persist regardless of fundraising efficacy because of the immense scale of the challenges they 
confront.  
 
Not only does funding availability for transnational activism seem perpetually inadequate, but 
the structure of funds is often incongruent with what TNGOs need. ―Our biggest obstacle is the 
fact that it‘s so hard to get unrestricted funds,‖ a respondent remarked (ID = 22). ―I'll tell you our 
real challenge is non-earmarked funds,‖ noted another (ID = 40). A general distaste pervades the 
donor community for funding general operating expenses through unrestricted or non-earmarked 
funds. This presents a particularly frustrating problem for transnational NGOs embarking on 
growth strategies that require increased fundraising and administrative costs. Internal 
investments to expand organizational capacity increase overhead and reduce the program 
expense ratio closely monitored by donors and nonprofit ratings agencies. From the perspectives 
of many stakeholders, higher overhead implies that an organization is wasting resources.  
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Moreover, many leaders identify a myopic orientation within the donor community. For 
example, one leader (ID = 48) commented that ―the biggest obstacle is the aid architecture, the 
global aid architecture, the way aid is delivered by those who give aid and, in particular, people 
tend to think about it in short-term time frames.‖  
 
External pressures to keep overhead low explains another respondent‘s comment, which 
illustrates how organizational growth was being retarded by structural forces (ID = 60).  
 
We're trying to ramp up—how do you, with limited resources, how do you do that? How 
do you—it's sort of like there are some individuals—like I would love to have a COO 
right now. I would love that, so that I could deal with some other things and they could 
focus more on the operations. But at what point can you afford to have a COO and at 
what point can you afford not to have one? Those are some—those growth issues are 
kind of hard, because you have to do everything incrementally and we don't have a big 
investor that comes in and says, ‗Here's five million dollars. Go ahead and set the whole 
thing up and we'll run with it.‘ We have to earn it little by little. You can't issue stock. 
 
The term overhead has starkly negative connotations within the discourse of charitable giving, 
which frustrates and annoys many professional transnational activists. One such leader described 
the problem as follows (ID = 48): 
 
RESPONDENT: So, hopefully we can take some of this data back out and share it with 
donors and try to convince them that if you really want to do this—I'm going to sound 
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like a broken record—but if you really want to do some of this long-term change, you 
need more than a two or three year project. You can't ask country offices to write a new 
proposal every six months, which is what happens in some countries. Donors only will 
commit at six month periods. You know? That's not good enough if you really want to 
take a long journey and really see change. 
 
INTERVIEWER: You are echoing a lot of the things that people say also about the 
foundation world where they fund a lot of project grants but not operating support and 
very not often multi-year funding. 
 
RESPONDENT: Not often multi-year funding, and, you know, people seem to be very 
allergic to operating costs and yet, if you don't have people in an organization actually 
attending to the details of making the operations happen, you cut yourself off at the knees 
at the get-go. It's a real frustration that we have, too, in talking to donors. So, that's part of 
what we need. Either we need to be better in explaining operational costs and what the 
efficiency is in the overall equation and that overhead is not quote-unquote ‗bad‘—it 
seems to be this, you know, it's a synonym: ‗overhead‘ equals ‗bad.‘ I agree everybody 
can get too fat and you have to be very careful. One of the things that we have to 
constantly do is step back and reassess. Have we allowed ourselves to get too off-kilter 
and do we need to re-tinker and get ourselves focused? And I think that's true of any large 
organization. It's important to do that from time to time without question. But that doesn't 
mean that overhead is bad. It's how you use that money; everybody's being focused on 
the same thing and pulling in the same direction. 
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Donor aversion to long-term commitments and general antipathy toward funding overhead may 
actually contribute to the very inefficiencies these norms are presumably intended to mitigate. 
An important study from Indiana University and the Urban Institute, for example, found that ―to 
deal with the inadequate funding for administration, organizations resort to the strategies of low 
pay, make do, and do without that diminish organizational effectiveness‖ (Hager, Pollak et al., 
2004a, p. 3). 
 
Since interviews took place in the United States many respondents offered comments specifically 
pertaining to the US fundraising environment. These touched upon domestic legislation such as 
the USA Patriot Act, cultural provinciality, public suspicion toward internationalism and a 
general reluctance among Americans to spend money overseas when it could be spent at home. 
For example, one interviewee (ID = 101) claimed that ―there is no question that the US has a US 
bias. It's easier to raise money for work in the US. It's easier to raise money here for work in the 
US than it is to raise money for work outside of the US.‖ Other obstacles discussed had more 
palpable political overtones, and are discussed below. 
 
The challenge of political context 
 
Even a cursory examination of the obstacles mentioned relating to political context reveals how 
politicized yet operationally pragmatic TNGO leaders seem to be. Leaders reported a broad 
range of political obstacles, including general ignorance among the public and elites, various 
foreign cultural and political obstacles, US militarism, the USA Patriot Act, the administration of 
President George W. Bush and the general post-9/11 political climate.  
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Some organizations exclusively pursue strategies of public education to achieve their objectives, 
and many TNGOs employ these strategies secondarily. Some of this activity is focused on 
influencing political elites beyond just the general public. In the context of transnational politics 
this is an unremarkable statement, but in the US context it is somewhat controversial because of 
domestic tax regulations that limit nonprofit lobbying behavior. Regardless, transnational NGO 
leaders discussed at length their difficulties attempting to influence policymakers. Some leaders 
expressed frustration trying to reorient the strategic thinking of key officials. ―Well there I think 
it‘s um, again, resources,‖ one leader reiterated (ID = 124), referring again to funding as a chief 
obstacle, ―but also a lack of awareness around, among a lot of policymakers about the 
importance of behavior change as a critical element of programming.‖ Other leaders indicted 
policymakers more harshly. A respondent from a human rights organization dealing with 
immigration issues said the following (ID = 33):  
 
I think one of the biggest obstacles is politicians, people who serve in the law making 
bodies who do not understand the issues. That is an obligation for us to do teaching but 
the job is so big.  I think that the politicization of these issues is really very disturbing and 
the idea that a group can decide by demonizing an entire group of people who I really 
hesitate to use the term ‗vulnerable‘ but vulnerable in terms of not having access to all 
parts of our society and who they view as not a threat to them, because so many 
immigrants are not citizens yet and so they do not vote. And the fact that these are public 
policymakers and they do not see the real impact on real human beings to what they did 
and even the hateful discourse that is created. So it is a huge obstacle just having public 
185 
 
policymakers who do not understand and who are so politicized that we have policies and 
laws that make no sense. 
 
Here the respondent explicitly criticizes the politicization of immigration issues, preferring 
instead to view immigration as a managerial problem. Another leader (ID = 52) whose 
organization works to promote religious freedom offered a more conciliatory characterization of 
the problem. ―It is very difficult because there are, you know, major concerns that policymakers 
have to deal with. And religious persecution is probably the last thing on the list. And so to get 
the attention of policymakers and everything is very difficult.‖  
 
Other political obstacles that leaders discussed were more concrete. In one extraordinary 
interview the respondent recounted a number of rather spectacular, if not fantastic anecdotes that 
included the following (ID = 12): 
 
I was in the upper, working in the upper Amazon and there was a—a charity sent a group 
of three people into a tribal village. And they didn‘t know anything about the customs or 
culture, it was a real primitive tribe and ah, they heard that the tribe was hospitable, 
which they were, very hospitable. And ah you know by custom, you know a stranger 
comes to the village and you know you get a meal and a place to sleep. With that tribe 
they also practice wife hospitality. And these three guys declined, not knowing that was a 
declaration of war and they were decapitated within a few minutes. 
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In addition to direct mortal challenges, longstanding domestic and international political disputes 
often yield similarly hostile environments for transnational activism. Examples abound the world 
over, but especially since 9/11 the Middle East has received increased attention. ―I hate to keep 
coming back to the word Israel,‖ said one respondent apologetically (ID = 118), ―but the fact is 
that we could probably do ten times the amount of aid work, not just the project stuff but the aid 
work in Palestine, if it wasn‘t locked down the way it is.‖ In the wake of Israel‘s 2006 invasion 
of southern Lebanon another leader mentioned the following (ID = 117): 
 
At the implementation side there are the usual barriers of unforeseen conflicts arising or 
the myriad of things that go on in the world. And we have been working in southern 
Lebanon for five years and that work has just been not only interrupted but probably 
eliminated. A lot of the things we have worked on have been bombed now, so that is a 
barrier.   
 
The respondent‘s understated manner seems to suggest such challenges are commonplace. In the 
post-9/11 context during which the interviews took place, many respondents noted that US 
foreign policy itself had rendered transnational humanitarianism considerably more difficult. 
More specifically, some leaders observed increased foreign suspicion toward US TNGOs. One 
such leader explained how he or she thought NGO neutrality had been brought into question (ID 
=56): 
 
…in the context of this…especially in the last five years of course, with post 9/11, there 
is this, a new or stronger trend towards having Western military intervention alongside 
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with aid and other activities accompanying that. That has polarized and made it more 
difficult I think for independent aid, humanitarian aid organizations to work in certain 
conflict settings. There‘s more rejection of that, more distrust of aid groups, question 
whether they can be independent… 
 
The leader quoted below would probably agree with this characterization. He or she explained 
the complications posed when organizations are associated with the US government, correctly or 
otherwise (ID = 23): 
 
And so, you know for example, ah, something will happen in the world where you know 
ah, a leader of a country will go on television and denounce our work and say this work is 
CIA and this organization, this person is an agent of the US government…and then we 
have to do sort of public relations for the next week. So in that way we are constantly sort 
of reacting to events, and it‘s very disruptive. 
 
That association with US foreign policy would be a detriment to transnational activism suggests 
something unsettling about America‘s perceived role in the world community at that time. It is 
unclear whether this is specific to particular US administrations or is a more general corollary of 
perceived government aegis.  
 
Many leaders found their organizations directly at odds specifically with the policies of the 
Republican administration and congress and explained their political obstacles in no uncertain 
terms. One such leader construed the challenges quite broadly (ID = 145): 
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It certainly is a major obstacle to reaching our objectives, which would be to establish a 
new global world order that‘s a civil world order and based on civil institutions whereas 
right now, the direction of US policy appears to us to be one that relies very much on 
military force and seeks to create a global network of military alliances to maintain order. 
In that setting, the idea of creating peaceful security through rule of law is challenged a 
lot. 
 
Other leaders articulated their frustrations with recent US legislation. The USA Patriot Act was a 
singular vehicle for the expression of these criticisms (ID = 28).  
 
With the Patriot Act and other laws that make it frightening for us at some level even to 
deliver services, you know the intelligence agencies have authority now to go through 
files and to, you know investigate in ways that they haven‘t before, and the appeals 
around that are becoming less and less. 
 
A leader from a Christian organization explained how the USA Patriot Act introduced increased 
political pressure and various practical obstacles (ID = 110).  
 
Obviously that, as a faith-based entity we have to be careful, of course, who we partner 
with. Obviously given all the Patriot Act and things that are going on, it adds a little bit 
more pressure, paper-work, whatever you want to call it, to [INAUDIBLE] as far as your 
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partners and potential partners, you have got all this vetting names, all this kind of stuff. 
So yeah. 
 
Some respondents expressed their concerns more flippantly, often not without humor. 
Considering the obstacles facing his or her organization, one interviewee (ID = 27) responded 
―oh there‘s lots of them. The current administration [LAUGHTER]. I don‘t know if I‘m allowed 
to say that now [LAUGHTER].‖ Others articulated very specific criticisms. The following 
conversation has been truncated to protect confidentiality, but it illustrates the attitude of a leader 
who found his or her organization‘s work stymied by Bush-era policies (ID = 26). 
 
INTERVIEWER: If you take a step back, what are the major obstacles to reaching those 
objectives? 
RESPONDENT: One objective, well the, um, well there‘s the Bush Administration for 
one. 
INTERVIEWER: Right. 
RESPONDENT: Um, no, I, I and I‘m being facetious, but not really… 
INTERVIEWER: Not entirely? 
RESPONDENT: One of the major, one of the major obstacles in achieving the expansion 
of [DELETED] rights has been um, the recent presidential administration. 
INTERVIEWER: Yeah. 
RESPONDENT: And the conservatism of the federal judiciary. 
 
190 
 
The leader‘s organization saw many of its achievements reversed by domestic legislation and 
court decisions. Another respondent flatly stated that the Bush administration was ―absolutely 
closed‖ to civil society (ID = 150): 
 
It depends, if you were to talk to me during the Clinton Administration it would have 
been different. Because the Clinton Administration was very open to civil society, um, to 
their analysis, to their um, policy recommendations, and this administration is absolutely 
closed to that.  
 
The Bush Administration vocally supported faith-based organizations within civil society, but 
even religious organizations reported political difficulties with the administration. A leader from 
the ―more progressive‖ side of the religious sector expressed some disappointment with the 
relationship between religious organizations and the administration, choosing his words rather 
carefully (ID = 88). 
 
And that is just to say um, you know the politics of religion. And how that plays 
out…over the course of the last eight years, for example with a more conservative 
administration in the United States, the work of [DELTETED], which tend to be viewed 
as the, as the main line of the more, more progressive churches in the United States, has 
struggled to work as effectively with this administration as perhaps we would have liked. 
 
The zeitgeist of the Bush presidency was the post-9/11 political context and subsequent US 
behavior. This had some obvious consequences for transnational NGOs, such as increased 
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scrutiny of financial transfers, especially those of faith-based organizations and NGOs working 
in Arab countries. But the fallout of 9/11 had other unintended consequences. Another leader 
explained how the terrorist attacks caused major donors and other stakeholders to orient attention 
toward the Middle East, which diverted resources away from other needy regions and causes (ID 
= 151).  
 
Well I think…there are a lot. I‘d say the policy environment is probably one of the 
biggest obstacles, especially in recent years where Latin America is not on the front page 
of the news in a lot of cases. When we first started…doing work in [COUNTRY 
DELTED] it was already a public issue…and so now going from something that is a 
public issue and working to actually try and build up something to become a public issue 
is challenging. And then…since September 11th and since the focus on the Middle East, 
when we were working in [COUNTRY DELETED] in 2000, US, the [INITIATIVE 
DELETED] and US military funding, [COUNTRY DELETED] was one of the largest 
disbursements of money and military aid. Now it just seems like pocket change compared 
to what‘s [being spent in] Iraq and Afghanistan. So I mean that‘s made it challenging…I 
would say with good reason grassroots energy has been focused towards the Middle East 
so that‘s made it, it has been a challenge for us… 
 
But other themes persist far beyond transitory administrations and policies to reveal more 
persevering relationships between transnational activism and politics. Effective service delivery, 
as one respondent commented, requires concomitant outreach and political support. Donor 
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education, fundraising, public education and service provision are all facets of a synthetic 
strategy that is most effective within a facilitative ―political climate‖ (ID = 61).   
 
So that that kind of political climate of course translates into what happens with funding 
climates but also translates into how people on the ground are working and reacting. That 
wholly affects what we do. When we‘re trying to achieve a positive agenda of health for 
all many of us are having to dig into battles about let‘s get drugs to this one community, 
this one population. So I‘d say this is very broad thing. The political climate is a real 
challenge to our work. When there‘s healthy, vibrant health-promotion going on, more 
work gets done, because the books and the materials that we give to people-they‘re really 
of use. Those organizations are all under extreme pressure. 
 
The political obstacles that leaders face reveal the multidimensional character of their 
organizations as simultaneously technocratic and politicized. The post 9/11 context presented 
particular challenges to TNGO leaders both domestically and internationally.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Leaders‘ preoccupation with financial obstacles and understanding of politics as an obstacle 
rather than a strategy suggests important insights about how TNGO leaders view their work. In 
the first instance, leaders exhibit a strong sense of pragmatism in overwhelmingly declaring 
funding as their most salient obstacle. In the second instance, leaders discuss politics 
disapprovingly, preferring instead to couch their activism in relatively apolitical, technocratic 
and managerial terms. However, as Willetts (2002) has argued, a failure to fully appreciate the 
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political significance of TNGO activity does not mean that its consequences—whether 
intentional or unintentional—are politically neutral:  
 
Legal systems may classify raising money for purposes such as poverty alleviation, 
disaster relief or environmental conservation as non-political, but the legal distinction 
between charitable and political activity is always based on an arbitrary, illogical and 
controversial definition of politics. Many NGOs will not see themselves as engaging 
directly in public policy, but their activities are always a social expression of values. 
Hence, NGOs are very likely to be political in the broadest sense of affecting social 
discourse and can often have an indirect effect on politics in the narrow sense of shaping 
public policy. 
 
Transnational NGO leaders in the United States walk a fine line. Domestically, their 
organizations are classified as charities and rewarded with a tax exemption. Their legitimacy 
hinges on a domestic cultural compact in which an implicit or explicit pledge to ‗do good‘ 
purchases valuable legal privileges and social respect. A TNGO that takes a political side puts its 
legitimacy at risk and calls into question whether the organization is fighting for universalistic or 
particularistic values. Leaders must respect this cultural compact at home while conducting 
operations abroad with political consequences.  
 
That many TNGO leaders would view political context as an obstacle second only to funding is 
revealing. Leaders may have so thoroughly internalized their technocratic managerialism that 
they fail to fully appreciate the political significance of their work both at home and abroad. The 
194 
 
discourse of transnational activism, with all its elaborate jargon—logical frameworks, capacity 
building, stakeholders, etc.—supplies a politically neutral language in which to conduct 
transnational public policy. Transnational NGO leaders may not conceptualize their work in 
overtly political terms, but an analysis of their perceived obstacles indicates that their work is no 
less political.   
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
 
What is the role of TNGOs in world affairs? The heterogeneity discovered among organizations 
implies that this is the wrong question. The right question is: ‗What are the roles of TNGOs in 
world affairs?‘ Transnational NGO leaders think differently about how to approach transnational 
activism and their organizations implement different types of strategies. Taking this 
heterogeneity into account reveals three types of TNGO: charitable relief and development, 
human rights activism and environmental advocacy. Each of these types of TNGO may be 
understood as playing a different role in the world system. Before turning to this discussion, I 
offer a brief summary of what has been discovered substantively so far. 
 
Summary 
 
Chapter four examined TNGO leaders‘ ideologies toward transnational activism. An exploratory 
discrete factor analysis found that about 66 percent of leaders described missions of 
amelioration, while about 34 percent described missions of empowerment. Additionally, only 
about 23 percent of leaders described missions involving ideational strategies or tactics, such as 
research and compliance monitoring, which is surprising considering that most scholars regard 
ideational strategies a hallmark of transnational activism. Taking these two latent factors 
together, about 51 percent of leaders adhere to an ideology of material amelioration, followed 
distantly by material empowerment (26 percent), ideational amelioration (15 percent) and 
ideational empowerment (8 percent). Leaders‘ most common attitude toward transnational 
engagement is that of material amelioration, not ideational empowerment, broadly suggesting 
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that most leaders take a materialistic, charitable approach to transnational activism rather than 
the approach of ideational contention thought by many scholars to epitomize TNGO behavior.  
 
Leaders‘ views differed only slightly when asked about the specific activities their organizations 
undertake. After factoring out the influence of likely coder bias, the familiar distinction remerged 
between amelioration (68 percent) and empowerment (32 percent) in strikingly similar 
proportions. In the contexts of both mission and activities, TNGO leaders are roughly twice as 
likely to favor strategies of amelioration over empowerment.  
 
Based on the sample data, leaders with an ameliorative mission orientation direct about 71 
percent of total TNGO expenditures while leaders with a material orientation control about 84 
percent. Leaders who described their organizations as primarily engaged in ameliorative 
activities direct about 93 percent of total TNGO resources. The majority of TNGO leaders in the 
United States directing most of the sector‘s resources have an ameliorative, materialistic 
approach to transnational activism. 
 
Chapter five examined the questions of TNGO autonomy and collaborative style. Transnational 
NGOs are strategic in their own rights and appear to be highly protective of their overarching 
missions even though they occasionally strategically adjust their programs in response to donor 
preferences. On balance, neither TNGOs nor donors clearly predominate. Leaders implement 
specific strategies to maintain operational independence in the presence of financial dependency. 
Transnational NGOs protect autonomy through brand recognition, funding diversification and by 
maintaining high proportions of unrestricted funds. When financial pressures become more 
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intense, some TNGOs secure government or other large grants to serve as bridge funding. 
Transnational organization gives TNGOs additional autonomy-preserving efficiencies since 
organizations can acquire funds internationally that may be unavailable domestically. Some use 
Southern partners to secure resources ostensibly unavailable to Northern organizations. 
Transnational NGOs thus appear capable of maintaining a degree of autonomy to influence 
world politics despite their reliance on external financial support.  
 
Chapter five also found that that about 63 percent of TNGOs exhibit a protective collaborative 
style, vastly preferring to partner with other NGOs rather than states, corporations or 
intergovernmental organizations. About 37 percent exhibit an interdependent collaborative style 
and are more likely to collaborate with other types of organizations.  
 
TNGOs vary within each collaborative type. Some protective TNGO leaders actively refuse 
government and corporate funding, others simply disfavor it. Within the interdependent style, 
many TNGOs collaborate with other types of organizations because they believe doing so 
increases effectiveness. A few TNGO leaders explicitly adopt a subcontractor model, which 
critics of the New Policy Agenda believe may pose a systemic risk to the authenticity and 
autonomy of TNGOs (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).  
 
Whether TNGO autonomy and independence from states and corporations is desirable depends 
upon additional factors such as function and sector, despite strong normative undercurrents 
pervading much scholarship. For instance, independence from government agencies may hinder 
service delivery in the health sector but improve the effectiveness of human rights activism. 
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Among the most difficult challenges to TNGO theorization is the problem of taxonomy. Scholars 
widely recognize TNGO heterogeneity but implement different and overlapping criteria to 
segment TNGOs for theoretical clarity. Chapter six developed a taxonomy of US-registered 
TNGOs based on the most commonly adduced taxonomic criteria: sector, function, 
autonomy/collaborative style, mode of influence and strategy. Consistent with the general 
structure of scholarship on transnational activism, there are three types of TNGO, but they are 
distributed in inverse proportion to the amount of scholarly attention they receive. About 67 
percent of TNGOs are charitable development and relief organizations. This type of TNGO is 
associated with sustainable development, service delivery, ameliorative strategies and 
materialistic influence, and controls about 85 percent of the sample‘s total resources. About 26 
percent of organizations are human rights activism TNGOs. They are associated with human 
rights, advocacy, the protective collaborative style and missions of empowerment, although they 
eschew ideational tactics. This type of TNGO controls about 14 percent of the sample‘s total 
resources. Finally, about 8 percent of TNGOs are environmental advocacy organizations. This 
type of TNGO is associated with the environment sector, advocacy, the interdependent 
collaborative style and empowering activities. This is the only type of organization that is very 
likely to employ ideational tactics such as information politics. This type of TNGO controls only 
about one percent of the sample‘s total resources.  
 
Transnational NGO research in international relations frequently identifies organizations such as 
Amnesty International and Greenpeace as exemplary or quintessential TNGOs. However, 
taxonomical analysis suggests that these organizations are highly uncharacteristic of both 
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TNGOs generally and of the subcategories they are commonly thought to typify (human rights 
activism and environmental advocacy, respectively). Scholars appear to focus disproportionally 
on the least efficacious types of TNGO in terms of their numbers and resources.  
 
Leaders‘ understandings of organizational effectiveness reveal additional insights about their 
approaches to transnational activism. Whether they understand effectiveness as ‗outcome 
accountability‘ or ‗overhead minimization,‘ their perspectives tend to be managerial and 
technocratic and their accountability practices are largely oriented toward donors. The 
widespread uses of complex logical frameworks and the high salience of specific financial ratios 
are indicative of a transnational NGO culture that prizes technical evaluations and upward 
accountability to boards and donors rather than beneficiaries. This donor-oriented managerialism 
calls into question the presumption that TNGOs authentically embody the values and preferences 
of their beneficiaries. 
 
Leaders do not hold heterogeneous attitudes toward all issues. When asked to discuss the 
obstacles their organizations face, leaders agreed on the centrality of funding, and to a lesser 
extent, leaders expressed concerns over the challenges posed by political context. Their nearly 
unanimous concern about funding reveals a pragmatic orientation that defies characterization as 
either strictly ‗principled‘ or ‗self-interested,‘ while their general discomfort with politics and 
use of technocratic jargon exposes a disconnection between the popular image of TNGOs as 
overtly contentious political activists and the considerably more mundane reality of TNGOs as 
professionalized managerial agencies.   
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Synthesis 
 
Based on preceding analyses, TNGOs registered in the United States appear to play three roles in 
world affairs. These are outlined in table 9.1.  
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Table 9.1: Roles of TNGOs in world affairs  
 
 
Alleviation Realization  Environmentalism 
TNGO type Charitable development 
and relief  
Human rights 
activism 
Environmental advocacy 
Collaborative 
style 
About equally as likely to 
collaborate within civil 
society as with states and 
corporations  
The most 
independent, 
preferring to 
collaborate within 
civil society   
The most interdependent, 
collaborating with states 
and corporations   
Mission and 
activity 
Amelioration, avoids 
ideational tactics  
Espouse missions 
of empowerment, 
but implement 
ameliorative 
activities; avoids 
ideational tactics  
Missions are about equally 
likely to be couched in 
terms of amelioration or 
empowerment; activities 
are the most empowering;  
most likely to employ 
ideational tactics  
Function Primarily regarded as 
service delivery   
Primarily regarded 
as advocacy    
Regarded as advocacy   
Sectoral 
typicality 
Primarily regarded as 
sustainable development,  
and to a lesser extent, 
humanitarian relief  
Primarily regarded 
as human rights, 
and to a lesser 
extent, conflict 
resolution   
Primarily regarded as 
environmental, and to 
much lesser extents, 
human rights and conflict 
resolution    
Efficacy 67% of organizations, 
85% of expenditures  
26% of 
organizations, 14% 
of expenditures  
8% of organizations, 1% 
of expenditures  
Potential impact Alleviation from poverty 
and disaster; reproduction 
of hierarchical power 
relations between the 
'developed' and 
'developing' societies 
Leveraging of 
material resources 
to promote the 
realization of 
human rights, 
depoliticization 
and 
institutionalization 
of conflict 
Environmental protection, 
whether through 
conservation, public 
mobilization or the 
certification of 
government and corporate 
practices 
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Roles of TNGOs in world affairs: Alleviation 
 
The first and most important role TNGOs play is that of ‗alleviation,‘ the role I ascribe to 
charitable development and relief organizations. Alleviation refers to more than simply lessening 
the suffering of disadvantaged people; it also represents a form of political power that, as 
DeMars (2005, p. 61) writes, ―goes far beyond success or failure in achieving…official goals.‖ 
Alleviation may create relationships of dependency that reproduce hierarchical power relations, 
while the discourse with which alleviation takes place enables and promotes transnational 
governmentality and rational managerialism (Jaeger, 2007; Roberts et al., 2005; Schuller, 2007). 
 
Alleviation is by far the most common role, and this role is a frequent target of critical 
scholarship questioning the consequences of the international relief and development community 
(DeMars, 2005; Jaeger, 2007; Naylor, 2011; Schuller, 2007). Scholars show how the 
international development discourse identifies ‗beneficiaries,‘ often represented in disturbing 
imagery, who are ‗vulnerable‘ and require ‗capacity building‘ and ‗empowerment,‘ suggesting 
that the ‗targets‘ of alleviation are incapacitated and weak and must submit to the ‗technical 
assistance‘ offered by Northern TNGOs (Billon, 2006; Naylor, 2011). Naylor (2011, p. 193) 
illustrates this powerfully in a detailed case study in which she characterizes the international 
development discourse as sustaining this ‗Politics of Pity:‘  
 
[B]ecause the current international development discourse operates through relations of 
power according to a Politics of Pity, which necessarily (re)constitutes subjects in an 
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unequal hierarchical relation to one another, it is unable to fully address the underlying 
structural inequalities that are at the root of poverty. 
 
If ideational power is indeed the primary source of TNGO influence in the world, the nature of 
this power is disputable. Instead of using information politics to achieve sociopolitical 
transformation, the most efficacious TNGOs may be sustaining a Politics of Pity articulated 
through technocratic managerialism that maintains and perpetuates the status quo.  
 
Scholars have argued that development TNGOs not only help sustain the contemporary 
international system, but may be essential for its continued maintenance. According to Chabbott 
(1999), most development TNGOs are located in the North. Figures compiled from multiple 
sources put their numbers at more than 2,500 in North and under 300 in South (Chabbott, 1999, 
p. 255). These TNGOs, argues Chabbot, maintain a discourse based on science and individual 
welfare largely grounded in rational individualism and neoclassical economic theory. Many 
official donors prefer to channel development and relief funding through these TNGOs instead of 
giving directly to individual states as a means of preserving control and limiting corruption. To a 
large extent these organization have carved out a role for themselves that extends far beyond 
what states originally intended, and in many contexts states have come to rely upon development 
and relief TNGOs for the provision of the basic services.  
Kaldor (2003, p. 92) has described the ―NGOization of public space‖ in which this type of 
organization plays a prominent role in the international system (also see: Schuller, 2007). 
―Effectively, what this means,‖ she writes: 
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is that those NGOs who are northern and therefore close to the centres of power and 
funding, whose emphasis is service provision, who are solidaristic rather than mutual 
benefit, and whose organization tends to be more formal and hierarchical, have come to 
dominate the NGO scene. This is, in part, a consequence of the growing support of 
northern governments towards NGOs: they tend to favour service provision and may be 
nervous about advocacy; they are biased towards NGOs from their own countries and 
also prefer to deal with formally organized professional NGOs. 
 
Kaldor (2003, p. 92) also argues that ―growing dependence on particular donors may distort the 
priorities or missions of NGOs. Dependence on government funding has, in some cases, 
transformed NGOs into…government subcontractors‖ that ―have become substitutes for the 
state.‖ She also warns of a ―damping down of the advocacy role of NGOs since,‖ particularly 
American ―NGOs are fearful of losing their sources of income,‖ which ―in extreme cases…are 
merely the ‗handmaidens of capitalist change‘ with little serious concern for effective poverty 
alleviation strategies. They are seen as the ‗modernizers and destroyers of local economies,‘ 
introducing Western values and bringing about ‗economicide‘‖ (Kaldor, 2003, pp. 92-93). Future 
scholarship would do well to examine these bold propositions empirically.  
 
Roles of TNGOs in world affairs: Realization 
 
The second aspect to understanding the role of TNGOs in world affairs is to understand the 
nature of ‗realization.‘ Human rights activism TNGOs advance missions of empowerment by 
providing material support to beneficiaries. These organizations are the most independent of 
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states, corporations and intergovernmental organizations and therefore the best suited to 
challenge the status quo from the outside.  
 
Conventional wisdom suggests that human rights realization is typically promoted through 
information politics, especially documentation and compliance monitoring (Hopgood, 2006; 
Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Ron et al., 2007). However, data suggest that although these 
organizations espouse missions of empowerment, they are largely not conducting ideational 
activities such as research and compliance monitoring. Instead, these TNGOs tend to deliver 
products and services for their beneficiaries to employ in the realization of their rights. An 
example provided in chapter four illustrates this role. Supporting embroidery projects, setting up 
computer labs and constructing playgrounds empowers beneficiaries with a sense of ―hope‖ (ID 
= 118, PMP = 0.64).
29
 
 
The role of realization performed by human rights activism TNGOs is perhaps the most common 
subject of academic study for scholars of transnational activism. However, more recently 
scholars have begun to question whether realization counterproductively serves to absorb and 
institutionalize political dysfunction and conflict (DeMars, 2005). Future scholarship could 
contribute to this already impressive research program by examining the materialistic 
programming more common to the sector and as well as its unintended consequences.  
 
Roles of TNGOs in world affairs: Environmentalism  
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The third aspect to understanding the role of TNGOs in world affairs is to understand the nature 
of environmentalism. Environmental advocacy organizations are the only type of TNGO to 
heavily rely on ideational tactics such as information politics. However, they are also the most 
likely to partner with states, corporations and intergovernmental organizations. These 
partnerships may promote environmental sustainability through certification programs that 
confer legitimacy and reward corporate social responsibility. Many TNGO leaders engaged with 
environmentalism collaborate with governments to improve program effectiveness when 
ministries exercise regulatory prerogatives over environmental resources. However, the 
interdependence between environmental advocacy TNGOs and state and corporate interests may 
call into question the autonomy of TNGOs to criticize transgressors from the outside.  
 
Interestingly, this contradicts McCormick‘s (1999, p. 56) view that environmental NGOs  
―function outside the [governmental] rule-making process, offering expert advice, undertaking 
research, and monitoring the application of these rules,‖ while lending credence to Raustiala‘s 
(1997) general conclusion that environmental NGOs tend to extend the regulatory power of 
states. 
 
Environmentalism is the most empowering TNGO role in the sense that it is highly likely to 
involve activities such as research and public education, advocacy and grassroots mobilization. 
These activities suggest that environmental advocacy TNGOs wield a unique combination of 
both carrots (certification) and sticks (grassroots mobilization) in the pursuit of their goals. 
Future scholarship could improve our understanding of environmental advocacy by examining 
how these diverse tactics promote or impede environmentalism.  
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Reflection 
 
Proponents claim that TNGOs promote universal rights; detractors claim they propagate 
neoliberal governmentality. A normative preference appears to imbue this literature, which 
celebrates the empowering orientations of realization and environmentalism, while disparaging 
the untended consequences of alleviation (compare, for example: Jaeger, 2007; Keck & Sikkink, 
1998). Politicization and contention are preferred to managerialism and service delivery, and a 
peculiar optimism—an emancipatory faith—about the potentiality of TNGOs to transform world 
politics is easily detectable. 
 
Perhaps this emancipatory aspiration has been projected onto TNGOs. Consider the idealized 
TNGO—a nongovernmental, noncommercial organization, an organization immune to hubris 
and greed, an agent of a global civil society yearning to improve its condition. It aspires for 
sociopolitical transformation. Untainted by violence and self-interest and imbued with the 
righteousness of universal principles, its potential to peaceably transform world politics seems 
unbounded.  
 
Alas, leaders of TNGOs in the United States paint a different portrait. Although their 
organizations are noncommercial, they are preoccupied with funding. While they are relatively 
independent of governments, they are more concerned about demonstrating accountability to 
donors than to their beneficiaries (Raggo et al., 2010). Most leaders adopt a materialistic, 
ameliorative approach to transnational activism. Grassroots mobilization and information politics 
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are uncommon. This is not to assert that some TNGOs are not conducting emancipatory 
campaigns; on the contrary, we know them all too well. But they are in the minority. 
 
Transnational NGOs registered in the United States may not radically transform the world 
system, but they do appear to offer alleviation from poverty and disaster, realization of basic 
human rights and environmental stewardship. But these services may be delivered with 
unintended consequences. Future scholarship would do well to focus greater attention on these 
effects. Additionally, future scholarship would benefit from more explicit treatments of empirical 
proportion so as to avoid theoretical mischaracterizations on the basis of irregular evidence.  
 
Finally, as detailed in chapter two, these conclusions are based on interviews with TNGO leaders 
in the United States and so pertain only to a national subset of organizations, albeit the largest 
one. Leaders in other Northern countries may offer different perspectives, as may leaders of 
Southern TNGOs. It is possible that TNGOs not registered in the United States are more 
politically contentious and transformative. More research is needed to better understand the 
perspectives of TNGO leaders based in other countries.  
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APPENDIX: ACRONYMS 
Acronym Description 
AIRS/INFO LINE Alliance of Information and Referral Systems/Info Line 
BVR Bivariate residual 
CAQDAS Computer aided qualitative data analysis software 
DFA Discrete factor analysis 
ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council 
HCA Hierarchical cluster analysis 
ICNPO International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations 
ID Identification 
IRS Internal Revenue Service 
ISIC International Standard Industrial Classification System 
L² Log-likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic 
LCA Latent class analysis 
LL Log-likelihood 
MOU Memorandum of understanding 
NACE Eurostat General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities 
NAICS North American Industry Classification System 
NCCS National Center for Charitable Statistics 
NGO Nongovernmental organization 
NPC Nonprofit Program Classification 
NTEE National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities 
PMP Posterior membership probability 
TNGO Transnational nongovernmental NGO 
UIA Union of International Associations 
UN United Nations 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
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APPENDIX: FINITE MIXTURE MODELING 
 
A latent class model with three response variables,   ,    and   , taking on values  ,   and 
  , respectively, models the probability of the ith leader‘s response pattern as follows: 
 
                             
 
   
            
 
   
 
 
where   is a nominal latent variable of   categories and 
 
     
 
   
 
 
represents the unconditional latent class probabilities over the K latent classes, which sum to one, 
and 
 
            
 
   
 
 
represents the product of the conditional probabilities over the t indicator variables (Vermunt & 
Magidson, 2005). The conditional probabilities for the values of each indicator within each latent 
class sum to one and their product over the indicator variables is one.  
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The latent class and conditional probabilities are the key quantities in LCA because they provide 
estimates of class size and information for ascribing class profiles, respectively (McCutcheon, 
1987). The conditional probabilities that define the profiles of the latent classes are 
parameterized as 
 
            
        
  
         
  
  
   
 
 
where     
  is a linear predictor obtained by 
 
    
    
     
 . 
 
The intercept is   
  and the effect of the latent variable on the indicators is    
 . The software 
automatically determines the correct logit model based on the specified scale types of the 
indicator and latent variables. Maximum likelihood estimates are obtained by way of the 
expectation maximization algorithm.
30
 The software, which is specifically designed for latent 
class analysis, also provides the latent class and conditional probabilities.
31
 
 
The probability structure for a latent class factor model with two discrete latent variables,    , 
and four indicators is as follows: 
 
                                      
  
                 
 
   , 
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which is similar to the traditional latent class model presented above except that the ith leader‘s 
response pattern depends upon two discrete latent variables instead of one (Magidson & 
Vermunt, 2003; Vermunt & Magidson, n.d.). The discrete factors are mutually independent and 
as with traditional LCA the meaning of each latent factor is derived from the information 
conveyed by the conditional probabilities.  
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APPENDIX: DATES OF INTERVIEWS 
ID Date ID Date ID Date ID Date ID Date 
1 3/14/2007 32 1/9/2008 63 1/16/2007 94 3/13/2007 125 7/19/2006 
2 12/10/2007 33 11/15/2006 64 2/18/2008 95 11/27/2006 126 3/25/2008 
3 2/15/2008 34 12/10/2007 65 11/7/2007 96 11/16/2006 127 3/12/2007 
4 1/2/2008 35 3/5/2008 66 4/20/2007 97 11/27/2006 128 3/13/2008 
5 4/17/2008 36 7/11/2006 67 6/13/2007 98 3/7/2007 129 6/26/2006 
6 4/2/2008 37 7/10/2006 68 6/12/2007 99 12/11/2007 130 3/15/2007 
7 6/22/2006 38 3/16/2007 69 3/11/2008 100 6/23/2006 131 12/21/2006 
8 3/19/2007 39 3/12/2008 70 12/14/2006 101 12/12/2006 132 3/24/2008 
9 7/13/2006 40 12/12/2006 71 3/15/2007 102 1/10/2008 133 12/12/2006 
10 3/10/2008 41 12/12/2007 72 2/21/2008 103 12/11/2006 134 9/6/2006 
11 3/15/2007 42 1/7/2008 73 12/29/2006 104 6/12/2007 135 3/13/2007 
12 3/12/2008 43 12/12/2007 74 11/9/2007 105 2/19/2008 136 12/12/2007 
13 5/24/2007 44 11/30/2007 75 12/13/2006 106 2/22/2008 137 3/11/2008 
14 5/17/2007 45 3/27/2008 76 12/13/2006 107 3/14/2007 138 12/14/2006 
15 12/11/2006 46 5/22/2007 77 7/20/2006 108 12/11/2007 139 6/14/2007 
16 6/12/2007 47 11/15/2006 78 12/12/2007 109 2/19/2008 140 7/12/2006 
17 11/28/2006 48 4/20/2007 79 8/14/2007 110 7/14/2006 141 5/3/2008 
18 3/16/2007 49 3/13/2007 80 3/13/2007 111 7/14/2006 142 6/21/2006 
19 3/13/2007 50 1/18/2007 81 12/12/2007 112 2/20/2008 143 7/18/2006 
20 3/14/2007 51 3/15/2007 82 6/14/2007 113 11/6/2007 144 1/8/2008 
21 3/11/2008 52 12/13/2006 83 7/13/2006 114 11/5/2007 145 8/2/2006 
22 1/9/2008 53 3/13/2008 84 11/16/2006 115 1/18/2007 146 6/21/2006 
23 3/13/2008 54 1/7/2008 85 3/12/2007 116 3/5/2008 147 1/8/2008 
24 6/20/2006 55 7/17/2006 86 4/27/2007 117 7/26/2006 148 7/26/2006 
25 8/24/2006 56 12/13/2006 87 3/11/2008 118 2/21/2008 149 12/19/2007 
26 2/5/2008 57 11/5/2007 88 1/23/2008 119 1/19/2007 150 3/13/2007 
27 6/30/2006 58 2/15/2008 89 12/11/2006 120 4/15/2007 151 11/28/2006 
28 11/17/2006 59 5/25/2007 90 2/15/2008 121 3/10/2008 152 6/27/2006 
29 2/20/2008 60 4/24/2007 91 5/18/2007 122 4/1/2008     
30 12/5/2006 61 3/15/2007 92 12/29/2006 123 11/8/2007     
31 12/11/2006 62 7/12/2006 93 11/9/2007 124 6/8/2007     
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APPENDIX: BIVARIATE RESIDUALS FOR EFFECTIVENESS  
Model1* 
Code Resours Flexabil Innovati Expertis Contacts Staff or Stakehol Goal Ach Evaluati 
Resours .                 
Flexabil 0.55 . 
      
  
Innovati 10.42 1.58 . 
     
  
Expertis 3.49 3.86 0.80 . 
    
  
Contacts 0.00 2.16 0.99 2.69 . 
   
  
Staff or 0.11 2.10 0.31 0.88 5.43 . 
  
  
Stakehol 0.00 0.94 0.15 0.10 0.12 5.04 . 
 
  
Goal Ach 3.14 0.00 0.43 0.33 0.22 0.11 0.14 .   
Evaluati 0.15 0.26 1.56 0.08 0.13 1.47 0.33 0.54 . 
          
Model2* 
Code Resours Flexabil Innovati Expertis Contacts Staff or Stakehol Goal Ach Evaluati 
Resours .                 
Flexabil 0.28 . 
      
  
Innovati 0.27 2.55 . 
     
  
Expertis 0.00 4.71 0.05 . 
    
  
Contacts 0.05 2.20 0.72 2.39 . 
   
  
Staff or 0.50 2.19 0.08 0.55 5.34 . 
  
  
Stakehol 0.06 0.96 0.26 0.05 0.12 4.95 . 
 
  
Goal Ach 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.29 0.23 0.09 .   
Evaluati 0.12 0.22 0.68 0.36 0.15 1.33 0.29 0.22 . 
  
Model3* 
Code Resours Flexabil Innovati Expertis Contacts Staff or Stakehol Goal Ach Evaluati 
Resours .                 
Flexabil 0.46 . 
      
  
Innovati 0.82 0.04 . 
     
  
Expertis 0.04 0.94 0.41 . 
    
  
Contacts 0.28 0.01 0.03 0.85 . 
   
  
Staff or 0.14 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.59 . 
  
  
Stakehol 0.00 0.05 0.92 0.03 0.23 1.82 . 
 
  
Goal Ach 0.01 0.57 0.00 0.05 0.31 0.13 0.63 .   
Evaluati 0.11 0.88 0.18 0.88 0.54 0.63 0.10 0.39 . 
          *BVR = chi2/df. A value greater than 3.84 indicates a local dependence at the 95% confidence level. 
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1 This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-0527679 (Agents of Change: 
Transnational NGOs as Agents of Change: Toward Understanding Their Governance, Leadership, and 
Effectiveness) and the Transnational NGO Initiative at the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at Syracuse 
University.  
2
 The dataset can be obtained by visiting http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/.  
3
 For more detailed information see: (Hermann et al., 2010) 
4
 The NCCS cautions their data be interpreted cautiously, however, due to reporting inaccuracies and other technical 
issues.  
5
 The calculation is based on average expenditure data from sampled organizations‘ IRS Forms 990 for the period 
2001-2006 and raw NCCS data for the year 2007.  
6
 The Gini coefficient for revenue inequality in the population of international nonprofits in the 2007 database of the 
National Center for Charitable Statistics is 0.94, whereas that for the transnational NGO sample is 0.84. 
7
 However, it should be noted that the NCCS population contains many inactive organizations with zero or near-zero 
revenues, so the distribution is zero-inflated. 
8
 The initial sampling n was determined to enable meaningful statistical comparisons among subgroups. The 
ultimate sampling n reflects this and also budgetary considerations resulting from refusals and other factors.  
9
 The strata were defined by five sectoral, three size (budget) and four financial classifications derived from 
information provided by Charity Navigator (www.charitynavigator.org). The five sectors were human rights, 
sustainable development, conflict resolution, environment and humanitarian relief. The three categories of budget 
size were small (less than $1 million), medium ($1 million to $10 million) and large (greater than $10 million). The 
four financial classifications were based on Charity Navigator‘s organizational efficiency and capacity ratings, 
derived from information from IRS Forms 990. 
10
 The response rate of 68 per cent is calculated as the number of successful interviews from the original sample 
divided by the number of cases in the original sample or 123/182=0.68. 
11
 The author is grateful to Jay Magdison for confirming this interpretation.  
12
 These tests were exploratory and the results of are not reported owing to path dependencies in the clustering 
routine that make replication difficult. I used the average linkage method and Jaccard similarity measure using 
identical sets of response variables as with the corresponding finite mixture models. Concordance between HCA 
assignment solutions and finite mixture model assignment solutions, as measured by the ratio of concordant 
assignments to total assignments, was generally in the neighborhood of 70 to 90 percent, indicating strong technical 
validity.  
13
 The solutions are statistically associated (n = 106, chi2(4) = 133.89, p = 0.00) and concordance is 93/106 or 88 
percent.  
14
 L-squared p-values are obtained using a parametric bootstrap procedure. Delta L
2
 p-values and response variable 
p-values are obtained from -2LL difference tests using a parametric bootstrap procedure. 
15
 Coder 3‘s chi-squared contribution is 6.6/12.26=54%, n = 116, chi2(4) = 12.26, p = 0.02. 
16
 The -2LL difference test p-value = 0.11. 
17
 Analogous models Model1 and Model2 both contain local dependencies. The analogous model Model3 (L
2
 = 
30.57, p = 0.37) provides adequate model fit and does not contain any local dependencies. Increasing the number of 
latent classes to four does not significantly improve model fit (ΔL2 p-value = 0.46). Again, a 3-class model is 
preferred. Profile parameter estimates are identical in direction, although not in magnitude, leading to the same 
substantive interpretation of the results.  
18
 An examination of the p-values for Model3 reveals that evaluation least significantly contributes to model fit, 
indicating that most respondents associate evaluation with effectiveness regardless of latent type. Indeed, the coding 
did not distinguish between different types of evaluation, such as financial and programmatic, which appear to 
define the clusters. Eliminating the effect of this single variable immediately lowers the L-squared bootstrap p-value 
for the null model well below the conventional threshold (L-squared = 112.40, p = 0.01), confirming the dilution 
interpretation noted above. Re-estimated latent class models with evaluation included as an inactive covariate 
generate a virtually identical set of solutions, pointing to a virtually identical 3-class model as the preferred solution. 
Thus, to simplify exposition Model3 may still be regarded as the preferred model. 
19
 The three lines inside the triangle intersect the three axes to indicate the latent class probabilities for outcome 
accountability (Cluster1), overhead minimization (Cluster2) and outliers (Cluster3). These correspond to the 
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estimated relative sizes of the three groups. The three lines converge at the point of zero coder bias, indicated by a 
small triangle toward the bottom left corner of the diagram. Coders 1, 2, 3 and 5 are all very near to this point and do 
not appear to be significantly biased. They are clustered along the horizontal axis with similar propensities toward 
outcome accountability (greater than 0.8), overhead minimization (less than 0.2) and outliers (close to 0.0). Turning 
to coder 4, we see the nature and direction of the bias. Coder 4 has the only significantly positive propensity toward 
the outlier group (close to 0.2). Coder 4‘s lower propensity toward outcome accountability and higher propensity 
toward overhead minimization can also be seen. 
20
 Coder 4 accounts for 23.00/28.38 = 81 percent.  
21
 Although even the reduced bias borders on significance (chi2(4) = 9.75, p = 0.045). 
22
 The residual significance is due almost entirely to coder 4‘s relative propensity toward overhead minimization and 
aversion toward outcome accountability. Again, although the table is poorly populated, coder 4 appears to be 
responsible for about 80 percent of the chi-squared statistic‘s magnitude. After modal classification and outlier 
removal, about 85 percent of respondents are categorized as having defined effectiveness as outcome accountability 
and about 15 percent as having defined it as overhead minimization. If coder 4 were eliminated altogether, the 
proportions would adjust to about 89 percent and 11 percent respectively [146 – 22 = 124; (124 – 14)/124, (22 – 
8)/124], indicating the maximum extent of coder 4‘s influence. Regardless of coder 4‘s residual bias, the substantive 
interpretation remains the same.  
23
 Statistical significance is determined by -2LL difference tests using a parametric bootstrap procedure. 
24
 More accurately, the conditional probabilities are the probabilities that the transcripts contained qualitative 
evidence justifying application of the corresponding codes.  
25
 All tests are performed at the conventional 0.05 level. The categories of sector are environment, human rights, 
humanitarian relief, sustainable development and conflict resolution (chi2(4)=2.70, p=0.61). The categories Charity 
Navigator‘s efficiency ratings are low (1 and 2 stars) and high (3 and 4 stars, chi2(1)=0.00, p=0.99). The categories 
of Charity Navigator‘s capacity ratings are low (1 and 2 stars) and high (3 and 4 stars, chi2(1)=2.68, p=0.10). The 
categories of function are advocacy, service and both (chi2(3)=2.85, p=0.42). The categories of headquarters 
location are New York, NY, Washington, DC, Boston, MA, the West, the South and the Midwest (chi2(5)=5.16, 
p=0.40). The categories of respondent‘s gender are male and female (chi2(1)=2.67, p=0.10). The categories of 
tenure at current organization are measured in years: 0-1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, and 10 or more (chi2(5)=8.80, p=0.12). 
The categories of respondent‘s country of citizenship are US citizen and other citizenship (chi2(1)=1.68, p=0.20).  
26
 The chi-squared contribution of this cell is 6.1/9.11=0.67.  
27
 When asked about accountability, leaders were most likely to feel accountable to donors. 
28
 The L-squared p-value for the null model is 0.13, providing adequate model fit. Subsequent model specifications 
failed to discover meaningful structure in the data, as model fit actually deteriorated with additional classes. 
29
 The leader‘s PMP is provided in chapter ten for his or her membership in the human rights activism cluster. This 
may differ from the leader‘s PMP in the material amelioration cluster from chapter four.  
30
 EM switches to Newton-Raphson after a tolerance criterion is met. 
31
 For an evaluation of the software‘s performance (Latent GOLD), see: (Haughton, Legrand, & Woolford, 2009) 
